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


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
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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

JOWETT



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THE
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
*WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS
ESSAYS, NOTES AND INDICES*

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
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NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

I. I.

ἀπειδὴ πάσων πόλεων κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

Whereas all communities aim at some good,
the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

τὰς τέχνην καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος δρμοῖς δὲ πρᾶξις καὶ προαιρεσίς ἀγαθοῦ ποτὲ ἐφίσταται δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφίρατο τάγαδὸν οὐ πάτερ ἐψίλει.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, *πάντες δύνανται τοῦ εἰδέναι δρύγανται φύσει;* and the Posterior Analytics, *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητική εἰς προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γένεσις.*

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: ‘But a community is a complex organisation;’ Or, ‘But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;’ Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;—

'We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.'

1. 2. "Οσοι μὲν οὖν οἰονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle's enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politicus, 259 C, φανέρων ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἔστι ταῦτα· ταῦτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1-5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2-8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἡ τῶν ιδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

1. 2. οἷον μὲν μᾶλλον ἀλιγών. Sc. ἄρχων ἦ, or ἄρχη.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ.

1. 2. καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,
sc. τὸν ἄρχοντα λέγουσι.

1. 2. τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης,

sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικὸν which follows:—'According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.' Cp. i. 8. § 7, θάλατταν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained from διεισις which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη εἴησις, where τοιαύτη (meaning 'in the sense of a bare livelihood') is gathered from αἱρέψις and μὴ δὲ ἀλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δεῖ δὲ τοιαύτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ πειθεῖσιν; where τοιαύτους, meaning 'disunited,' is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἢ τοις γὰρ οἵσται φιλία κοινῶν δύνεται τὸν τέκνων καὶ τὸν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, δεῖ μὲν εὖσι ἐξ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ σωματάραι τὴν τοιαύτην πολεμίαν, where the

idea of an 'imperfect' state, like that contained in Plato's Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον.

1. 3.

i. e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσαμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μίρος τε ἡν.

ὑφηγημένην, 'which we have followed,' not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but 'generally' or 'in this discussion.' The *μέθοδος*, like the *λόγος* in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ὅστερ γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀντικεῖται 1. 3.
διαιρέειν (ταῦτα γάρ ἀλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), τύτῳ καὶ πολιτῷ ἐξ ὧν
σύγκειται σκοποῦντες δύφορεβα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ἥρθεντων.

τούτοις may either refer 1) to *ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται*, i. e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by *περὶ ἔκαστος τῶν ἥρθεντων*, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to *τούτων* cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of 'the kinds of rule' in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

αἱ, according to the first explanation= 'as about the state so about the elements of the state,' according to the second, = 'about kinds of government as well as about other things.' *ὅστερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις .. αἱ περὶ τούτων* is repeated or resumed in *ὅστερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αἱ περὶ τούτων* at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e. g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human

frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (*Rep.* v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (*infra* c. 2. § 13).

2. 1. *εἰ δή τις ἔξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φύσιμα βλέψειν, διπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κἀλλοις' ἀν οὕτω θεωρήσειν.*

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e. g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

2. 2. *καὶ ἐν . . . φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἄφεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλατεῖν ἔτερον.*

Aristotle, like Plato (*Symp.* 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; *De Gen. Anim.* i. c. 23.

2. 2. *ταῦτα ποιεῖν,*

sc. τὰ προορώμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχόντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

2. 3. *τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν.*

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the *ἀβελισκαλύχητον* mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as *λαμβάνοντα ἵμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν*, ‘having an iron part added to it in front.’ The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the *Proverbiorum Centuria*, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, *Commentatio de Machaera Delphica*, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

2. 4. *τὸ φύει ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, . . . γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αἵτινα δοῦλος καὶ δοῦλοι.*

‘Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.’ Cp. *infra*, cc. 12, 13.

‘οἰκον μὲν πράτιστα γυναικά τε βοῦν τ’ ἀροτῆρα·’

2. 5.

Compare Wallace’s Russia (p. 90. ed. 8). ‘The natural labour unit (i. e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.’

εἰς πάσων ἡμέραν.

2. 5.

‘For wants which recur every day,’ and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.

δμοκάπτους.

2. 5.

‘Sitting in the smoke of one fire’ is read by MSS. of the better class, P⁴, L¹, corr. Mb, William de Moerbek; δμοκάπτους by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word ‘fed at the same manger’ is better suited to the context.

ἴ δέ εκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κάμη. 2. 5.

There was a time when the κάμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ή γενῶν καὶ κοινῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκειας), and Thucydides, i. 5 : ib. 10 (πατὰ κόρας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθεῖσης, sc. τῆς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Aetolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. To be taken with the words which follow: ‘When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.’

μελιστὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ζειτονή πάμη δρουεῖα εἰδίας εἶναι· οὐκεὶ καλοῦσί 2. 6.
τινες δρουεῖλακτος, παιδές τε καὶ παιδίσκοι παιδές.

‘The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.’ (There should be a comma in the Greek after δρουεῖλακτος; the words παιδές τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with αὐλοῖσιν, being really an explanation of δρουεῖα.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression δρουεῖα εἰδίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quae propagatio et sibiles origo est rerum publicarum.'

διμογάλακτες, a rare term for γενῆται or φράτερες.

2. 6. διδ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων γάρ συνῆλθον. πάσα γάρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάρου, διστε καὶ αἱ ἀποκλιταὶ διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτο ὅτιν δ λέγει "Ομήρος,

θεμιστεῖς δὲ ἄκαστος

παιδῶν ηδὲ ἀλόχων."

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αἴτοι οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· δισπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιώσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευμένων γάρ συνῆλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts

have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κώμη (*γένος*) to one another,' or 'to the original *oikia*'.

'*θεμοτείνει δὲ ἔκαστος παιδῶν ηδ' ἀλόχων.*'

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in *Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13*, *κυκλωπικῶς θεμοτείνων παιδῶν ηδ' ἀλόχουν.*

ὅπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιῶνται οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὗτοι καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

τέλειος πόλις.

2. 8.

Opposed to *πρώτη* (§ 5).

γνωμένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἐπεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν.

2. 8.

'The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.'

οὖσα partly derives its meaning from *γνωμένη*, 'having a true being' opposed to 'coming into being' (cp. *οὐσία* and *γένεσις*).

ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν.

2. 8.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this transcendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the *oikia*, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the *oikia* as prior to the state and more necessary (*μέτερος καὶ διαγενέστερος οἰκία πόλισσα*). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 & 26.

εἶτας καὶ εἰ πρότερος οὐσίας.

2. 8.

'If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.' But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

2. 9. τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις.

i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word *φύσις*, which is not applicable to the state.

2. 10. φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, διε περ ἀξυξ ὡν δοκερ ἐν πετροῖς.

Lit. 'For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.'

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives 'sicut in volatilibus') reads πετρωοῖς. πετροῖς is the reading of one late MS., πετροῖς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἀξυξ occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our back-gammon; the game is not however called πετροί, nor does the description answer to the game of πετροί. The word ἀξυξ, when applied to a game, may mean either 'exposed' or 'blocked,' and so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πετρωοῖς, ἀξυξ might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παρὸς ἀγελαῖον ζειν in the next sentence.

But neither *διε πετροῖς* nor *ἐν πετρωοῖς* can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ἀξυξ ἀν, alteration into ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνω) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ἀξυξ is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

2. 11. διότι.

Either 1) **why,' or 2) 'that.' In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—'Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.'

2. 12. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία πολὺς αἰδεῖς καὶ πόλις.

τούτων, sc. 'of these perceptions,' or rather 'of those who have these perceptions.' For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ.

2. 12.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is *φύσει πρότερον*, but the family *χρόνῳ πρότερον*. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαφθαρέσσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαῦτη.

2. 13.

Referring either 1) to *δύναμίς* :—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (*διαφθαρέσσα*) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *to *δυνάμεις λιθίνῃ* ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

ὅτι μὲν εὖ η̄ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον δὲ ἔκαστος, δῆλος εἰ γὰρ μὴ 2. 14.
εἰπάρεται ἔκαστος χωρισθείς, δροῖσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ δῶλον.

This is a resumption of the words; *καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ.* in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

δοῦτε δὲ οὐρίας δὲ θεός.

2. 14.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

φύσις μὲν εὖ δὲ δρμός.

2. 15.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.

2. 16. δὸς ἀνθρώπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τάνακτια
ἔστι χρῆσθαι μᾶλιστα.

1) *ὅπλα ἔχων = ὄπλισμένος, the words φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of φρόνησις and ἀρετή as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished φρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινότης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become φρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανουργία) and ἀρετή, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere φυσικὴ ἀρετή (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, as δρμαὶ τινες ἀνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ἀνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φάνονται οὖσαι, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate 'Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments *for* wisdom and virtue'; i.e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into φρόνησις and ἀρετή, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of 'for' after ὅπλα ἔχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with φύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὅπλα ἔχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that 'man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.'

Ἐνī τέλεστια ἔστι χρῆσθαι μᾶλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6.

§ 7, ἔλαττον δὲ θηριώτης κακίας φοβερότερον δέ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακά ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἄδειας καὶ οἱ τάγαθά, οἱ δὲ ταῦτη τύχοσι βινέτες σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις αὐδὲν μέγα αἰδεῖσσος αὐδένα οὔτε ἴδιωτην οὔτε πολὺ δρᾶ.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς καινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ 2. 16.
δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

'But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.'

In this passage δίκη is the 'administration of justice': δικαιοσύνη, 'the virtue of justice': τὸ δίκαιον, 'the principle of justice to be applied in each case.'

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν αὐθις οἰκία συνιστάται· οἰκία δὲ τέλεως ἐκ 3. 1.
δούλων καὶ ἀλευθέρων.

αὐθις = 'in turn.' 'As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.' Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δεσποτική καὶ γαμική (διάσωμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικός καὶ ἄνθρος 3. 2.
σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτος τεκνοτοιχική.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμική and τεκνοτοιχική. In ordinary Greek they would have meant 'of or referring to marriage,' and 'to the procreation of children': here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theat. 182 A, where he calls πενόης an ἀλλότερος θύρα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκεῖον δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where περιποίησις is used for what is here called τεκνοτοιχική. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2,

3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. 1. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀναισθησία, upon the anonymous mean of φιλοτιμία and φίλοτιμία, upon ἀφροδίτια the excess of courage, and upon δύναμις δόριστον, ρήμα δόριστον, δάριστος ἀρχή.

3. 2. Ιστωσαν δέ αὐται τρεῖς ἀς εἴπομεν.

'Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.' Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if *ai* were inserted before *τρεῖς*: 'let there be those three.'

3. 4. τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσποτέειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

ἐν γάρ τι τοῖς δοῦλοισιν αἰσχύνη φίρει
τοῦτο μα· τὰ δέ ἀλλα πάντα τὰν ἀλευθέρων
οὐδεὶς κακῶν δοῦλος, δοτις ἐσθλὸς γέ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακὸς γάρ δοτις μὴ σύβει τὰ δεσποτῶν
καὶ ἔνγγύγηθε καὶ ἔπιεδίνει κακοῖς.
ὅγε μὲν εἴη, καὶ πέφυχ' ὑμῶν λάτρις,
ἐν τοῖς γενναιοῖσιν ἡριθμημένος
δοῦλοισι, τοῦτομ' οὐκ ὅχειν ἀλευθέρων
τὸν νοῦν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δοῦλοις γάρ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτομ' οὐ διαφέρει
παλλοὶ δὲ δμάνοντες εἰσὶ τὰν ἀλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobaeum,—

οὐδὲ δοῦλος γέ τις, οὐδὲν ἄττα, δέσποτα,
ἀδρανεῖς αὐτὸς δοτις, δὲ ἀδρανεῖς γέ.

ib. fr. 39,—

οὐδὲ δοῦλος δοτις, σάρκα τὴν αἰτήν ὅχει
φύσει γάρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἔγειρθε ποτέ
ἡ δὲ τύχη τὸ σώμα κατεδουλάσσει.

3. 4. Βίαιος γάρ.

Either 1) * = παρὰ φύσιν or simply 2) 'brought about by violence'; βίᾳ may be opposed either to φύσις or νόμος or both.

Δοτερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖν ἀν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ 4. I.
οἰκεία δρυαν, εἰ μὲντει ἀποτελεσθήσεται τὸ ἔργον, οὐτω καὶ τῶν
οἰκονομικῶν.

The first six words δοτερ . . . τέχναις are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δέ; and for the omission of both δέ and ἄ.

Retaining Bekker's reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ἐπεὶ οὖν begin with καὶ ή κτητική; or 2) δέ after δοτερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ἐπεὶ in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26 ἐπεὶ γὰρ δ μὲν κατηγορῶν δέ εἰκότων διαδείκνυσσιντα). If we omit δέ, the apodosis still begins with δοτερ.

ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 δ γὰρ βάναντος τεχνίτης ἀφερισμένην ταῦτα ἔχει δουλεῖαν.

Instead of Bekker's reading οὐτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν another reading οὐτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) 'sic et yconomico.' But τῷ οἰκονομικῷ is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. οἰκεία δρυαν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

καὶ δοτερ δρυαν πρὸ δρυάνων.

4. 2.

Not 'instead of' but 'taking precedence of':—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρὸ cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δοῦλος πρὸ δεῖλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου. So the hand is spoken of as δρυαν πρὸ δρυάνων (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

οἱ γὰρ ἥδιστοι κ.τ.λ.

4. 3.

The connexion is as follows:—'There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.'

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4. 4. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὅργανα ποιητικὰ ὅργανά ἔστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κεράδος ἔτεράν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς εἰλίης ἡ χρήσις μάρον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both *κτήματα* and *ὅργανα* should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλούτος ὅργάνων πλήθες ἔστω οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an *ὅργανον*: ‘there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the *instrument* of doing something’). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the ‘instrument preceding instruments’ (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12-14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

4. 5. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ πολησίς ἔστω· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ἵπηρέτης τῶν πρᾶξεων πρᾶξιν.

‘Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master’s life.’

4. 5. τὸ γὰρ μάριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἔστι μάριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάριον ἄλλον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τάκον, ὃν δε γε πράξεων καὶ μὴ χωρισθῆ, δυνατὸν μάριον εἶναι.

4. 5. μάριος ἔστενον.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave’s individuality is lost in his master.

5. 1. τῷ λόγῳ θεωρήσεις καὶ ἐκ τῶν γνωρίσμάν πεπερασθέν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and

facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the 'long and difficult language of facts.' The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them 'any more than between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.'

εἰδὸς ἐκ γενετῆς.

5. 2.

'From their very birth,' or, with a logical turn, 'to go no further than the state of birth'; cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τοῦτο εἰδὸς ὑφίγγηται περὶ τὴν φυχήν and infra § 4, τὸ δὲ ζῆσθαι πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.

ἔπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει, τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, οὗτοι τι τούτων ἔργον.

5. 3.

'As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.'

εἰτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτ' ἐκ διῃρημένων.

5. 3.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τῆς ἀράρης φύσεως ἀντάρχει τοῖς ἀμφότοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐτο 5. 4.
τοῖς μὲν μετόχουσι τοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἀρχήι, οἷος ἀρρενίας.

1) The connexion is as follows: 'This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them.' It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate' (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or διά is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. 'Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings' (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation,

the addition of *μᾶλιστα* after *ἐνυπόρχει*, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

οὗτον ἀρμονίας.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,' or 2) 'as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The first accords best with the common meaning of the word *ἀρμονία* and with the use of the genitive.

5. 4. *ἔξωτερικανέρας.*

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of *ἔξωτερικοι λόγοι*.

5. 4. *τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, διὸ τὸ μὲν ἀρχὸν ἔστι φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον.*

i. e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by *δὲ* in *τὸ δὲ ζῷον* is as follows: 'not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For *πρῶτον* (which is to be taken with *συνέστηκεν*) meaning either 'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. *πρῶτον* *ἐν ζῷῳ θεωρήσας* infra § 6, and the similar use of *εἰδὴν supra* § 2.

5. 5. *δεῖ δὲ σκοτεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντις μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις.*

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

5. 6. *ἴστη δ' οὖν διστερ λέγομεν.*

A resumption of the words *τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον* above.

5. 6. *ἢ μὴ γάρ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.*

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

5. 7. *τυγχάνει γάρ σωτηρίας οὐτος.*

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 *ἀρχὸν δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν.*

εῖτερ καὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους.

5. 8.

— I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for *τὸν πολιτικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς*, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

Θεὸς καὶ ἀλλού ἔστιν.

5. 9.

‘Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.’

τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ἥπα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ· καὶ ἡ 5. 9.
χρεία δὲ παραλλάσσει μικρόν.

‘The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.’

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in noting the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

*Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν 5. 10.
Διατέβερεν καὶ τῶν δοῦλων, τὰ μὲν Ισχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρήσιν, τὰ δὲ
ἄρδεν καὶ ἀχρηστά πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν
βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηγημένος εἰς τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν
εἰρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοιαυτίσιν, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν
Διατέβερεν τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς.*

‘Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen.’ that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring *τοὺς μὲν* to the freemen and *τοὺς δὲ* to the slaves: ‘the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i. e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.’

Διατέβερεν must be taken both with *σώματα* and *ψυχάς*.

Βούλεται expresses, first of all, ‘intention’ or ‘design’; secondly, ‘tendency.’ The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of *βούλεται* Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, *βούλεται μέντος μᾶλλον*, sc. τὸ νόμον, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general

thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), *οὐποτε δουλείη κέφαλον ιδεῖα πέφυκεν* | *ἀλλ' αἰεὶ σκολεῖ,* καύχένα λοξὸν ἔχει.

5. II. *ἀλλ' οὐχ δμοῖς ράβδοιν ιδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς καλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.*

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

5. II. *ὅτι μὲν τοῖν τοῖν εἰστι φύσει τὰς διὰ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἵ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν*
*οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ are not subdivisions of τὰς, which is itself parti-
 tive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two con-
 structions; 1) τὰς μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τὰς δὲ δοῦλοι; and 2) οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθε-
 ροί οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι. In other words the construction beginning with
 τὰς has varied into οἱ μὲν—οἱ δὲ.*

6. 2. *ἄστερ ρήγορα γράφονται παραβάων.*

‘But a covention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure. The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, *νόμος γάρ δι πάσισ τινέστεροι δίδιός ἔστιν, ὅταν παλεμουντεν πόλις ἀλφ, τῶν ἐλάστων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σύμματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα.*

6. 3, 4. *αἴτιος δὲ ταῦτα τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ δι τοιαὶ τοῦδε λόγους ἐπαλλάτ-
 ται, ὅτι τρόποι ταῦτα ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιβλεσθεα δίνεται
 μέλιστα, καὶ οὗτοι δεὶ τὸ κριτοῦν ἐν ἀπεργῇ δημοσίᾳ ταῦτα, θοτε δοκεῖν μὴ
 έσσεν ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὴν βίαιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαιού μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβή-
 τησον. Διὰ γάρ τούτο τοῖς μὲν οὕτους δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον τῶν, τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸ-
 τούτῳ δίκαιοις, τὸ τὸν κριτέοντα ἄρχοντα, οἷς διαστάτων γε χωρὶς τούτων
 τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ Ισχυρὸν οὐδὲ ξενοντα οὐδὲ εἰδεῖσθαι περοι λόγοι, ὡς τὸ δεῖ
 τὸ βέλτιον καὶ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ διεπιβάνειν.*

δι τοιαὶ τοῦδε λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, *ἔμεσον στολῆσσος* | *πενίπατ*.

λέξεως (Il. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ' εἰδη δύο μὲν διεῖλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν τις αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—ταῦτα γάρ συνδυαζόμενα τοιεὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, διότε ἀριστοκρατίας τε δηγαρχίας εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικότερας. See also infra c. 9. § 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue. Cp. Plat. Rep. i. 352 ff.

Διὸ γάρ τούτῳ, ε.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτου τὸν λόγον in § 4 refers, not to the τοὺς λόγους of § 3, but to the two positions which immediately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second, that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the connexion between *ēperī* and *βία*; the point in dispute being whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4). If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: ‘but there is no force or plausibility in this’ [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong conviction, which is repeated again and again in the *Politics*, that the superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: ‘There are others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the war may be unjust, and the persons may be ‘nature’s freemen,’ and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable; and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror is invalid.

The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of δὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is εὐνοία a) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or b) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεῖον, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)? The thesis that 'justice is benevolence' is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words διαστάτων χωρὶς = a) 'being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,' or b) 'being set aside?' Both uses of διαστάσθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, δέ τὰ στοιχία (sc. of Empedocles) διαστήκει χωρὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ νεκρού, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words ἀρέποι λόγοι refer a) to one of the two preceding propositions, or b) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of 'the latter,' or 'one of these two propositions.' It is better to translate 'the other view,' which is explained by what follows, ὡς οὐ δεῖ κατ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is εὐνοία. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1–3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and φιλία: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

6. 5. διλογίδες δὲ διατεχνητοί τοις, δέ οἱονται, δικαιοῖς τινέσ·

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' 'Οἱονται may be taken either 1) with τιθέσθαι, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with διατεχνητοί, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

6. 5. διμιοὶ δὲ οἱ φιλοι·

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are.

compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

*τήν τε γάρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸ 6. 5.
ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἢ φαῖ τις δοῦλον εἶναι.*

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1)* the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ τὸν βαρβάρους. 6. 6.

Cp. Xen. Hell. i. 6. § 14, κελευστῶν τῶν ξυμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τὸν Μηδικαλόντος οὐκ ἔφη [δὲ Καλλικράτης] ἐπιτοῦ γε ἀρχοτος οὐδένα ‘Ελλέρων εἰς τὸ ἑκένον δυνατὸν ἀδρανοδισθῆναι, and Plat. Rep. v. 469 B, C, where Plato indignantly prohibits Hellenes from becoming the owners of other Hellenes taken in war.

διόπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησί. 6. 7.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, περίστεγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, Εἰς τοῖς λεπτὸν ἡράβησεν; τίνες δέων οὐ τετίμησεν, διὸ ἡ πόλις νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, οὐ γάρ εἴ τι λογικῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἥδονῶν ἡγάπαται ἢ λυπῶν, θεωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγνωμασίαν, εἰ ἀντιτίνειν, διόπερ δὲ Θεοδέκτου φιλοστήτης ὅπερ τοῦ ἔχεις πεπληρώματος, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

*ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο λέγουσι, οὐδεὶς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακὸς διερίζουσι τὸ 6. 8.
δοῦλος καὶ διαίδερος.*

‘When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.’

ἢ δὲ φύεις βούλεται μὴ τοῦτο τοιούτον πολλάκις οὐ μέρος δίνεται. 6. 8.

Not ‘nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,’ for

she always intends it; nor 'nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,' which does violence to the order of the words πολλάκις οὐ μέντος: but 'this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,' πολλάκις adhering to both clauses.

6. 9. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τιὰ λόγοις η ἀμφισβήτησις.

ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάκτων φάσκοντες.

6. 9. καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι.

'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating *ὅτι*. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, *ὅτι μὲν τοῖν τοῖν εἰσι φύσει τοῖν οἱ μὲν δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν*: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words *εἰσι καὶ* are inserted before *οὐκ εἰσί* by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

6. 9. ἐν τοιούτοις διάφοραι τὸ τοιούτον, οὐ συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δούλευτον τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule'; οὐ is substituted for οὐτε, that it may be in regimen with τῷ μὲν.

6. 9. δούλοι καὶ δεσπόζειν.

'And consequently the master over his slaves' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

6. 10. δούλοι καὶ συμφέροντες δούλοι τοιούτοις φύλα δοῦλοι καὶ δεσπόζειν τρεῖς μᾶλλον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, § μὲν οὖν δοῦλος οὐκ δούλοι φύλα τρεῖς, § δὲ δεσπόζεις. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle's position.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων.

7. 1.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; 'From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,' is clearly proven.

ὅτι γὰρ ἔτερα ἔτερων κ.τ.λ.

7. 3.

'Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.' Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

δοῦλος πρὸς δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸς δεσπότου.

7. 3.

Aristotle clearly uses the word *πρὸς* in the sense of precedence as *supra* c. 4. § 2, *δρυκῶν πρὸς δρύσιν*. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics. 7. 5.

ἢ δὲ εἰπεῖν ἔτερα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμών τις αὐταὶ 7. 5. οὐρανικός.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 21) or hunting. The words *οἷον ἡ δικαία* imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, *ἢ γὰρ οὐρανικός μίρος εἰνῆς* [sc. τῆς εἰπεῖν], *ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς ἀνθράκους δοὺς αὐτούς δρυκῶν μὴ θέλουσα, ἢς φύσει δίδοσιν τούτων ὅτι τὰ πόλεμον*). The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of *οἷον* is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays,

'for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting ;' for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to *τις* is feeble ; but 'I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, s.v. οἰον.)

8. 1. δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ δ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν.

'We have been speaking (*ἥν*) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For *ὑφηγημένον* cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

8. 2. πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ή αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family ; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way ? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

8. 3. Δύτε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.= 'the question arises' or 'we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household ; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,' which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast *χρηματιστική* in all its branches with *οἰκονομική*, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause *δύτε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.* following as if *ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι* without *εἰ* had preceded. The words *ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ κ.τ.λ.* are to be repeated with *πότερον μέρος τι*.

8. 4. ἀλλὰ μήτε εἰδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς.

'The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making ?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.'

πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὴν τούτων.

8. 5.

τὰς ῥαστώνας κ.τ.λ. ‘For their convenience and the obtaining’; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, ‘for the opportunity of obtaining.’

τούτων. Sc. *καρποῦ, φράου,* understood from *ζεφόφαγα, καρποφάγα.*

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes 8. 6. that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, *Polit. Econ.*, Preliminary Remarks.

θελαττῶν τοιαύτην.

8. 7.

Sc. *συμφέρουσαν πρὸς ἀλιείαν.* Cp. note on c. 1. § 2.

αὐτόφερον.

8. 8.

Either 1)* ‘immediately obtained from the products of nature’ = *ἔξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως*, or 2) = *αὐτορυγόν*, ‘by their own labour.’

τὸν ἐνδείστατον βίον.

8. 8.

Bernays reads *ἐνδείστερον* without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (*ἐνδείστατον*) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

σκαλπροτοκή.

8. 10.

Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τὸν δὲ διαιρέον τὰ ὄντα σκαλπροτοκή. The term ‘vermiparous’ is not strictly correct: for all animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an egg.

τὴν τοῦ καλούρικον γῆλακτος φύσιν.

8. 10.

A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. § τῆς ἀγρίδος, τοῦ στέρρωτος, τῶν πετερρίων, φύσις, Hist. Animal. passim. (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

Δέστι δραστικές δέρας θτι μὲν γενομένους αἰρίσιν τὰ την φυτὰ τὸν γένος δένειν 8. 11. οἷς μὲν τελλαὶ ἔχει τὸν ἀνθρώπου χάρα, τὰ μὲν δέρατα μὲν δὲ τὴν χρήσιν μεί

διὰ τὴν τροφίν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλέοντα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἀλλης βοηθείας ἔνεκεν, ὥντα καὶ ἀσθῆτα καὶ ἀλλα δργανα γίνηται δέ αὐτῶν.

Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (*Politicus* 263 D) that 'a crane or some other intelligent animal' would have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. I., ch. vii.: 'It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.' Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to *κατὰ τὴν πρότην γένεσιν*, and *εἰδὸς καὶ τελεωθεῖσιν*: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Göttling and Bernays) *γεννήσιν*, which is found with a slight variation, *γεννήσια*, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has 'genitia.' For the use of *γεννήσια* = 'after they are born' cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 12. § 5, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιος (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γεννήσια τοῦ παιδεύθησαι.

8. 12. ἡ γὰρ ὄπρατος μίρος αἴτιος (sc. τῆς πολεμικῆς).

Cp. Plat. *Soph.* 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (*Primitive Property*, e. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἔστιν. 8. 13.

In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—‘one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.’

κατὰ φύσιν is equivalent to *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστι*, and is best taken, not with *οἰκονομικῆς* (Bernays) but with *κτητικῆς*, as is shown by the use of the words *infra* § 15: *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δί τῷ αἰτίᾳ, δῆλον.*

ὅτι δεῖ ήτοι ὑπάρχειν ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, ὃν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς & 13.
χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πολεων ἡ οἰκίας.

δεῖ is a confused expression referring grammatically to *ἐδος κτητικῆς* or *τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος*, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It is needless to read, with Bernays *καὶ δεῖ*, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

αὐτὴν refers to *κτητικὴ* or possibly to *φύσις*: the nominative to *ὑπάρχῃ* is either the same as to *ὑπάρχειν*, i. e. *δεῖ=κτήματα* understood from *ἐδος κτητικῆς*, or *θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων δέ ἔστι. πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖο,* the genitive *δέ* being substituted by attraction for the nominative *=ἔστις ὑπάρχῃ χρήματα δέ ἔστι θησαυρισμός.* It must be admitted that the words *δέ ἔστι* would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

πλούτου δὲ οὐδὲν τίρη πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κίται. 8. 14.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, *ἀνθρώπουν* for *ἀνδράσι κίται*.

πλούτου γέρε διπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις. 8. 15.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) *πλούτην* understood=*τῇ τέχνῃ τοῦ πλούτου*: or 2) *τοῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις* may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely=‘in the other arts’: or 3) *τῇ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικῇ* may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

οὐδὲν γέρε δρύαντα διπερον οὐδεμιᾶς δοτὶ τέχνης εἴτε πλέθεισι οὐτε μεγίστη, 8. 15.
δέ δὲ πλούτου δρύαντα πλήθες δοτὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.

Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὃς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶσαν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, 'the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.'

8. 15. δὶς τὴν αἰτίαν.

Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

9. 1. δὶς τὴν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας.

'Owing to which,' or 'to the nature of which,' 'there appears to be no limit,' etc.

9. 1. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲν φύσει οὐδὲν φύσει.

So Plato divides κτητική into θηρευτική and ἀλλακτική, Soph. 223 ff.

9. 2. ἑκάστου κτήματος διττὴ η χρήσις.

Cp. Adam Smith's 'Value in use' and 'Value in exchange'; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

9. 4. δύον γὰρ ίκανάν αὐτοῖς.

Sc. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

9. 5. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκουάνοντων πάτερ, οἱ δὲ κοχυρωμένοι πολλῶν πόλεων καὶ ἔτρεψαν ἐν ταχὺ τὰς δεήσεις ἀνθρακίων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.

Bernays inserts ἄτρεψαν before ἔτρεψαν, which he would translate 'different persons want different things;' and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κοχυρωμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:—1) 'In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same': or 2) *καὶ ἔτρεψαν* may be taken more simply: 'they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well'; i. e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The

word ἀκοινόντων = καὶ εἰχον is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like εἰχον or ἐκτόντο is wanted.

For αὐτομορφέμενος compare ii. 2. § 3, Διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιώντῳ καὶ πάλις θνῶν δταν μὴ καὶ κόμας δτοις κεχωρισμένοις τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἴοντος Αρκάδες.

οἱ μέν, sc. οἱ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, ‘mankind in the first stage of society’; οἱ δέ, sc. πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὖσης further explained by αὐτομορφέμενοι, ‘mankind after their dispersion.’

τὸ in the words which follow is to be connected with τὰς προσδόσεις.

καὶ τὸν βαρβαρικὸν ιθνῶν.

9. 5.

καὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause ‘As moreover some barbarian nations still do.’ There is no need to introduce νῦν after καὶ without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

εἰς ἀπαλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας.

9. 6.

Lit. ‘to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;’ or ‘to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,’ = εἰς ἀπαλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔρδειας δοτε αὐτόρες εἶναι.

καὶ λόγον. ‘In a natural way’; ‘as might be expected.’

9. 7.

ξεινιστήρας γυνομάνης τῆς βαρβαρίας.

9. 7.

‘When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,’ etc.

δεῖ λαζαρεῖσθαι ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπορίσθη χρήσις.

9. 7.

‘Of necessity there arose a currency.’

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 371 B, νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ὄντα. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 11, οἷον δέ, ὅπεραλλαγη τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε πατὴ συνδέσμος.

δὲ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸν εἰχε τὸν χρείαν εὑμεταχειρίστος.

9. 8.

‘Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,’ although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (λίπος); see § 11.

παρεθάντος οὖν φύη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαῖας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδες 9. 9.
τῆς χρηματοποιῆς ἀγέντος, τὸ καπηλακόν, τὸ μὲν πρώτου δελέον ίσως γνω-

μενον, εἴτα δὲ ἐξ' ἐμπειρίας δὴ τεχνικότερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει τέρδος.

Θάτερον εἶδος, i.e. 'other' than what Aristotle before called *τὸς οὐργοῦς* (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from *καπηλική*. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that *καπηλική*, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on *δὲ ἐμπειρίας*.

9. 11. For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90-145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

9. 12. *τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πίρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.*

Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

9. 13. *καὶ διπέρος δὴ οὐρος δὲ πλούτος.*

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there is a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word *πίρας*, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to the infinite or indefinite *ἄπειρος*, and (2) 'end' as opposed to 'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money-making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

Δοκερ γὰρ οὐ λαρυγή τοῦ ὕγιαντος εἰς ἀπειρόν ἔστι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν 9. 13. τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσας), οὗτος καὶ πεντης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ δ τοιοῦτος πλούτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις.

'The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

τῆς δὲ εἰσαρμοστῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς εἰσαρμοστῆς ζητεῖται.

Lit. 'the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. δ τοιοῦτος πλούτος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.'

διαλλέγεται γὰρ οὐ χρῆντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα διατίπα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. 9. 15.

'For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.'

ἢ χρῆντος governs both τῆς χρηματιστικῆς and τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The emendation of Bernays διατίπα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς is unnecessary.

9. 15. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτῆσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτά, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἔπειρον τέλος, τῆς δὲ ἡ αἴρησις.

χρήσεως κτῆσις. 'For acquisition belongs to the same use of *χρηματιστική*,' i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

9. 16. οἵσαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν ἐπιθύμουνται, τὸ πρός τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦνται, φῶτ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (*τοῦτον*) depend on wealth. Cp. τοῦτο, § 15, referring to *χρηματιστική*.

9. 17. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος.

I. e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

10. 1. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ή οὐ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ ἀπορούμενον see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2.

τοῦτο, sc. τὰ χρήματα, understood from *χρηματιστική* as infra § 3. τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν refers to τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ δεῖ is the other alternative of the *ἀντρία*, implying the answer to the question: 'whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.'

10. 1. οὐτεργά γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ η πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήπαις αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῖναι γῆν ηθικατταν η ἀλλο τι.

The last words *γῆν ηθικατταν η ἀλλο τι* are either 1) * in apposition with *τὴν φύσιν*, or 2) accusatives after *παραδοῖναι*. In the first case *γῆν* and *θικατταν* are an explanation of *τὴν φύσιν*. In the second case *τροφὴν* is a remote accusative, 'nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.' The latter way of taking the words is

forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δέ, ταῦτα διαθέναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον.

10. 1.

ἐκ τούτων, 'thereupon,' i.e. ἐκ τοῦ λαβέν παρὰ φύσεως; ταῦτα διαθέναι, 'to order them,' i.e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or *ἐκ τούτων=from what is given by nature.'* *ταῦτα διαθέναι,* 'to set in order,' i.e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.

καὶ γάρ ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις.

10. 2.

'Were this otherwise' (as in the translation) i.e. 'if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.'

καὶ περὶ ὑγείας.

10. 3.

About health as well as about wealth.

μᾶλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δέ τινες τοῦτο ἐπάρχειν.

10. 3.

τοῦτο refers to some general idea, such as 'the means of life,' to be gathered from *τὰ χρήματα* in the preceding sentence.

παστὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὐ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἔστω.

10. 3.

τὸ λειπόμενον=τὸ λειπόμενον ἐξεινώς ἐξ οὐ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i.e. milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, φύεται . . . ἐξ οὐ γίγνεται τὸ γυνόμενον (ἥτος ἐξ μαρίου τῆς μρχήν, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τροφὴ τῷ γυνόμενῷ δεῖται: and supra c. 8. § 10.

Θεὸς αὐτὰς φύεται δοτὸν ἡ χρηματοτοκὴ πάσων ἀπὸ τῶν παρτῶν καὶ τῶν 10. 4.
(φύεται).

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (δοτός), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

δέ δὲ τάκης γίνεται νόμοσμα τομίσματος.

10. 5.

Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, τοῦτο δέ οὖθ' ὁ τάκος τι θηρίον; Theasm. 845,
δέ τοι γενεῖται τάκης τακούσια τακούτοις τάκοις.

Cp. also Shakspere's Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—‘A breed of barren metal.’


It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E; Laws v. 742.

11. 1. τὰ τοιάντα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν δραγκαίαν.

i*) ‘To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.’ In modern language ‘a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.’ Cp. infra § 5, περὶ ἀκίστον δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἰργαταὶ καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ καὶ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἔργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀνθετρίζειν: and iv. 15. § 4, διλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσιες οἵδεν ἂς εἰστεῖν· σὺ γάρ τε κρίσις γύγειον ἀμφισβητούστας περὶ τοῦ ἀκίστος· ἔχει δέ των ἀλληρῶν διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἀκίστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ὅπει τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι πεπαλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἀκίστον ἀλήθευταν.

Or again 2) ‘Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;’ i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e.g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμον πρὸς τὰς ἔργασίας supporting the second, φορτικὸν τὸ ἀνθετρίζειν the first. ἐμπειρίαν connects with δημιαρά which follows: ‘experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.’

SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF *κτητική*, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.



11. 3. πανεληρία, φορτηγία.

πανεληρία = 'commerce by sea,' φορτηγία = 'commerce by land.' The word πανεληρία may also be taken in the narrower sense of 'owning of ships'; and φορτηγία in the sense of 'carrying whether by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

11. 3. διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἔτερα ἐτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλειστοὶ πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ favours the more general application of the words.

11. 4, 5. οὐν ὄλογομά τε καὶ πάσα μεταλλευτικό. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἕδη περιεληφθεῖσαι· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευομένων ἔστε.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating 'the third or mixed kind of chrematistic,' which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἡδη, 'mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.'

11. 6, 7. εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικόταται μὲν τῶν ἔργων ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναστήσαται δὲ αἱ τὰ σώματα λαβάντα μᾶλιστα, δουλικόταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεισταὶ χρήσεις, ἀγαπήσαται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσθεῖ δρεπή. ἐτελὲ δὲ τούτοις ἔνοιαι γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἐτελὲ δὲ τούτοις skips the intervening passage εἰσὶ δὲ . . . ἀρετῆς, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle's Politics; e.g. iii. 4. §§ 11-13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, παραγόμενον τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εὑρημάνων ἴστορικὸν εἶναι.

οἷος Χάρης δῆ.

11. 7.

δῆ is to be taken with *οἷος* like *οἷος δῆ, οὗτος δῆ, καὶ δῆ* with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e.g. *καὶ πλουτῷ δῆ*, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλες τοῦ Μιλησίου.

11. 8.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. ‘But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.’

τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι δν.

11. 8.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

εἰπάλει μάνος, οὐ πολλήν ποιήσας ὑπερβολήν κ.τ.λ.

11. 11.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

δράμα Θάλεω.

11. 12.

δράμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of ‘idea’ here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

* *εύρημα* (Camerarius): *θεώρημα* (Coraes): *δράμα* (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 A.

ἔπει δὲ τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

12. 1.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that ‘all three parts are concerned with man’ is resumed in the next chapter.

καὶ γάρ γυναικὸς δρόχεων καὶ τίκτων.

12. 1.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either *ἢ μέρος οἰκονομῆς* or *εἴργηται αὐτὸν* from the preceding words.

δξ ίσου γάρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν. δρας δέ, 12. 2. δτει τὸ μὲν δρχῇ τὸ δ̄ δρχηται, [ητει διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, διστερ καὶ Ἀριστεις εἶναι τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδαρετῆρος λόγον.

Βούλεται sc. ἡ πολιτεία οτὶ πολιτειῇ δρχῇ, understood from *δὲ ταῖς πολιτείαις δρχαῖς*: ‘where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.’ The construction of *ζητεῖ* may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.

"Αμασίς, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: 'Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.'

12. 3. τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (*δεῖ*). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an 'aristocratical' than a 'constitutional' rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

13. 2. καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων.

Supply ἀρετή τις before τῶν ἀλλων—assisted by *οὐδεμίᾳ* in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, σκυτούμος δὲ οὐθέτις, οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλλων τεχνιτῶν. The words τῶν τοιούτων are used inaccurately 'of such habits,' meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

**13. 5. ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταῦτης δὲναι διαφοράς, διπέρ
καὶ τῶν φύσει δρχομένων.**

'Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]'; or, with Bernays, 'corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,' cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert *ἀρχόντων* καὶ before δρχομένων. Better: 'There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.'

13. 6. καὶ τοῦτο εἰδὼς ὑφίγγεται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.

1) '*And this is immediately suggested by the soul': or 2) 'And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.' There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb *ὑφίγγεται* in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz,

'and this distinction was indicated in the soul.' Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, δῆλον ὅτι καθάπερ ίψήγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτέον. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2-6.

ὅστε φύσει τὰ πλεία ἀρχόντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γάρ τρόπον τὸ ἔλει- 13. 6-8.
Θερον τοῦ δούλου ἀρχεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀρρεν τοῦ θῆλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσι
ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. οὐδὲν γάρ
δοῦλος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἀκυρον δὲ
πάσις ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἀτελέσ. δροίως τοινυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
ἡθικὰς ἀρτές.

By inserting ἔτει before φύσει, altering τὰ πλεία ἀρχόντα into τὰ πλεία τὰ ἀρχόντα, and omitting ἀναγκαῖον before ἔχειν a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacoluthon seems more probable, and Bernays' alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words ἄλλος γάρ τρόπον go back to ταύτης εἴναι διαφοράς.

ὅστε φαστέον ὅτι ἔστιν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ 13. 9.
εἰνὴ συφροσύνη κ.τ.λ.

'Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.'

πεθάνειν γάρ οἱ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

13. 10.

In the Meno of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to

allow,—that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand, and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the *Meno* is intended.

13. 13. καὶ δὲ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει σκυτούμος δὲ οὐδείς.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan. The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of the modern operative with that of the mediaeval serf. We may note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household servant in England has received an impress from a master or mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from them.' Cp. iii. 5, § 4, τῶν δὲ ἀντράπαντος οἱ μὲν ἐν λεπτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κονιοί βάνανται καὶ θῆται, where, in a similar spirit, Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to the individual.

13. 14. ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσμοτικήν.

These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the slave in his particular employment;' i. e. it is not as the teacher of a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

13. 14. διὸ λέγουσσαν οὐ καλέσαι οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δοῦλους διοστεροῦντες καὶ

**Φάσκουτες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον νοιθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δοῦλους
ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.**

These words may mean: either 1)* ‘who do not allow us to converse with slaves,’ or 2) ‘who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.’ In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

**περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἔκαστον 13. 15.
αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς δμοίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς
ἔστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς
πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν.**

This is one of the many promises in the *Politics* which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of *παιδονόμος* and *γυναικονόμος*.

BOOK II.

1. 1. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ξητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἔτερον μὴ δοκῆ πάντως εἴναι σοφίεσθαι βουλομένων.

τὸ ξητεῖν is the nominative of μὴ δοκῆ: πάντως is to be taken closely with μή, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' μὴ δοκῆ and δοκῶμα are dependent on ἡνα.

1. 1. ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s. v.

1. 2. δέ μὲν γάρ τόπος εἰς δὲ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως.

εἰς δὲ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read λούτης.

1. 3. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

The comments of Aristotle on Plato's Republic and Laws, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the

Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle.' Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

δε' ήν αἰτίαν φησι δέν νευρομοθετήσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ 2. 1. φαινέται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὁ φησι τῇ πόλει δέν ἴστάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον. πῶς δὲ δέν διελεῖν οὐδὲν διώρισται.

δε' ήν αἰτίαν, sc. unity.

'The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after *πρός*, which he takes with *ἔτι*: cp. *πρὸς τούτους* *ἔτι* (*Meteorol.* i. 8, 346 a. 10); *πρὸς* *δὲ* *ἔτι* (*Herod.* iii. 74). The construction is thus made simpler; but the adverbial use of *πρός* hardly ever occurs in Aristotle. 'Moreover, the end, viz. unity, which he attributes to the state upon his own showing is impossible.'

The first of these propositions, *τὸ μίαν ὅτι μᾶλιστα εἴναι τὴν πόλιν* is discussed in the remainder of this chapter,—the second at the commencement of chapter 3.

ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, 'as it is described in his book,' or 'as it is actually described.' Cp. *infra* c. 5. § 23, *νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται*.

πῶς δὲ δὲῖ διελεῖν. Sc. *τὸ τέλος*, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.'

For the use of *διελεῖν* in the sense of 'to interpret,' cp. *Herod.* vii. 16, *εἰ δὲ ἄρα μή ἐστι τοῦτο ταῦτα εἰον ἢν διαιρέει, δῆλα τι τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει, σὺν τῶν εἰτὸν συλλαβεῖν εἴρηται.* *διελεῖν* may also be taken in the more common sense of 'to distinguish,' i.e. how we are to distinguish or define unity and plurality (cp. *iii. 13. § 6*: *εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσὶ διάφοροι πάντας οἱ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἔχοντες, τίνα δὲῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;*).

οὐ γάρ γίνεται πόλις δέ δρομοῖς.

2. 3.

The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (*iii. 16. § 2*; *iv. 11. § 8*; *vii. 8. § 4*) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

διοίσει δὲ τῷ ταυτότητι καὶ πόλις ὕσθιον, ὅταν μὴ πεντὰ καύματα δύοις κατεχαρισθεῖσαι τὸ πλήθος, ἀλλ' εἷς Ἀριθμός.

The clause *ὅταν μὴ π.τ.λ.* may be a description either 1)* of the

ἔθνος, 'when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages'; or 2) of the *πόλις*, 'when they are no longer dispersed in villages.' According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato's Symposium, 193 A, *των δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδεκίαν δηρκίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Δακέδαιμοντων*. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state. 2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the *ἔθνος* but of the *πόλις*, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a *συνοικίοις*. We may paraphrase 'When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.'

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation.

To Aristotle the *ἔθνος* is a lower stage than the *πόλις*. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek *πόλις* was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

2. 3. *ἴεντες δὲ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι, εἶδεν διαφέρει.*

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

2. 4. *διόπερ τὸ λόγον τὸ διπλωμοθέας σύζει τὰς πόλεις, διόπερ δὲ τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἰργασταὶ πρότεροι.*

Euclid in his 6th Book uses *διπλωμοθέας* to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical

use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης ἡδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τε καὶ ἴσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

ὅσπερ *dv* τοῖς ἡθικοῖς. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

ὅσπερ *dv* εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτέis καὶ οἱ τέκτοnes καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ *dv* 2. 5. σκυτογόμοι καὶ τέκτοnes ἡσαν.

These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, ‘yes, if possible,’ but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9; cp. also infra, c. 11. § 13).

dv οἴς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν . . . *dv* ξ ἀρχῆς.

2. 6.

‘However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.’

dv τούτοις δὲ μηδίσθαι τὸ *dv* πέρι τοῦ λόρου εἰςει προίστοις *dv* 2. 6. ἀρχῆς.

dv τούτοις, sc. among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government.

μηδίσθαι, ‘to imitate,’ i.e. to come as near as we can to ‘this principle of succession,’ dependent on βλήνων.

τοῖς *dv* ἀρχῆς, sc. εἶκοντα. Like ‘the original rulers, who have yielded to them;’ or, without supplying εἶκοντα, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, *dv* καὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν γένεται λεγέντα τὰς

πολιτῶν συνεστηκοῦα καὶ καθ' ὅμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιούσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, ὃ πέφυκεν, ἀξιούστες ἐν μέρει λειτουργῶν, καὶ σκοπέων τινὰ πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, διόπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον.

2. 7. *τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄρχοντων ἔτεροι ἔτερας ἄρχοντων ἄρχας.*

i) The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways :
 a) by succession ; b) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely ; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, a) the words are a passing thought suggested by *ἄλλας γενόμενος*, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. ‘There is a further variety ; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.’

3. 2. *εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἔκαστος, τάχ' ἀν εἴη μᾶλλον δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν δὲ Σακράτης . . . νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτω φήσουσιν κ.τ.λ.*

‘When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common ; they mean “all,” not “each.”’

3. 3. *τὸν γέρα πάντες καὶ διμόδητερα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτια διὸ τὸ διππὸν καὶ δὲ τοὺς λόγους ἐρωτικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογομούσ· διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸν λόγιον ὁδὸν μὲν καλόν, διλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὁδὸν δὲ οὐθὲν διμορφικόν.*

The absolute unity of ‘all’ in the sense of ‘each’ is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable ; a state without individuals is a *μέραν εἶδος*. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term ‘all,’ like the term ‘one,’ is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

πάντες καὶ διμόδητερα. The fallacy is that these words may mean ‘all’ or ‘both,’ either in a collective or individual sense.

περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια. The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together

are even : e.g. the odd numbers, $5 + 7 = 12$, which is an even number ; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist. Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, οὐ γάρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εἰδαιμονεῖν ἔντερ τὸ ἀρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. ‘For the word *πάντες* is fallacious, and indeed the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.’ *καὶ*, ‘not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.’

The fallacy referred to is that of *σύνθετος* and *διαιρετος*, cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

ἢ δοντος ἕπεται ἐπιβάλλει.

3. 4.

Either, ‘only so far as comes in the way of,’ or, ‘is the business of each,’ or, with a slight difference of meaning, ‘only so far as it touches or affects each.’ Cp. i. 13. § 8, διὸ τὸν μὲν ἀρχαντα τελέαν ἔχει τὴν ἡδυτὴν ἀρτηὴν τῶν δὲ πλλων ἔκαστον δοντος ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.

καὶ οὐτος οὐχ ἂς ἔκλιστον.

3. 5.

‘Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.’

Ἔπει τούτοις ἔπειτος ἄμφος λέγει τὸν εὐ πράττοντα τὸν πολεμόν ἢ κακόν, 3. 5.
ἄμφοτος τυγχάνει τὸν ἄμφοτον ὅν, οὖν ἄμφος ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τούτου τὸν τρόπον
λέγει καθ' ἔπειτος τὸν χαλίνον.

ἔπειτος⁶, ‘on this principle’; ἄμφος=ἄμφος δοτι. ‘Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, “he is mine,” whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number; I mean that (*εἰσει*) he will say, “he is mine,” or, “his,” and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato’s thousand citizens.’ The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, μῆλοντα συμφιλέσσοντος ἄπος τοὺς ἢ εὸς ἢ πάντος πράττοντος . . . ἐπει τὸ δῆμος εὐ πράττει ἢ τὸ δῆμος πακόν. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest: he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way: we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other: they say, ‘my son is doing well,’ or, ‘is not doing well,’ being each of them a thousandth part

of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words *τὸν εὐ ή κακῶς πράττοντα*: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: *ἔμὸς λέγει τὸν εὐ ή κακῶς πράττοντα = ἔμὸς λέγει τὸν εὐ πράττοντα, οὐκ ἔμὸς λέγει τὸν κακῶς πράττοντα*. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τὸν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. infra c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

3. 7. *δέ μὲν γὰρ νόον κ.τ.λ.*

'In Plato's state they are all "mine": in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardsman or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.'

3. 7. *οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπος, οὐ κατ' ἀλληρού τοῦ συγγένεας.*

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato's society in which the state and the family are identified.

3. 7. *κρέστον γὰρ θέων ἀνεγένεται εἰναι ή τὸν τρόπον τούτους νόον.*

A resumption of *πάτερον οὐτού κρέστον*; 'Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato's fashion.'

3. 9. *φασὶ τοις . . τὸν τὸς γῆς περιβόες πραγματευόμενος. εἴναι τοις τὸν δικαῖον πονέται τὸς γυναικεῖς, τὰ μέντοι γυνέμενα τέσσα διαιρέσεις κατὰ τὸν δραματήρας.*

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῷ ἀν οἷς τὸν ἀνδρῶν τὸ πονέται, τούτου παῖς πομπεῖται, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.

ὅτε οὐδὲν δυόν ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς μὴ 4. 1.
πέρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, δισπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαθεῖς.

'Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.' Aristotle here mixes up Plato's point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

καὶ γενομένων, τὸν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιμομένας γίνεσθαι 4. 1.
λύσεις, τὸν δὲ μηδεμίαν.

tὸν δὲ is opposed to *tὸν μέν*, though not parallel with it—'but in the other case,' as if *tὸν μέν* without *γνωριζόντων* had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after *tὸν μέν*, and *γνωριζόντων* may be separated from it. 'And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.'

ἄποτος δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν παθήσαντα τοὺς νιοὺς τὸ συνέναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν 4. 2.
τὸν δρόσταν, τὸ δὲ ἄραν μὴ καλῦπται, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἀλλας, ἃς πατρὶ¹
τρόπει νιὸς εἶναι πάστων ἔστιν ἀπροπότερον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν ἐνει
καὶ τὸ ἄραν μόνον.

The instance quoted, πατρὶ πρὸς νιάν, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τὸ δῆμον evidently in the lover's sense of the word.

Τοιούτοις δὲ μᾶλλον ε.τ.λ.

4. 4.

'If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians'—that is, according to Aristotle's view of communism, not Plato's. Cp. vii. 9. § 8; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should

destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

4. 4. τοιούτους.

Sc. ήττον φιλικοὺς gathered from ήττον φιλία.

4. 5. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν δὲ Σωκράτης οὗτοι δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τίκτα.

Supply τούναντίον (from the preceding) τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν, viz. unity.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δέ ἡν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νεομοδετήσθαι τὸν ερέπον τοῦτον δὲ Σωκράτης οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

4. 6, 7. δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ κακένος εἶναι φησὶ τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀρετικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὃς τῶν ἔργωνται διὰ τὰ σφόδρα φιλέιν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφώναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὅντων ἀμφοτέρων ἔτα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἄνα· διὰ δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῆ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ποιατήρην, καὶ ηκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἔμπολον ἢ νήσον πατέρα ἢ πατέρα νήσον.

Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἔρωτικοι λόγοι), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.

ὡς τῶν ἔργων, a rare construction after λέγειν. Cp. Plat. Meno 95 E, ὡς διδακτοῦ οὖσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει.

ἢ τὸν ἄνα. ‘If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.’

4. 8. οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ διὸ τὸν ἀνθρώπων τούτων διαφροντίζειν ηκιστα ἀναγκαῖον διὸ τῇ πολεστείᾳ τῇ τοιούτῃ, ἢ πατέρα ὡς νήσον ἢ νήσον ἢ πατέρας, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλήλων.

ἀναγκαῖον διὸ is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ηκιστα with διαφροντίζειν. The latter word has two constructions, 1) with τοῦ for subject, and οἰκειότητα as object; 2) with πατέρα, νήσον for subjects, and the genitives νήσον, πατέραs following, e. g. ἢ πατέρα διαφροντίζειν ὡς νήσον.

4. 9. τὸ τε θέαν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν.

ἀγαπητόν, ‘that which is to be cherished or valued,’ like ἀγαπητόν in Plat. (?) Alcibiades I 181 E, αἱρέτη ἀγαπητό, φε θέατο, ‘Alcibiades. τῷ

Κλεωπότιον ἐραστής οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἡ εἰς μόνον, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης δὲ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης: and Rhet. i. 7, 1365 b. 19, οὐκ ἵση δημιούρια, ἂν τις τὸν ἑτερόθεαλμον τυφλόση γαλ τὸν δύν ἔχοντα ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφέρεται: also Homer (Odyssey ii. 365) μούνος ἔδει ἀγαπητός. Compare the English 'dear.' Or, more simply, ἀγαπητόν may also be taken as answering to φίλειν: 'men love an object which is naturally to be loved.'

καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φίλαξιν [εἰς] τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

4. 10.

Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another. Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρὰ τοῖς φίλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. 'those who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.' The words *εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας* have been explained as a pleonasm= 'in relation to the other citizens' (*οὐ προσταγορεύοντων ἀδελφούς, κ.τ.λ.*), 'they do not call them brothers.' But the use of *εἰς* in a different sense in two successive lines is objectionable. It is possible that the words *εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας* are an error of the copyist, who may have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of *εἰς* (which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., M⁹. P¹, but inserted as a correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the passage.

αὐτὸν γέ ἐκεῖνα χαρίς,

5. 2.

sc. τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰ γυναικεῖς.

πότερον . . τὰς τε επίγειες πονητὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις.

5. 2.

These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led, un-

necessarily, to alter the reading. The change made by him of *τε* into *γε* and of *καὶ* into *κατὰ* impairs the parallelism of *κτήσεις* and *χρήσεις* (*τὰς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βάλτιον κατὰ τὰς χρήσεις*). The three cases are: 1) the soil divided, produce common: 2) soil common, produce divided: 3) soil and produce alike common.

5. 2. ὅπερ ἔνα ποιεῖ τῶν θητῶν.

θητη as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for *βάρβαροι* and generally opposed to *πόλεις* or ‘*Ελλῆνες*: also any loosely organised people, ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. 5. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

5. 3. ἐτέρων μὲν οὐν δυτῶν τῶν γεωργούντων ἀλλος δὲ εἰη τρόπος καὶ ἡρών.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

5. 4. τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι· σχεδὸν γάρ οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* ‘fellow-travellers’ or ‘fellow-settlers in a foreign city.’ Whether the *κοινωνίαι* were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words *σχεδὸν γάρ κ.τ.λ.* supply *προστρέψονται*.

5. 5. καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν . . διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for δὲ δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, διαφέρει, καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν (‘when it has been improved’), οὐ μικρὸν δὲ διενέγκαι.

5. 6. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐπιμέλειας διηρημέναις τὰ ἄγριάματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσονται.

Either 1), ‘for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,’ i. e. will prevent complaints, *ἐπιμέλειας* being taken as the nominative to οὐ ποιήσονται: or 2) regarding (as the words πρὸς ἀλλήλους and the following clause μᾶλλος δ' ἐπιδέσσονται seem to indicate) εἰ μὲν ἐπιμέλεια as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, ‘Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.’

5. 6. δέ διηρήν δέ.

‘But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.’

ὑπογραμμίνον.

5. 6.

'Sketched out or faintly indicated.' For ὑπογράφειν, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 6, 743 b. 24, οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῦς γραμμαῖς οὐτως ἐναλείφουσι τοὺς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον.

οἵσιν καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν 5. 7.
ἴδιοις, ἔτι δὲ ίσηποις καὶ κυσίν, κανὸν δεηθῶσι ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χόραν.

χάρα as opposed to πόλις:—'When on a journey in the country, they take the produce in the fields.' The apodosis (i. e. some such words as χρῶνται ἐφοδίους) is omitted. Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, §§ 1, 3, 4, Ἐραντία γε μὴν ἄγρῳ καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς θελαισι πλεον τῶν ἁπαντῶν ἔκαστος καὶ παιδῶν καὶ οἰκετῶν καὶ χρημάτων ἀρχοντας δὲ Δικαιοῦρος, κατασκευάσαι βουλόμενος ὡς ἀν μηδὲν βιλάπτωστες ἀπολαύσοντες τι οἱ πολίταις ἀλλήλων ἀγαθῶν, ἐποίησε παιδῶν ἔκαστον δροσίος τῶν ἁπαντῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀρχεων. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκεταῖς, εἰ τις δεηθεῖη, χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυρῶν δὲ θηρευτικῶν συνῆψε κουωνιάς διστοι οἱ μὲν δεόμενοι παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ δέρμα, δὲ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸς σχολάζων ἥδεως ἐπεκέμπεται. Καὶ ἵπποις δὲ ἀσαύπτως χρῶνται δὲ γὰρ ἀσθενήσας ἡ δεηθεῖς δέχεταις ἡ ταχύ πει βουληθεῖς ἀφικίσθαι, ήν τον ἤη ίπποιο δότα, λαβόν καὶ χρησάμενος καλῶς ἀποκαθίστησι, ε.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἐπιδημήσας δηόρεις ἐπιδημηρι φαγεῖν διαπορειώμενος τὰς ὅδούς, τῆς μὲν γενναίας ἀπτέσθω, δὲν βασιλῆται, μεθ ἓντὸς ἀπολούθου χωρὶς τιμῆς, δέπα δεχόμενος, τῆς δὲ ἄγροίκου λεγομένης καὶ τὸν τοιούτων δὲ νόμος εἰργέτω μὴ κουωνιέν ἡμῖν τοὺς ἔποντες.

ὅποις δὲ γένεσται τοιούτοις.

5. 8.

'Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.'

τὸ δὲ φιλαρτος εἶναι φύγεται δικαῖος, ε.τ.λ.

5. 9.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato's Laws, v. 731 E.

τὸν ταυτότερον.

5. 9.

'Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.' Cp. note on i. 1. § 2.

ἀναρρέων δρυς . . συφροσύνης περὶ τὰς γυναικας.

5. 10.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness

in the relation of the sexes, and is very far from allowing his guardians to indulge in sensuality.

5. 11. Εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὐν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἀν εἴναι δέξειν δὲ γὰρ ἀκροβύτενος ἀσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσεσθαι φίλαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς διάντας, ἀλλως τε εἰπεῖν διατηγορῆ τις τῶν τοῦ ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γνωμένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας.

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the opening of Book vii, noticed by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regularity supra c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories, especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing institutions. Cp. Plat. Rep. vi. 464, 465; iv. 425.

5. 12. ὅν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν.

A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, ἐτι δὲ εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μερίαν τάξειν οὐσίαν πάσιν, οὐδὲν δικελος μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἀπιθυμίας δικαίειν ή τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.

The emphatic negative *ὅν οὐδὲν γίνεται* for *δὲ οὐ γίνεται* is curious.

5. 12. ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν διάγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβολῶντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ίδια τὰς κτήσεις.

To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers, than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referring to disputes arising in 'guilds' or 'clubs,' or partnerships in business. *διαφερομένους* is to be repeated with *κεκτημένους*. The meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

5. 15. ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος δν, διστερ ἐργατι πρότερον, διὰ τὴν ταυτεῖαν κοινὴ καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν.

Aristotle takes up a position half-way between the communism

of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

*Θοκερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνῳ καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσστίοις δ 5. 15.
πομαδέτης ἑκούσιος.*

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30-32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6-9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

*πάστα γάρ σχεδὸν εὑργται μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνῆκται, τοῖς δὲ οὐ 5. 16.
χρῶνται γνωσκόντες.*

οὐ συνῆκται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (*ἐν εἴ τις χωρίοις αὐτῷ λάβοι μάρτιον τὸ πρότον, οὐδὲ θεοὺς φέρει τὰς πρότας οὐραῖς εἶναι, θεῖος ἀνεύρηθαι ποιέσσειν, καὶ απτὰ τὸ εἰκὸν πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένης καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνους αἷς λεγόμανα περιστενῶσσαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν*), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

*μᾶλιστα δὲ γένοστο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις θαυμάσῃ τὴν τοιεύτην 5. 17.
πολετίαν κατασκευαζομένην.*

'In the actual process of creation.'

Cp. Plat. Tim. 19 B, προσέσωπο δὲ δή τοι μη τοιόδε τὸ πάθος, εἰσ
εἴ τις ἡρά καλά του θεατέμενος, εἴτε ἵππος γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ἔντε
δημοσίες, ἥσυχίας δὲ μηντα, εἰς ἀπειδημίαν ἀφίκοστο θεάσασθαι καινόμενο
τε αὐτὰ τοι τὰ τοῖς σώμασι διακούστων προσήσσειν πεπτὰ τὴν σύνταξιν
διλούσστα. ταῦτα καὶ ὅγει πίστεωθα πρός τὴν πόλιν ἣν δεῖθενται.

5. 17. μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὰ μὲν and τὰ δέ, which follow.

5. 17. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

1)* 'Which already,' i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato's ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), 'which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]' (Schneider). For the use of *νῦν* compare ii. 8. 6.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon) is used pleonastically= 'do carry out.' So τῶν ἐπιχειρούσάντων νεωτερίζειν (v. 7. § 13)=τῶν νεωτερισάντων. And Plato's Phaedrus, 265 E, μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγύναι μέρος μηδέν.

5. 20. ποιεῖ γάρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἰνοφρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργούς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

1)* The emphasis is on τὸν μὲν and τὸν δέ. 'He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, 'to these he opposes the husbandmen'] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.' 2) Bernays translates, 'For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison],' making a pause at τὸν ἄλλους. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between φρουροί and πολέτας is harsh. For the φρουροί or φύλακες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he 'snatches' at the word φρουρῶντας, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ἵποιει γάρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτος δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχον.

5. 23. ἀλλὰ γάρ εἴτ' ἀπογκάια τοῦθεν ἕμοιος εἶτε μή, νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διέρισται.

Here, again, the antecedent to *ταῦτα* is to be gathered generally from the context, = 'whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,' &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

τὸν γε.

5. 23.

'As far, at least, as his book shows.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἔχομένων.

5. 23.

Sc. οὐδὲν διάρισται from the previous sentence. 'And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.' A repetition of § 18. The emendation *ἀρχομένων* (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

τίνει εἰ κούται αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

5. 24.

Sc. τίς οἰκονομήσει; or more generally, 'What then?' Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

ἄποτος δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολὴν, δῆτα δὲ τὰ 5. 24.
εὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολὴν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. oīs: sc. τοῖς θηρίοις.

'The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change 5. 26.
 the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.' But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

Ἔτι δέ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φιλάκων, διῆτη φησί δέν 5. 27.
εὐδαιμόνα ποιεῖν τὴν τάλα τῶν τομοθετηρῶν. ἀδύνατος δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν διῆτη, μαζὶ
τῶν πλείστων δὲ μηδέποτε μερῶν ἡ τιμὴν ἔχεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

This passage, like many others in the *Politics*, involves a miscon-

ception of Plato's meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents him from seeing that Plato does not really take away the happiness of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common with him (cp. Pol. i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice. Compare also Rep. iv. 420 B, C, and Politics vii. 9. § 7, (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλις οὐκ εἰς μέρος τη̄ βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν πάντης ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας*) where Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he here repudiates.

5. 27. ὥντερ τὸ ἅρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 supra); but happiness must always exist in both.

6. 1-4. Socrates is here spoken of by implication (*ἀλλὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, § 4*) as if he were the chief speaker in the Laws, though he is not introduced at all. The Laws are quoted as Plato's in c. 7. § 4.

6. 1. καὶ γάρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ δλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν δὲ Σωκράτης.

The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the subjects contained in the Republic. Probably the metaphysical and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle *πολιτικαὶ μεταφοραὶ* (Met. c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.

6. 2. τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.

'And a third class taken from the warriors,' (*τὸν προπολεμούστων*).

6. 3. περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, πότερον αἰθεριάς δὲ μετέχουσι τυποὶ ἀρχῆς . . . σύδεις διώρισται.

Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the declaration of an oracle, 'that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed' (Rep. iii. 415, and supra c. 5. § 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes

are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the Laws v. 776 ff.

τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις.

6. 3.

I. e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (Books ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though naturally entering into Plato's conception of the state, which includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.

τῶν δὲ τόμων τὸ μὲν πλέοντον μέρος τόμαι τυγχάνουσιν ὅπερ, ὅλγα δὲ 6. 4. περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρησται.

This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the Laws of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the twelfth to legislation.

καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν τοιών ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν 6. 4. περάγει πᾶλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word *κοινοτέραν* cp. c. 6, § 16, *εἰ μὲν οὖν* *δεις κοινοτέρη ταύτην πεποντεῖται ταῖς πόλεσι τὸν ἀλλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.*

ἑτέραν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the Laws (Laws v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical, of the Laws more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to 'bring round the Laws to the Republic' in the assimilation of male and female education, in the syssitia for women, in the assertion of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to

which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (*Laws* xii. 965 ff.).

6. 5. τὴν μὲν χιλίων.

Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, supra.

6. 6. τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττόν κ.τ.λ.

This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάντας τῆς τοιαύτης ἀγρήσεως γνωμένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγέν τὰ εἴδη. Δάξεις δ' ἀνά ιῶσις βελτιών εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ σικεῖα ἀναυρεῖν, ἀλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὅντας ἀμφοῖν γάρ ὅντων φίλων δυσιν προτυχάν τὴν ἀλήθειαν) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the *odium philosophicum* of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

6. 6. χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαθυλανίας κ.τ.λ.

A strange remark : Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

6. 7. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον.

Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the *Laws* he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; *Laws* v. 739.

6. 7. οἵτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθέναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεννιμόντας τόκους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλεις γῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἰ γάρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν γένεται βίον κ.τ.λ.

[sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute πολεμίαν for πολετικὴν which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of μὴ μονωτικὸν or μὴ μονάτερον in some MSS. after πολετικὴν appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini's forcible saying, 'Non-interference is political suicide.'

εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ίδιον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς 6. 8.
πόλεως . . διελθοῦσιν.

'But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.' In modern language, 'however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.'

διελθοῦσιν, i.e. 'lest they renew the attempt.'

καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως δρᾶν δεῖ, μήποτε βιλτινοὶ ἔτρεποι διορίσαι 6. 8.
τῷ συφῷ μᾶλλον.

Literally, 'Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?'

ὅτερ δὲ εἴ τις εἰπειν δύνεται [γῆ]ν εὖτε γέρει δεῖται αὐθίδην μᾶλλον. 6. 8.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato's definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) 'this is only saying, "enough to enable a man to live well." But this explanation seems to require that the following words τοῦτο γέρει δεῖται αὐθίδην μᾶλλον should be translated 'this however is too general' (Bernays), giving a sense to μᾶλλον (=μᾶλλον § 8c) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* 'By the confused expression "Enough to live upon with temperance," he means only "enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea."

6. 9. *ἔξις αἱρετι.*

The MSS. give *ἀἱρετι*, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into *αἱρετι*. But the words *ἔξις αἱρετι* are unmeaning. It is possible that *ἔξις* may be the true reading and *ἀἱρετι* the gloss or vice versa. See note on text.

6. 10. *ἀφέναι τὴν τεκνοποίαν.*

Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

6. 11. *δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὅμοιως ἀκριβῶς ἔχει περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν.*

'But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,' i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.

6. 11. *παράζυγας.*

'For whom there is no place at the banquet of life.'—Malthus.

6. 12. *τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἀν συμβαίνη τελευτῶν των τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν.*

τῶν ἄλλων, 'the sterility of others,' i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word *γεννηθέντων*,—'the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.'

6. 13. *Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἀν τομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἰκους ισous φήσῃ δεῖν διαμέτρεις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρώτον τοὺς αλήρους δισούς εἶχος πάρτες κατὰ μέργοθος.*

Ισous and *δισούς* are here used in slightly different senses, *Ισous* referring to the numbers of the families, *δισούς* to the size of the lot. 'He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.' That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.

Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Dorians i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word *Καρπίθεος* may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, *infra* c. 11.

§§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10, § 6.

περὶ μὲν τούτων . . λεκτέον ὑστερον.

6. 14.

There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.

φησὶ γάρ διῶ κ.τ.λ.

6. 14.

Aristotle is finding fault with Plato's vagueness:—'He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.'

τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας.

6. 15.

Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (*κτᾶσθαι*) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ τὴν τέλην οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαιρεσιν δεῖ σκοτεῖν, μή ποτ' οὐ συμφέρῃ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vi. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.

δε γάρ τὰς ἀπλευτότατας ἔστιν.

6. 16.

The normal idea of a *πολεῖται* is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ὅπου δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ ποιὸν πολευόμενοι συμβάνει δὲ αὐλόγης ὅτι μὲν γάρ διαφέρειν περ' ἀρετὴν ή ἄλιγον εὐδέχεται, πλείους δὲ διηγεῖται ἡ περιβάντος πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολευτικήν γάρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται· διότιπεν πεπάντη τὴν πολευτικὰς πορεύεται τὸ προπαλαιροῦν, καὶ μετέχουσαν αὐτῆς εἰ πεπτυμέναι τὰ δηλα,

τὴν γάρ πρότινη πολευτικά.

6. 16.

The same as the ἀντίρα πολεῖται (§ 4), i.e. the Republic of Plato.

6. 17. Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So uncritical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans. . . With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the Laws, iv. 712 D, E, καὶ μὴν ξυνοῦν γε, δέξιε, τὴν ἐν Δακεδαιμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχει σοι φράσειν οὔτως, ἥστιν προσαγορεύειν αὐτήν δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεικέναι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἄφρον θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε· καὶ τις ἐντοτέ μοι φάνεται πασῶν τῶν πολεων δημοκρατουμένη μᾶλιστ' ἔσκεναι. τὸ δέ αὐτὸν μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτήν εἶναι παντάπαισιν ἀπόπον. καὶ μὴν δὴ βασιλεῖα γε διὰ βίου τ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἔγω δὲ οὕτω τὸν ἔξαιρητον ἀν ἐρωτηθεὶς δύναται, ὅπερ εἴπον, οὐκ ἔχει διωριστάτερος εἰπεῖν τις τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.

6. 18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δίον συγκεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστήν πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος.

This is not really said, though in Laws (iv. 710ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.

6. 19. *φέρειν ἀρχόντας.*

φέρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

6. 20. αἱροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάνταγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρέστον τυμίλατος, εἴτα πάλιν ἵσσοντες ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἴτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν οὐ πάσιν ἐπάνταγκες ἢν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτην, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάνταγκες τοὺς πρότοις καὶ τοὺς δευτέρους.

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versa, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.

There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting : for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.'

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato, and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words *ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων* can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either *τοῦ τετάρτου* or *τῶν τετάρτων* must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for *τοῦ τετάρτου* agrees best with *τοῦ πρέστου τιμίμαρος* and *τοῦ δευτέρου* antea, and *τῶν τετάρτων* may have crept into the text from the preceding *τετάρτων*. Either alternative is simpler than reading *τετάρτων* (for *τετάρτων*) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit *πρέστων* & before *τετάρτων*. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc. The words *εἰς τὰς ἐπαρχίας, sc. αἱρέσθαι*, do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently *τὸ εἰς ποτὲ* and *τὸ εἰς τωὐ*, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.

ἀς μὴ εἴη εἰς δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συμοτάρει τὴν τουτότην 6. 22.
πολεμέας, εἰς τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὑπέρον βηθμομένων, ὅταν ἀπιθέλλῃ
ποτὲ τῆς τουτέτης πολεμέας η σκέψη.

ἐκ ταύτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (*ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ*), Aristotle is looking forward to the discussion of what he calls *πολιτεία*, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τοιάντης, 'a state similar to that in the Laws.'

6. 22. *τῶν ὑστερον ἀρθησομένων.*

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7-9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

6. 22. *ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἱρεσῶν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἱρετῶν αἱρετοῦς ἀπικίνδυνον εἰ γάρ τινες συστῆμα θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι τὸ πλήθος, δεῖ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθῆσαντας βολῆσσιν.*

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of *ἀπικίνδυνον* cp. Thuc. i. 137, *ἀπικίνδυνη ἡ τῷ δοσφαλοῖ μὲν ἀριστοῖ, ἀπικίνδυνη δὲ ἡ ἀπικίνδυνη πόλις η ἀποκαρπή δύσπεται.*

7. 1. *αἱ μὲν ἔμετέν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφαις καὶ πολιτικοῖς.*

ἴδεντος is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to *δημοσύργος* (Laws 921 B) and to *ποιητὴς* (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to *ἰατρός*. 'ἴδεντος' such as Phaleas

and Hippodamus; 'philosophers' such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; 'statesmen' such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. *infra*, c. 12. § 1).

διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλεπόντιος τοῦτον εἰσήγεγκε πρώτον.

7. 2.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. 'Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.'

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 *φησὶ γάρ*, § 8 *ἔτοι δὲ ὁ Φαλέας, οἱερας γάρ*) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of 'the best state,' c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words *περὶ τῆς πολεοίας τῆς ἀριστῆς*, 'Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state' which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

πατουμένων, sc. ταῦς τελεῖον or πλευρίαν, an emphatic present, 7. 3.
'when in process of settlement.'

τῷ τὰς προῖνες τούς μὲν πλευρίαν διδόντας μὲν λαρβάντας δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ. 7. 3.

Cp. the Babylonian 'marriage-market' in *Hdt.* i. 196.

ἴργον γάρ μὴ παντεργοντες εἶναι τούτους.

7. 5.

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato 'that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,' to which he replies that 'it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.'

7. 6. οἰον καὶ ξελων ἐνομοθέτησεν κ.τ.λ.

Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

7. 7. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώζειν.

Dependent on νόμοι εἰσί, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

7. 7. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβανεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τυμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν.

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

7. 9. ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ηττις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν δῆθελος.

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

καὶ τὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ. ‘Moreover there is no point in saying that it is one and the same, for it may be bad.’

7. 10. τούτωντος δὲ περὶ ἀκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διδόντες περὶ τὰς κτήσεις δικούς, οἱ δὲ χαριεῖντες περὶ τῶν τυμῶν, ἔτινες.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property, by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.

περὶ ἀκάτερον, sc. τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰς τυμές.

οὐ τούνν διὰ ταῦτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ ἐπιθυμοῖεν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἁνει 7. 12.
λυπῶν ἡδονᾶς. Τί οὖν ἄκου τῶν τριῶν τούτων;

The words *καὶ διὰ ἐπιθυμοῖεν*, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, *καὶ διεν ἐπιθυμίαν* (Bojesen), sc. *ἀδικήσοντα*, an ingenious conjecture; *διὰ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν* (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; *ἀνεπιθύμηται* (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain: ‘And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.’ The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

οὐκ ἀν ἐπιζητοῦεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος.

7. 12.

‘They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.’

οὗτον τυραννοῦστα οὐχ ἵνα μὴ βργώσιν. Διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι.

7. 13.

Cp. the Story of Jason, who said *πεισῆν δέ μὴ τυραννοῦ*, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that ‘he knew nothing except how to govern.’ ‘And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.’

δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνῶντας κ.τ.λ.

7. 14.

A favourite idea of Aristotle. Cp. supra c. 6. § 7.

ἀλλ' οὕτως ὡς διὰ καὶ μὴ ἔχοντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν.

7. 16.

= *ἀλλ' οὕτως ποιεῖς ὡς διὰ ποιοῖς καὶ μὴ ἔχοντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν*, the more general word *ποιεῖς* being understood from *πολεμῶν*.

‘That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,’ i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in 7. 17. Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradates, the Satrap of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. *Ἀριστοτελῆς*.

7. 19. διωβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in 'the good old times.' Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. *Vesp.* 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] *Politics* that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times : also cp. Lucian *Dem. Encom.* 36; *Prooem. Dem.* 1459, 27, a remarkable place ; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, 'Public Economy,' Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. 1, pp. 296 ff.

7. 20. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή κ.τ.λ.

If ἀρχὴ be retained, τῶν τοιούτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. *ἄη* conj. Scaliger, ἀρκεῖ Coraes.

7. 23. ἀλλ' εἰπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν 'Επιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ ὡς Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκείαζεν Ἀθῆναι, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Bernays places a comma after εἰπερ, and omits the second δεῖ, placing a καὶ before καθάπερ. 'But if this is so (i.e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be engaged in public works should be slaves.' Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ἐργαζομένους: 'But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.'

τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or 'some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known,' was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

8. 1. Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work *περὶ τελείας*, which bear the name of 'Hippodamus the Pythagorean' (Florileg. xlii. pp. 248-251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. *Fragm. Philos. Graec.* vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The

portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of *καλός*, *δίκαιος*, and *συμφέρων*, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

HIPPODAMUS Περὶ Πολιτείας.

‘In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the “Good”—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessaries. The first class I call councillors; the second, “allies” or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman’s life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

‘Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before

them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers; and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessities into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things—reason ($\lambda\delta\gammaος$), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling

and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation ;—if the amount of wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil ;—if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed ; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them; since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.'

Aristotle's account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato(?) (368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—*γραῦλος τὴν φωνὴν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ λεχθεσμάλητός . . . ἐστιν, καὶ μικρόμυγος, ἐσθῆτι τε ἐπιστήμης χρέωντος καὶ διαιτῶντος καὶ πειρᾶτος* (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippodamus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (*Knights* 327) the α is long, yet if the name be a compound of δῆμος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the 'Ιπποδάμειος δύορά at the Piraeus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, ὡς φασί), that the architect of the Piraeus was the architect of the

magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (*κατὰ τὴν Μῆδων*); but he had probably no special means of information and only ‘combined’ the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called ‘the Thurian’ in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 B.C. and Rhodes was built in 406 B.C. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, B.C. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἴδιων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται . . . ἀν εὐτομος γέ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πεάτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

8. 1. καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἐτι δὲ ἑσθῆτος εὐτέλους κ.τ.λ.

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted in combining expensiveness and simplicity: *ἑσθῆτος* is dependent on some such word as *χρήσει* to be supplied from *κόσμῳ*.

8. 3. διῆγει δὲ εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ιεράν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δὲ ιδίαν.

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

8. 4. δικαιοτίμων ἐν τῷ κύρων.

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. ‘The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.’

τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαιστηρίοις κ.τ.λ.

8. 5.

See infra note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of *n. l.* or *non liquet*, whence the Scotch verdict of 'not proven.' The ideas of Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

ὅς οὖτε τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις 8. 6.
οὐτος δὲ νόμος τὸν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων.

Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: '*But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,' and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: 'And this law now exists at Athens.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

τοὺς δ' αἱρεθέας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ δρφανικῶν. 8. 7.

I. e. 'They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.'

Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an 8. 10, 11. opponent, raises several *ἀπορίας* respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. 'How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a *raison d'être*, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by force.'

To these *ἀπορίαι* he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: ‘How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?’

8. 12. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας.

Either *oikia* is here used like *oikos* in the sense of ‘property’ or ‘inheritance’; or *γεωργήσει* must be taken to mean ‘maintains by agriculture.’ (Cp. for a similar use of *oikia* Dem. de Falsâ Leg. *καρπουμένη τὰς τῶν χρωμένων οἰκίας*: and for another singular use of *γεωργέω*, i. 8. § 6, *διπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν γεωργοῦντες*.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading *eis δύο οἰκίας* (Berthays), or *δύοις οἰκίαις*. The old Latin translation ‘ministrabit’ has suggested the emendation *ἱπαυργήσει*. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than *γεωργήσει* in the sense given above.

8. 13. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ διάκη καὶ πλείσιον ἐνδέχεται.

‘This in an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.’

8. 14. δ μὲν γάρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, δὲ δικαιοτῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ή δ μὲν πλέον, δ τὸ διαστον, δόλλος δὲ πέντε, δὲ τέτταρας.

δ μὲν γάρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. διφειδεσθαι οὖσαι. But in what follows, the words ή δ μὲν πλέον δ δὲ Διαστον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ή δ μὲν πλέον δ δὲ διαστον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, δ μὲν γάρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, δ δὲ δικαιοτῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς. But in the second case the words are restricted to δ δὲ δικαιοτῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, δόλλος δὲ πέντε, δ δὲ τέτταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words δόλλος δὲ πέντε κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle δ μὲν πλέον κ.τ.λ. already stated.

8. 16. εὐθέαλμον δικούσαι μάνοι.

A confusion of language: cp. *εὐπρόσωπος* (c. 5. § 11).

8. 16. οὐχι γάρ συσφαστίας.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not

of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus' error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermae at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

αἱ τέχναι πάσαι καὶ αἱ δύναμεις.

8. 18.

Every art and science is also a power to make or become; hence the word *δύναμις* being the more general term is constantly associated with both *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη*.

γηροῦσι δὲ οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τάγαθὸν πάντες.

8. 21.

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

δροῖος εἴναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς διωγότους, δοκεῖτε καὶ λέγεται 8. 21.
καὶ τὸν γηρεῖν.

δροῖος has been altered by Bernays into *δλίγος* but without reason. It may be taken 1) as = *δροῖος τοὺς γηρεῖσι*, or, 2)* *δροῖος* may be joined with *καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας* = 'no better than simple or common persons.' Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, γνόμυμα δχρέοντο δροίγοις καὶ σύ. Plat. Theat. 154 A, Άλλα διθρέατη δρ' δροῖος καὶ σύ φεινται διοῖον.

δοκεῖτε γάρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, καὶ τὴν πολετικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατος 8. 22.
ἀριθμὸς πάντα γραφῆται.

1)* If we take *πάντα* as subject, *τὴν πολετικὴν τάξιν* may be the remote object of *γραφῆται*, or the words may be governed by *περὶ* of which the force is continued from *περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας*. Or 2) *τὴν πολετικὴν τάξιν* may be the subject of *γραφῆται*, in which case *πάντα* is to be taken adverbially.

οὐ γάρ ταῦταν ἀφελέσσεται κακήσας, δῶσα βλαβήσσεται τοῖς δρχούσι 8. 23.
ἀπειθεῖς ἀνεπθεῖς.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 87, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ὅτι χάροις πάρει διατήτεις
χρημάτη πολις ερίσσων δετὸς ή παλὸς ὥχουσιν ἀκόροις.

κυήσας, sc. δ πολίτης gathered from the previous sentence.

8. 24, 25. δ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, διότε τὸ ῥᾳδίος μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἔτερους νόμους κανούσις ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν . . . ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν.

Cp. Plat. Laws i. 634 D, εἰς τὸν καλλίστων δὲ εἴη νόμων μὴ ἄγτειν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἔαν, ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ή μὴ καλῶς ἔχει and Arist. Met. ii. 3, 995 a. 3, ἡλίκην δὲ ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ σύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μείζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γυνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος.

ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν, lit. 'makes a great difference.'

9. 1. In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephoralty is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. §§ 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

9. 1. εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναγότως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

εἴ τι, sc. *νεομοδέτηται*: καὶ τὸν τρόπον following πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. προκειμένης αὐτοῖς, i.e. 1) 'which is proposed to the citizens,' πολίταις understood from πολιτείᾳ supra; or 2) 'which legislators set before themselves' referring to *νομοθέται* implied in *νεομοδέτηται*: cp. ἡ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

9. 2. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from ἡ των σχολῆς πατοῦ of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C διαν εἰς ἣν, σχολή τῶν μᾶλλω δγων, πράτη.

9. 2. ὃ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν παντοτεια πολλάκις ἀπίθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, δρόσος δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δάκαιοις οἱ Εἵλεταις διότε γὰρ ἀφεδρέοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διαπελοῦσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: 'I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controvèrted and disputed about, some approving

and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.' Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

περὶ δὲ τὸν Κρήτας αὐδέν πω τοιούτου συμβέβηκεν· αἴτιος δὲ ἵσως τὸ θ. 3.
τὰς γειτνάους πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐτῶν κεκτημέναις περιοίκους·
τοῖς δὲ Δάκωσιν οἱ γειτνῶντες ἔχθροι πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι
καὶ Ἀρκάδες.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no out-siders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἰρηται σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, καὶ ἐν Ἀργείαι τῶν ἐν τῇ δραδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Δάκωνος ἡγαγάδοθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τούτων). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 supra, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word 'perioeci' appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, γειργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν (sc. Δακωμένοις) Εἵλονται, τοῖς δὲ Κρήτοις εἰ περιοίκοι. But compare also Sosicrates [B.C. 200-128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), τὴν μὲν ποιὴν δουλειῶν οἱ Κρήτοι παλαιότεροι μνεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ιδίαν ἀφανέστεροι, τοῖς δὲ περιοίκοις ἀπηγόρευε. The use of the term *μνεῖσθαι* in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated

Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), *τούτῳ* (sc. τῷ ξίφει) δεσπότας μυστας κέκλημαι. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term *μυφῆς* is said by Hermon to be applied to 'well-born' serfs: *εὐγενεῖς οἰκέται*.

καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους. 'Since they too have perioeci.'

9. 4. With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle's proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

9. 5. *δοκερ γὰρ οἰκίας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνὴ.*

The singular *μέρος* is used by attraction with the singular *ἀνήρ*.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E ff.: 'For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.'

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 1361 a. 10, *δοκει γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναικας φαῦλα δοκερ Δακεδαιμονίους, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ θῆμαν οὐκ εἰδαμονοῦσι*: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

οὐδὲν δέ, εἰ βούλοστο τις,

σύφρων γύναισι Σπαρτιατίδεν κέρη.

9. 8. *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτῶν.*

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, 'in the days of their greatness,' i. e. in the fourth century B. C. after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained 'many things in their government were ordered by women'? (Schlosser). For why should

women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations ἀρχῆς corresponds to ἀρχήν in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. ἐνὶ στρατίᾳ. Arist. Wasps 557; τὸν ἐνὶ τῷ πραγμάτῳ, sc. δυτα, Dem. 309. 10.

For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of 9. 10. Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5 § 28, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν δρῶσαι ἡμεῖς οὐτοί, ἀλλα οὐδέποτε θύωσαι πολεμίους, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, οὐχ ἡττον δὲ τούτων ἀλίτουν τὸν Ἀγρισίδαν οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θύρυβοι καὶ κρανγαὶ καὶ διαδρομαὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων δυσπασχετούντων τὰ γυνέματα, καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυαρίσσων ἤσυχάσσειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπαιον ἐκφράσσων οὐσῶν πρός τε τὴν κρανγὴν καὶ τὸ σῦρ τῶν πολεμίων.

χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, διπέρ εὐ ἐτέραις πόλεσιν, θύρυβοι δὲ 9. 10. παρίχων πλεῖστα τῶν πολεμίων.

Either 1)^{*} ‘For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless’; or 2) ‘For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.’

The employment of the men on military service, which rendered 9. 11. it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (*φασὶ μὲν*), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words *καὶ Μεσσηνίους* in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one

hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2. c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the φλαλάκων) Laws vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (Ages. c. 31), and even supposes that 'their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.' Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.

9. 12. αἰτίαι μὲν οὐν εἰσὶν αἴτιαι τῶν γερομένων.

Sc. the women: * or 'these are the causes' (αἴτιαι by attraction for αἴτια). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

9. 12. τίνι δεῖ συγγράψαντι ἔχειν.

'We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.'

9. 13. οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειαν τινὰ ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αἴτιην καθ' αὐτήν.

αἴτιην καθ' αὐτήν must agree with ποιεῖαν understood in ἀπρέπειαν τινὰ ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, these words being equivalent to ἀπρεπή ποιεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν: or αὐτῆς, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὐτήν.

9. 13. μετὰ γάρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς επήστως ἐπιτίμουσιν ἀν τις.

.. i)*. The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

9. 14. Plutarch (Agis, c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition,

or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων.

9. 15.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5, *ἐνιοτε δὲ ἀρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι.*

ἢ καὶ μετρίαν.

9. 15.

'Or even a moderate one.' *καὶ* is here qualifying. 'Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.'

νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι δοῦναι τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτε ἀν βούλησαι.

9. 15.

νῦν, not 'now,' as opposed to some former time, but 'as the law stands.' See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. *δοῦναι*, sc. *τινά*.

'A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases': i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle *νῦν*.

οὐδὲ χῆλοι τὸ πλῆθος ησαν, sc. *ὅτι τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς*, §§ 10, 16. 9. 16.

γύρους δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι φωνῆς αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ 9. 16.
τὴν τάξιν ταστῆρν.

τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of *ταύτην* with a vague antecedent, cp. below *ταύτην τὴν διάρθρων*: also i. 2. § 2.

μίαν πλευρήν.

9. 16.

The battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240-248 B.C. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 5), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

ἕτι μὲν τῶν προτίρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσσαν τῆς πολεμίας.

9. 17.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the

prophet, and Hegias, were the only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

9. 17. καὶ φασὶ εἶναι ποτὲ τοῖς Σπαρτιέταις καὶ μηρίοις.

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

9. 18. ἵπενταρίος δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοπολαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phaleas, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4-8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. τὰς επήσεις λοιδόρια, 6. § 10; τῆς χάρας οὐρα διηρημένης, 9. § 19; and so Plato, Laws 684 D.

9. 19. διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν δύος ἡσαν.

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, πιστίνειν χρήμασιν διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, Καὶ ὡς ὁ Δάκων εἰθυνόμενος τῆς ἔφορίας, ἐργάζεται εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δυσίως διαλύειν ἄτεροι, ἔφη. 'Ο δέ, 'Οικοῦν σὺ ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔθου'; Καὶ ὃς ἔφη. 'Οικοῦν δικαιως δύ', ἔφη 'αὐτὸν σὺν ἀπόλεσμα'; 'Οὐ δῆτα,' ἔφη, 'οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἐπράξαν, ἡνὸς δ' οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη.'

9. 20. καὶ νῦν δὲ τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις.

'Ἀνδρίοις is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in

which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word ἀνδρια for φιδίτια or συσσίτια. For this use of the word ἀνδρια cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἀνδρια, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ὃ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἀληθύειν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (*ὅτεον ἄφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπάλεσαν*).

ὅτε καὶ ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεοθα τὴν πολιτείαν.

9. 20.

'So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.'

δεῖ γάρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μελλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεοθαι τὰ 9. 22.
μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτα.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαδοι, κ.τ.λ. show that the corresponding words τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως are the subject of βούλεοθαι=δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως βούλεοθαι τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτα.

ταῦτα is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν=κατὰ ταῦτα.

ἀθλον γάρ ή ἀρχὴ εὗτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔστιν.

9. 22.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the γερουσία, he says, ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον τῆς πολιτείας ευρὺ γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν δροίων.

παιδαριάδης γάρ ὅτι λίαν.

9. 23.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the γύροις (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls παιδαριάδης. Plato, Laws iii. 692 A, says that the Ephoralty is ἕγγον τῆς ἀληφατῆς δονάμεως, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephoralty was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is 9. 24. everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer ἀρχόμενοι but ἀρχότες, the citizens of Sparta seem

to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

9. 25. τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, οὐκ ἀσφαλές.

'But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.' The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (*ὅτι δὲ οὐκομοθέτης, κ.τ.λ.*), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

οὐκ ἀσφαλές, sc. τὸ κυρίους αὐτὸν εἶναι μεγάλων.

9. 26. δόξει δὲ ἐν κ.τ.λ.

The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

9. 27. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἦρ πανούνται τῶν γερόντων, κατά τε τὴν κρίσιν δοκιμαζαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: 'The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρίνονται γὰρ βοή καὶ οὐ ψῆφος), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.'

9. 27. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλέμενον τοι μὴ βουλέμενον δρχειν τὸν ἄγοντα τὴν ἀρχήν.

Cp. Plat. Rep. 345 E ff., 347 D.

πῶν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλλην πολιτείαν δὲ πομοθέτης φάνεται ποιῶν 9. 28.
φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν
αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων.

According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

Διόπερ ἐξίπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἔχθρούς.

9. 30.

συμπρεσβευτὰς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the dissensions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. Διόπερ = ‘by reason of a like suspicion.’

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) ‘they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,’ e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as *συμπρεσβευταί*, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (*de Rep. Lac.* c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent *συμπρεσβεῖα* among Spartans, but that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), ‘A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.’

τὴν σύνοδον.

9. 31.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.

9. 32. Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων.

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of levelling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

9. 33. The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Ly-sander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king.

9. 35. τούτου δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ Ἐλλατονοὶ νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τάχαδα τὰ περιψάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ή κακίας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρέπτω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.

'The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue' (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The 'not less error' is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained.

9. 37. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δὲ Ιωάντας φιλοχρημάτους.

It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Gylippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them 'was the real source of the evil.'

The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying *χρήματα χρήματα* δῆλο is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle à φιλοχρηματίᾳ Σπάρτας δλεῖ δῆλο οὐδὲν is quoted in the Aristotelian Πολιτεία fr. Rei. Lac. 1559 b. 28.

10. 1. πάρεγγυς μὲν δοτε ταύτης.

Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lacedaemon, 'Ἐστι δὲ τὴν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταβάστες (πολιτείας) δίξιν ἐπιστῆσαι

κατὰ δύο τρόπους πῶς οἱ λογιάτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων "Εφόρος, Σενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρώτον μὲν δμοίαν εἶναι φασι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Δακεδαιμονίᾳ, δεύτερον δὲ ἐπανετήριον ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαίνουσιν. Δυνατέρερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the γέροντες; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἡπτον γλαφυρῶς.

10. I.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12. § 11, τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν
νόμων ἔστι γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian 10. 2. but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

Διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίουσαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευά- 10. 3.
σαντος Μίνωα πρότου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. Διὸ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (a.c.?) the Cretan Syssitia are described as still exist-

ing (see the passage quoted in note on § 6). Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 480], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called 'Αρδρία or 'Αρδρεῖα, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo l.c.

10. 3. Δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ μῆτος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν τεφυκίαν καὶ κείσθαι καλέσ.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not disposed to a geographical digression; cp. vii. 10. §§ 3-5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15, 16. The 'silver streak' and 'the empire of the sea' are the symbols of two different policies.

10. 4. Διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατίσχειν δ' Μήνης.

Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

10. 5. γνωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰλοτες τοὺς δὲ Κρήτες οἱ περίοικοι.

But if Socrates, a writer of the second century B.C., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες μαλῶν μνοίσ, τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν διφαμίστας, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ἐπράσσει: see c. 9. § 3.

ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

10. 5.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10. § 2, ἀρχαῖα δὲ τούκες εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσστίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενέμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common meals came from Crete to Sparta.

οἱ μὲν γάρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις 10. 6.
αδεσμοῖς.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi, never acquired the military command, which was retained by the Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circumstance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

οὗτοι καλοῦσσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλῆν.

10. 6.

Yet we are told that the term *βουλή* was generally used to signify 'the council in a democracy.' Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17, also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamnus] ἀντὶ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλῆν ἐποίησεν. In the Cretan use of the term *βουλή* there may be a survival of the Homeric meaning of the word.

βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μόνον ἦσα.

10. 6.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiades, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following account of the Cretan Syssitia : 'The Lyctians collect the materials for their common meals in the following manner: Every one brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (*fratres*) to which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city, which the municipal authorities distribute to the several households. Further, each of the slaves contributes a poll-tax of an

Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call andreia. A woman takes care of the syssitia with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called *καλοφόροι*, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the syssitia, one called the andreion, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (*κοιμητήριον*). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the syssitia, called "strangers' tables," at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat; but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the syssitia in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.'

10. 8. *Ἐστὶ δὲ κοινῷ τρέφεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναικας καὶ παιδας καὶ ἄνδρας.*
ἐκ κοινοῦ, 'out of a common stock'; not necessarily at common tables. The syssitia or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the Laws, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of Dosiades (*supra*). The name *ἄνδρια* or *ἄνδρεια* also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words *τὰ μωνᾶ* are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with Oncken (*Staatslehre der Arist.* ii. 386) we should suppose the words *γυναικας καὶ παιδας* on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

10. 9. *Ἄρτις δὲ τὴν διηγεστίαν.*

The connexion appears to be as follows: 'And as there were so many mouths to feed,' the legislator had many devices for

encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀρρενα ποιῆσα δυλίαν, περὶ ἣς εἰ φαῦλως ή μὴ φαῦλως 10. 9.
ἔπειτας ἔσται τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καρός.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in Book vii. c. 16, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of c. 8. § 25 supra, Διὸν μὲν ἀφώμεν τούτην τὴν σκέψιν, ἀλλων γάρ ἔστι καρόν.

ἴνταίθα δὲ οὐκ ἔξι ἀπάντων αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ 10.10-12.
τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντὶ τις ἔστει
λέγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακεδάμων γυναικέων. τὸ γὰρ ἀντεῖδυντο, καὶ τὸ
διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς ἄξιας αὐτοῖς. . . τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ δὲ. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (Susemihl, Bernays) or to the κόσμοι (Stahr)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the Cosmi appear not to have held office for life (cp. γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων), perhaps only for a year (Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see infra, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has 'gone off upon a word' as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζειν. περὶ δὲ and γυναικέων have also been taken as neuters: 'about which things,' i. e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα δρχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτογράμματα διτιθαλές. 10. 11.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

οὐδὲ γὰρ λήματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις δύσπειρ τοῖς ἀφέροις, πάρρει γ' ἀντα- 10. 12.
κῶσιν δὲ τῆσθε τῶν διαφθερούντων.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers,

and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

10. 13. οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλής δὲ κακόν.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a *κακόν*. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.

10. 14. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἢν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκαιοι βούλωνται δοῦναι.

The words *ἢν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις* which follow and the preceding *ἐκβάλλουσι συντάντες τῷν* show that the expression *τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν* means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

10. 15. οὗτι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις τῶν βουλομένων ἐπειθεούσαι καὶ δυναμένων.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (*οὕτως ἔχουσα*) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

10. 16. Διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοικῶν μένει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

10. 16. οὐτε γὰρ ἔξωτερης δρυῆς πουσανοῦν.

Either 1*) have no foreign dominions; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

10. 16. μενούτι τε πόλεμος ἔπειτας διεβίβησε τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be B.C. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly after-

wards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a 'foreign war.' Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (B.C. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander.

μεσοί τε refers to *σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον*, 'Quite lately [her isolation did not save her,] foreign mercenaries brought war into the island.'

καὶ πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τὸν ἄλλους.

11. 1.

'And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations' or 'with the others of whom I have been speaking.' For the use of *περιττός*, cp. c. 6. § 6.

αὐτοί γάρ αἱ πολεῖται τρεῖς διλήμματα τε σύνεγγύς πάσι εἰσι.

11. 1.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only 'the common tables,' the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 infra): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

σημεῖον δὲ πολεῖτας συντεταγμένων.

11. 2.

'And the proof that they were an organized state' or 'that they had a regular constitution.' The insertion of *εἰς* before *συντεταγμένων* (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. supra ii. 9. § 22.

τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα agrees with some word such as *πόλιν* understood 11. 2. from *πολεῖτας*= 'the city with its democracy.' There is no need to change *ἔχοντα* into *ἴστατα* (Bernays) or *ἴστασσαν* (Spengel).

μήτε στάσις γεγονόθει.

11. 2.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that 'the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,' which is also irreconcileable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in loco.

11. 3. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταῖρῶν τοῖς φεδρίσιοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις . . τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσι.

Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the 'camp life' of the Spartan syssitia; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councillors of Carthage: or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or suffetes who seem to have been elected annually and were not military officers at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, *infra* § 9.

11. 3. οὐ χείρον.

Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, 'and this is an improvement.'

11. 4. καὶ βελτιῶν δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αἰτό, εἴναι γένος, μηδὲ τούτῳ τὸ τυχόν, εἴ τε διαφέρον ἐκ τούτων αἱρεούσες μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.

The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With *διαφέρον* supply τὸ γένος ἐστί. The correction of Bernays, *τυχόν, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων αἱρεούσις* is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, *εἰ δέ, ἀλλ' εἰ τι, εἴτις* have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. *εἴ τε* is to be read as two words and answers to *μήτε*, as *διαφέρον* does to *μηδὲ τούτῳ τὸ τυχόν*. 'It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.'

11. 4. μεγάλου γάρ κύριος αἰδοστότες, δὲ εἰστέλεις δέσι, μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ οὐλαγήσι τὸν τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Δακτύαιμονίων.

He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not unfrequently sold the highest offices for money.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας,

11. 5.

sc. ἐπειρηθέντων ἢν κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'But of the things which would be censured when compared with the ideal of aristocracy and constitutional government, etc.'

The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower 11. 5. sense, and like Aristotle's own *πολιτεία*, a combination of oligarchy and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian constitution is expressly called an 'aristocracy' in iv. 7. § 4, because it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them; 2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power of initiation.

εἰς τὰς ἔτραπεις πολιτείαις.

11. 6.

Sc. Crete and Sparta. Cp. supra § 5, *τὰς εἰρημένας πολιτείαις.*

τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ.

11. 7.

Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired, nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or committees of the *γερουσία*. Their position may be illustrated by that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the *γερουσία* when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

τὴν τὰς διατάξεις.

11. 7.

Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed *μεγίστη δοξή*, the other is said to consist of great officers who are compared with the Ephora. If the two institutions are assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the citizens in Plato's Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000.

But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the ordo judicum consisted of 100. ‘Centum ex numero senatorum judices diliguntur.’ Justin xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year B.C. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

11. 7. *καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχεῖων δικάζεσθαι πάσας [ἀριστοκρατικόν], καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπὸ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ.*

Either 1)* *καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ* refers to the immediately preceding clause, *μὴ ἄλλας ὑπὸ ἄλλων*:—or 2), to the words *δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχεῖων δικάζεσθαι πάσας*, in which case *καὶ . . . ἄλλων* must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect *ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχεῖων*, unless the words *καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπὸ ἄλλων* be regarded as suggesting *αὐτῶν* by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. ‘Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.’ The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are

both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The difficulty in this way of construing the passage is not the parenthesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of *ἄλλων* vaguely for ‘different persons,’ and not, as the preceding words *ἴποτε τῶν ἀρχέων* would lead us to expect, for ‘different magistracies,’ or ‘boards of magistrates.’

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contradiction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter are as follows: ‘For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extraordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates; at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided, some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.’

For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, ll. 9.
παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίους δόμα φανέρως διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς· παρὰ δὲ Ὀρυγαλούς θάνατός ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον.

Δεῖ δὲ τομίζειν διμάρτημα πομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταῦτην κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office; the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the governing class, and then there would have been no need to appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even if the better classes generally are not to be protected against poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will ensure them leisure. See infra § 12, βλέπειν δὲ εἰ καὶ προστέο τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῶν ἀντεκτάντων διπομοθέτην κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ τρίτης εὐτερίας χάριν σχεδῆς, φαινεῖν τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ll. 10. διηγήσας εἶναι τὸν δρχόν, τόν τε βασιλεῖαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the *Politics*, the meaning can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian constitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words *τὰς μεγίστας*

ἀνηρᾶς εἴναι τῶν ἀρχῶν would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, § τινα ἀλλήν ἔχεις ιδέαν πολιτείας, γῆτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γάρ καὶ ὡνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τοιαῦται τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τις τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὑροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἑλληνας.

11. 12. βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ προείτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διομοθέτης.

The MSS. vary between *ἀπορίαν* and *εὐπορίαν* without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth] of the better class.' A similar confusion of *ἄπορος* and *εὐπόρος* occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, *ἀπόροις* and *εὐπόροις*: v. 1. § 14, *ἀπόροις* and *εὐπόροις*: v. 3. § 8, *ἀπόρων* and *εὐπόρων*: vi. 2. § 9, *ἀπόρους* and *εὐπόρους*.

11. 14. κοινότερὸν τέ γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἔκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ βάττον.

κοινότερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, cp. § 13.

ἔκαστον τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because each thing remains the same. The insertion of *ινὸ* before *τῶν*, suggested by the Old Translation *ab eisdem*, is unnecessary. *τῶν αὐτῶν*, 'where the duties are the same.'

κάλλιον ἀποτελεῖται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

11. 15. ἀκφεύγοντι τῷ πλούτῳ. See note on text.

So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there 'any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged' (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.

ἀλλὰ τοιὶ ἔστι τύχης ἐργον.

11. 15.

Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

ἄν δικαιά γένεται τις.

11. 16.

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says 12. 2–6. that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle's criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the *δικαιοσύνη* to Solon (cp. Schömann's Athenian Constitution, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (*τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσας, τὰ δικαιοσύνην ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων*); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle's (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

ἐπειρος τῶν δημογούνων.

12. 4.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the *Gorgias*, pp. 515, 516.

12. 5. ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔουκε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόντας τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν.
Cp. Solon, Fragm. 4 in Bergk Poet. Lyri. Graeci, Δῆμῳ μὲν γὰρ
ἔσθικα τόσον κράτος, δύστον ἐπαρκεῖ, | Τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελῶν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος.

12. 6. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γυναίκων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν
πεντακοσιομεδίμων καὶ ζευγιτῶν καὶ τρίτου τελούν τῆς καλουμένης ἵππαδος
τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμάς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippes to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in Suidas and Photius about ἴππαις and ἴππας (Boeckh, P. E. ii. 260) under ἴππας, which in Photius s. v. is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (?) de Rep. Atheniensium, and an addition 'that ἴππαδες belong to ἴππαις' (?).

12. 6. ποιοβέται δ' ἐγέροντο Ζάλευκός τε Δοκρόis τοῖς ἐπιέφυρίοις, καὶ Χαρόν-
δας δὲ Καταναῖς τοῖς αἰτοῦ πολέταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting Ephorus, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given:

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

12. 7. Θαλης.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by Ephorus apud Strabonem, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of Lycurgus; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in Plut. de Musica, pp. 1135, 1146, Clinton supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 B.C. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of Plutarch and Pausanias.

12. 7. Λυκούργος οὐδὲ Ζαλεύκος.

A greater anachronism respecting Lycurgus is found in the fragments of Ephorus (Strabo x. 482, ἀντιχόστα δ', οὐ φασί τινες, καὶ

Ομήρῳ διατρίβοντι ἐν Χίῳ, quoted by Oncken, Staatslehre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 346).

έγινετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος.

12. 8.

The δὲ is not opposed to μὲν at the end of the last sentence, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ε.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, περιπάται δέ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Andromedas, nothing more is known: 12. 11. of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xliv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ὁ τῶν Δοκρῶν νομοδέτης, τοὺς νόμους ἔφησε τοῖς ἀραχνίοις ὄμοιοις εἶναι· δοκεῖ γάρ εἰς ἐκείνα ἔτι μὲν ἐμπέση μνᾶ ἡ κάνων, κατέχεται, ἔτι δὲ σφῆς ἡ μελιστα, διαρρήξασα δέρπεται, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἔτι μὲν ἐμπέση πένης, συνέχεται· ἔτι δὲ πλούσιος ἡ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαρρήξας ἀποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle's phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said 'to be of general application.' Stobaeus has also preserved (xliv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

Πλάτωνος δ' η τέ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ 12. 12. τὰ συστίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δισκηρῶν ὅπεις ἀμφιλέξιοι γίνεσθαι απὸ τὴν μελέτην, ὃς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοὺς χερούς τὴν δὲ δημόροτος.

The reference to Plato's communism in contrast with Phaleas' proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the 'Laws,' is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them on matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which

genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the *Politics*. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δισκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause *διὰ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος*. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after *ἀμφιδέξιος γίνεται*, or may be taken with *περὶ*.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the *ἀμφιδέξιος* as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, φύσει γάρ οὐ δεξιὰ κρέττων καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τις *ἀμφιδέξιος γενέσθαι*), whereas in Plato (*Laws* 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

12. 13. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

Cp. Plut. Solon 17. Another reference to Draco occurs in Rhet. ii. 23, 1400 b. 21, καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθράκων οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος χαλεποὶ γάρ.

BOOK III.

τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι.

1. 1.

The particle δὲ after τῷ was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου

1. 1.

are a resumption of the opening words τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. ‘The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.’ The clause τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ . . . περὶ πόλεως is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἡ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

οἵδιοι τῶν δικαιῶν μετέχοντες οὐτε καὶ δίκαιοι ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά- 1. 4.
ζούσαι.

οἱδιοι is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαιῶν μετέχοντες. ‘Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.’

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει.

1. 4.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent πόλεως above, ‘for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,’ whereupon follows the correction, ‘although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.’ Or 2*) they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e. g. infra c. 6. § 4, where

τοῦ ξῆν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ is repeated in κατὰ τὸ ξῆν αὐτὸ μόνον : also iv. 1. § 1, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔστιν, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for a) such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, καὶ ἀλλοσούμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἔνυθεν βαλαίσ πρὸς τοὺς ἔνυμάχους δίκαιοις καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς δρόσοις σόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν). b) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

1. 5. οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν.

λίαν qualifies and at the same time emphasises δὲλῶς: 'But not quite absolutely.'

1. 5. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων κ.τ.λ.

I. e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

1. 7. ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαιοτοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ.

'This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.' Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: 'Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.'

1. 8. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαθέσθαι ὅτι τὸν πραγμάτων ὃς οὐς τὰ ὄποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἕστι πρᾶγμα τὸ δὲ διάτερον τὸ δὲ ἔχομενον, η τὸ παρόνταν οὐδέν ἔστι, οὐ τοιάτι, τὸ κατόν, η γλίσχρη.

τὰ ὄποκείμενα. 1*) 'the underlying notions' or 'the notions to which the things in question are referred,' i. e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, 'the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends' (see Bonitz s. v.). 2) ὄποκείμενα is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates 'where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.' But it is hard to see how things which are

different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

*τὰς δὲ πολιτείας δρῶμεν εἶδε διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας 1. 9.
τὰς δὲ προτέρας σύντοις.*

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with the imperfect. So in Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, 'there are no common ideas of things prior and posterior.' The logical conceptions of prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern metaphysics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions 'a priori' and 'a posteriori,' or 'prior in the order of thought,' which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind, they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing sense of the continuity or development of all things.

διόπερ ὁ λεχθεῖς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ πολίτης.

1. 10.

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle's own polity hereafter to be described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. infra, c. 13. § 12). Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (infra, c. 7. § 5), but he here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of democracy which is akin to the *μίση πολιτεία*.

καὶ μέρος.

1. 10.

Generally 'in turn,' but the examples show that the phrase must here mean 'by sections' or 'by different bodies or magistracies.'

*τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῷ Καρχηδόνῃ πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ των κρίουσι 1. 11.
νὴ δίκαια.*

τὸν αὐτὸν, i.e. because in both these cases the administration of justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.

The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at Lacedae-

mon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

L. II. *ἀλλ' ἔχει γάρ διάρθρωτον ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός.*

The particle *γάρ* implies an objection which is not expressed. ‘But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies?’ To which Aristotle answers, ‘But I will correct the definition so as to include them.’ Finding *ἀδέρφιος ἀρχή* to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, ‘admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.’

L. 12. *ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.*

Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

2. I. *πολιτικῶς.*

‘Popularly’ or ‘enough for the purposes of politics.’ Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So *τομικῶς* (viii. 7. § 3), ‘enough for the purposes of law.’

For *ταχέως* Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read *παχέως*.

2. 2: *Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Δεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἵστως ἀπορῶν τὰ δὲ εἰρηνεύομενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοιν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Δαρισταῖος τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους εἶναι γάρ τινας λαριστοποιούς.*

ἀπορῶν. ‘In doubt about the question who is a citizen?’

δημιουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only ‘magistrates,’ but 1) ‘makers of the people,’ 2) ‘artisans.’ The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

There is also a further pun upon the word *Δεοντίνος*, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

‘Artisans make kettles.

Magistrates make citizens.’

The sentence may be translated as follows:—‘Gorgias, every

likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Larisceans manufactured by their 'artisan-magistrates; for some of them were makers of kettles' (*λάρισσαν οὐ Δαρισσαῖος*).

For the term *εἰρωνεύμενος*, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii. 7, 1408 b. 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωνείας, διπερ Γοργίας ἔτοιει: and for *Δάρισσαν* compare *Τάναγρα Ταναύρις*, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epigram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Λαβροσίνη τάδε δῶρα, φλευδείχῳ τε Δαφνυμῷ
θήκατο δεισόδου* Δαριέως κεφαλά,
τὸς Δαρισσαίως βουγάστορας ἐψητῆρας,
καὶ χότρας καὶ τὰν εὐρυχαδῆ κύλικα,
καὶ τὰν εὐχάλκωτον ἐντραπτόν τε κρεάγραν,
καὶ κηῆτον, καὶ τὰν ἐποδόντον τορύνα.
Λαβροσίνη, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα κακοῦ καὶ δωρητῆρος
δεξαμάνα, τίνοις μή ποκα συφροσίνα.

**δεισόδου*=stinking; cp. Suidas, s. v. *δεισαλέος*:—*δεισαλέος*, *κοκράδης*.
δεῖσα γὰρ ἡ κώπος.

ξένους καὶ δοῦλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.)

2. 3.

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they stand, taking *μετοίκους* with both *ξένους* and *δοῦλους*. He quotes Aristoph. Knights 347 (*εἴ που δυῖδιον εἴρεις εὖ κατὰ ξένους μετοίκους*), and infers from the juxtaposition of the words *δοῦλους μετοίκους*, that they mean, 'slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves, though belonging to a master.' That is to say *μέτοικοι* are spoken of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics. Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures, like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave insulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

τὸ δὲ ἀρμονιζόμενα πρὸς τούτους ἔστιν οὐ τὰς πολέμης, ἀλλὰ πότερον 2. 4.
ἀλλίως ἡ δυαλεῖα. ποίεις καὶ τοῦτο τις ὅτι προσπειρόμενος κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in

principle.' These two senses of the words 'true' and 'false' were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

2. 5. *τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἀρχῆς* refers to *τωι*, sc. *ἀριστερ*, supra 1. § 7, 'an office such as we spoke of.'

3. 1. *δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φαίνον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ή μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν.*

A doubt is raised whether the *δικαίως πολιτεύων* is truly a *πολίτης*. The answer is that the *ἀδίκως ἄρχων* is truly an *ἄρχων*. But the *πολίτης* is by definition an *ἄρχων*, and therefore the *ἀδίκως πολίτης* may be rightly called a *πολίτης*.

καὶ τούτους, sc. τοὺς ἀμφισβητουμένους (§ 4), 'these as well as the legitimate citizens.'

πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1, and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the *de jure* citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the *de jure* state, which is now to be discussed.

3. 1, 2. *ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ή τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὗτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνοιο βούλασται δειλίαν.*

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypelids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

3. 2. *εἰπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦντα τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτων, δύοτε τῆς πολέως φαίνον εἶναι ταῦτα τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταῦτα πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.*

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. *πρὸς Λευτίου*, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedae-

monians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

ἐνδέχεται γάρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπους.

3. 3.

E.g. the case of the Athenian *κληροῦχοι*, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, δ τόπος εἰς δ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως.

πολλαχῶς γάρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστί πως εὑμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης 3. 4.
ζητήσεως.

'When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word "state" is used in different senses.'

ἔμοιστος δὲ καὶ τὸν τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κατοικούντων,
sc. ἡ ἀπορία ἐστίν, supplied from τῆς ἀπορίας ταῦτης.

3. 4.

τοιαύτη δὲ ίσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλών.

3. 5.

'Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,'—
further illustrated by ἡς γ' ἐλασκνίας κ.τ.λ.

ἡς γέ φασιν ἐλασκνίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθίσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. 3. 5.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: 'The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.' Also Jeremiah li. 31: 'One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.'

Διὰ τοῦτο μὲν ταῦτη τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς Ἑλλον ταῦτα χρήσιμος ἡ σπίχις 3. 6.
τοῦτο γάρ μηγίθων τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πέριον καὶ πέπεριον ὅθεος δὲ οὐ πλέον
επιφέρειν, διό μὲν λανθάνειν τὸ πολεῖτιν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, οὗτοι δὲ πολεικήρη
χαραγμένοι πρότοις τὸ τε πλήθος τὸν ἀνθρώπους, πάντος τοις καὶ πολέος
τελέρχουν διό φύσις, καὶ πατέται τὸ χήρων ἀνεπότας, οὗτοι τε εἶναι καὶ πολέος

των ταύτην, and § 11. In the words τὸν πολιτικὸν Aristotle identifies himself with the statesman or politician of whom he is speaking.
πότερον οὗτος ἐν ἡ πλείω, cp. vii. 9. § 8 and 10. § 13.

3. 6, 7. ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούστων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερον ἔστι διὸ τὸ γένος ταῦτα τῶν κατοικούστων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ δὲ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γεννομένων, διόπερ καὶ ποταμούς εἰσθαμενούς λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγυμνομένου νάματος, τοῦ δὲ ὑπεξιώντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἵτια, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἄτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἴτερ γάρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives ἀλλὰ τῶν . . . τρέπων create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἵτιαν. ‘For the same reason as the rivers;’ i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or

for worse ; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree ; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word *πόλις* (§ 4). Cp. iv. 5. § 3 ; v. 1. § 8.

εἰσερ γάρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, 3. 7.
γνωμένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ διαφέρούσῃς τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
δέξειν ἀν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν.

'For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, *ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας*, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes' : or, if this construction is deemed harsh *πολιτείας*, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle *γάρ* implies assent to the second alternative (*supra*).

'The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which 4. 1, 2. is the safety of the ship ; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.'

οὐ μή δὲλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλοι τρόπους ἔστι διατοροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν 4. 4.
λόγον περὶ τῆς δρόστης πολιτείας.

The last words are an explanation of *κατ' ἄλλοι τρόπους*.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men : secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6 ; vii. 14. §§ 2-5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide ; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (*καταλέγεσσιν* in Aristotle's own language), and they appear to be here confused.

4. 5. εἰ γὰρ ἀδίνατον ἐξ ἀπόστων σπουδαῖον δυτικὸν εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δὲ ἔκαστον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ὅργον εἰς ποιεῖν, τούτῳ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδίνατον δυοῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἀν τὴν μίαν ἀρετὴν πολέτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄγαθον. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαῖον πολέτου δεῖ πάσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀριστοτῆτος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἀδίνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἄγαθον εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαῖᾳ πόλει πολίτας.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible with the different occupations or natural qualities of different citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation of society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of Aristotle. (Compare Ethics ii. 5. § 14, ἐσθλὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντῶς δὲ κακοῖ.)

4. 6. καὶ οἰκίᾳ ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις ἐξ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου.
κτῆσις is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of the οἰκία: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, κτῆσις is a subdivision of the οἰκία under which the slave is included.

4. 7. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολεμικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of the φρόνιμος: and vi. 8. § 1, where πολεμικὴ is described as a species of φρόνησις.

4. 7, 8. ἀλλ' ἡδη δύτις η αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολέτου τε σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαῖον; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολεμικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν ποιεῖσαν δὲ εἰδῆς ἀνέρας εἶναι λέγοντι πινεις τοῦ ἀρχοντα, διότε καὶ φαίνεται εἰ τῷ βασιλέων νικῆσσιν καὶ πολεμώσῃ παιδευμένος.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.

καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δὲ εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ. ‘Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different.’ So in § 6 above, εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5. § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ὑπάρχει γάρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα τὸ έν καὶ τὸ δύ.

μή μοι τὰ πάμψι.

4. 8.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol.

Fr. 16:—

λαμπροὶ δὲ αἰχμαῖς Ἄρεος ἔν τε συλλόγοις,
μή μοι τὰ κορυφὰ ποιᾶσθαι γενοίσθαι,
δὲλλ’ ὅν πολει δέ, μεγάλα βουλεύονται.

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poets (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ δρχούστων τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολίτης δὲ στὶ 4. 9.
καὶ δὲ δρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἀνὴν πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὲς μάτιοι
πολίτους.

‘If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,’ i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

οὐ γάρ ἡ αὐτὴ δρχούστων καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ιέναι λάσιον ἔφη ποιῆσθαι, 4. 9.
ὅτε μὲν τοραστοῖς, διὸ εἰς διαιτήμενος θεάστητο εἶναι.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) ‘that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station’; or 2)* ‘that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to

live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to *πεινήν* and *ἐπιστάμενος*.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26,
'δέν ἀδικεῖν ἔντα, δύνται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποεῖν.'

4. IO. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφο, οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἀμφο ἐπαυτεῖ δόμοις.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words *οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἀμφο ἐπαυτεῖ δόμοις* according to the first way = 'the citizen is more to be praised than the good man': according to the second, 'the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy'; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

4. II. ἔτει οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα δέν τὸν ἀρχοντα μαθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖς, τούτωνθεν δὲ κατέδοι τις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1^o that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the *ἀρχῶν* and *ἀρχόμενος*, taken separately.

The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ἀμφότερα into ἀμφω ἔτερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty, ('since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things'), because τὸν ἀρχοντα καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in favour of Bernays' emendation that ἀμφότερα may have crept in from the ἀμφότερα in the next line; and against it that the two words ἀμφω ἔτερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8–10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταῦτην γάρ λέγομεν in § 14.

ὅτι γάρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική κ.τ.λ.

4. 11.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ἀρχὴ πολιτικὴ to which they do.

ὅτι γάρ refers back to τὸν ἀρχοντα, 'We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.'

ὅτι παρ' ἑτοῖς οὐ μετίχον αἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον 4. 12.
γενέσθαι τὸν δημαρχον.

ἵδι, referring to ἀνθρωπῶν and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, 'Because of their servile and degraded character.'

τὸν ἀρχεράντα σύντε.

4. 13.

I.e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάρην εἴτε πρὸς αὐτόν, οὐ γάρ ἐτι κ.τ.λ.

4. 13.

* 'For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually' (indicated by ποτε), 'there is no longer any difference between master and slave,' i.e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τὸν μή, τὸν δέ, instead of τὸν μή, τὸν δέ, 'for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at

another time servant'—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.

4. 14. οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ δόξαι μη ἀρχόμενα.

An ancient proverb naturally attributed by tradition (Diog. Laert. i. 60; Stobaeus xlvi. p. 308) to Solon. Cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 215 D, who assigns the saying to Agis, ἐφωτθεῖς τί μάθημα μάλιστα ἐν Σπάρτῃ ἀσκέτας, τὸ γυνάκειον, εἶπεν, ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι.

4. 16. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω.

At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

4. 17. καὶ γυνὴ λαλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη διπερ δ ἀνήρ δ ἀγαθός.

Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μη χείροις γενέσθαι ὑπὸ μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἡσ δὲ εἰπέλλαχιστος ἀρετῆς πέρι ἡ ψύχου δὲ τοῖς ἀρσεσι κλέος γένεται.

4. 18. ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς διπερ αἰλοποιὸς γάρ δ ἀρχόμενος, δ δ' ἀρχεῖν αἰλητῆς δ χράμενος.

Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητής who has only πίστις δρθῆ and the χράμενος who has ἐπιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the αἰλοποιὸς and the αἰλητῆς, and Cratylus 388 ff. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, 'ἢ μὲν γάρ φρόνησις ἀπειπετεῖ ἔστιν...ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κρετικὴ μάνον.'

5. The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

5. 1. εὗτος γάρ αἰλέτης.

Sc. δ ἔχει τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν. See note on English text.

ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φίσσων συμβαίνεις ἀποκεῖ; οὐδὲ γάρ 5. 2.
οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀτελεύθεροι.

'But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.'

διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον=so far as this objection goes, viz. the implied objection that he has no place in the state.

τῶν εἰρημένων refers to οὐδὲ μέτρους οὐδὲ ἔρως.

ἔξ ὑποθέσεως.

5. 2.

'On the supposition that they grow up to be men.'

τῶν δ' ἀνηγκαῖων.

5. 4.

'But in respect to servile occupations'; either an anacolouthon resumed in *τὰ τοιαῦτα*, or governed by the idea of *ἔργον* contained in *λεσχουργοῦντες*.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

φανέρων δ' ἀπτεῖθεν μηκότεν ἐπιστοχαμένοις πᾶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γάρ 5. 4.
φανέρων τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ.

'What has been said at once (*φανέρων*) makes the matter clear.' It has been said that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (*supra* c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows.

'For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.'

περὶ αὐτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

ἢ Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἡ τὸν δίκαιον ἄνθρακας μὴ διεργαζόμενον τὴν ἀγράν μὴ 5. 7.
μετέχειν ἀρχῆς.

Cp. *infra* vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated. It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the

state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

5. 7, 8. προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος . . οὐ μὴν ἀλλά κ.τ.λ.

ξένων is partitive: 'The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.' For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

5. 8. τοὺς δὲτὸν γυναικῶν.

I. e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words *εἰς δοῦλους*), but strangers or resident aliens.

5. 8. τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς δὲ διμφοῖν αὐτῶν.

The MSS. read *αὐτῶν*: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed *αὐτῶν* into *δοτῶν*, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word *δοτῶν* is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to *πολίτης*; and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. 'they make only those of them (*αὐτῶν*) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father's and mother's side.' *εἰτῶν*, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

5. 9. ὡς εἰ τούτοις διέμητος μεταβάστην.

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of *διέμητος* = *τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων*. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.

ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἔστιν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι- 5. 9.
κούντων ἔστιν.

τὸ τοιοῦτα = τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i. e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, ‘the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.’

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικούντων, which is taken in the sense of ‘fellow-colonists’: ‘the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.’ (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11–13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

κακέως.

5. 10.

Sc. δ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς καὶ πολέμης στοῦντας ἦν. In his later edition Bekker reads κακεῖντος, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read κακέως. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. ‘Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i. e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.’ κακέως = καὶ δ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.: κακεῖντος = ὃς γε δ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.

ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία . . πολιτείαιν ἔτεραν εἶναι τούτων.

6. 1, 2.

Lit. ‘The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολιτεύμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἢ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly

we say that they differ in their constitutions.' The three words *πολίτευμα*, *πολιτεία*, *πόλις* have three primary gradations of meaning: 1) *πολίτευμα*=the government, i. e. the persons through whom the government acts; *πολιτεία*=the government administering and being administered, i. e. the state or constitution; *πόλις*=the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

6. 3. *καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ξῆν καλῶς.*

μέρος is to be taken with *καθ' ὅσον*, the genitive *τοῦ ξῆν καλῶς* is partitive. *ἐπιβάλλει*, sc. *ἐκάστῳ τῷ ξῆν καλῶς* or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

6. 4. *συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ξῆν ἔρεκεν αἴτου (ἴσως γὰρ ἔρεστι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον), καὶ συνέχουνται τὴν πολιτικήν κοινωνίᾳ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ξῆν αἴτον, ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λάσι.*

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A: 'And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined;—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.'

6. 5. *ἀς ἐνούσης ταῦς εὐημερίας ἐν αἴτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φύσεώς: cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 7, τὸ δὲ ξῆν τῶν καθ' αἴτον ἄγαδόν καὶ ἥδεν κ.τ.λ.*

6. 6. *ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αἴτός.*

αἴτος refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

6. 9. *τὸ αἴτον ἄγαδόν.*

The reflexive refers to the principal subject *ἀξιώντες*: but is

changed into the singular by the introduction of *ταῦτα*. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, ‘Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.’ For the ‘disinterestedness’ of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

νῦν δέ.

6. 10.

Answering to *πρότερον μὲν* above. ‘The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.’

ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτες φαγέοντες τούς μετέχοντας, ἢ δέι κοινωνίη τοῦ συμ- 7. 2.
φέροντος.

The meaning of *γάρ* is as follows: ‘Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.’ For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, *πᾶσαν πόλιν δρόμεν κοινωνίαν τοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ πάσαν κοινωνίαν δῆμον τοῦ δικαιοσύνης ἔνεκεν συνεστηκεῖν.* And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

ἀριστοκρατίας, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖς, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον. 7. 3.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like Plato in the Cratylus, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. *σωφροσύνη*, ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φρόντιον, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; ἡθικὴ from ἡθος, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; δίκαιος δὲ δίκαιος δοῦς, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; μακρέων διὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; *τυμωρεία* . . . διὸ τυμωρέων πολεύειν, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of *ἀριστοκρατία* is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take *ἀριστος* in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle’s ideal state.

πολεύειν.

7. 3.

In Ethics viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with *τυμωρεία* = διὸ τυμωρέων πολεύειν, a government based upon a property qualification (*τυμωρείαν λέγειν εἰδίνειν φαίνεται*, πολιτείαν δὲ αὐτήν εἴδεσσον εἶ πλεῖστης

*καλεῖν). No example of the word *τυμοκρατία* occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense—the government of honour (ἢ φιλότυμος πολιτεία, Rep. viii. 545 B).*

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, *πέμπτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα ποσῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μῆτ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ χρώνται ταῖς τέτταροι μόνον, δοκεῖ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις : also ii. 6. § 16.*

8. The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

8. 6. *διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ὥρθεις αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς.*

The MSS. have *διαφορᾶς* ('That the already mentioned differences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat unusual sense to *αἰτίας*). The old translator has 'differentiae' in the genitive. Better to take *διαφορᾶς* as a genitive, making *αἰτίας* the predicate, and repeating the word with *ἥρθεις*. 'And thus the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays inserts *πολιτειῶν* after *ἥρθεις* without authority, and appears to translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the governing body being few or many (*τὰς ᥕρθεις αἰτίας*), but by poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and the poor many.

9. 1. *καὶ οὖτις, διὸ τὸν πᾶσιν, διλλὰ τοῖς ισοῖς.*

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp. Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honoris summis et infimis . . ipsa aequitas iniquissima est' Burke, French Revol. (vol. v. p. 106, ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to every man.'

τὸ δὲ αἰτιον δτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις.

9. 2.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

ἔπειτα . . θείηρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἰς.

9. 3.

Lit. 'Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons.' τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον is to be taken not with διέρηται, but with the words which follow=δμοίως.

τὴν δὲ οἰς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

9. 3.

τὴν δέ, sc. Ισότητα is accusative after ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

οἰς as above τὸ οἰς, the technical word for persons, lit. 'in relation to the whom.' Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. §§ 6, 7.

οὐ γάρ εἶναι δίκαιος ὅστις μετέχει τὸν ἑκατὸν μηδὲν τὸν εἰσεγέγαγτα μίαν θ. 5.
μᾶν τῷ δόσι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὐτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγνωμένων.

Either 1)* τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς is in apposition with τὸν ἑκατὸν μηδὲν or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may=τῶν δέ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰσεγέγαγταν τινά i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burke, Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), 'In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.'

εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μάνος ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ.

9. 6.

εἰ δέ introduces the opposite side of the question. 'If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong' (cp. above, § 5, διεῖ
δ τὸν διαγερχαῖν λόγος δόξειν δὲ Ισχύειν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacoluthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

οὐ γάρ δὲ δοῦλοις οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων ζῆσαι δυνατοί.

9. 6.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, εἰδαμονίας δ' αἰδεῖς ἀνθρακόδερμος μεταδίδωσιν εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου,

οἰς δεῖται σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλλολους.

9. 6.

Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων καινωνῶσιν.

9. 8. μὴ λόγου χάρα

is either 1)* taken with περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελές εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ὡς ἀληθᾶς, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

9. 8. γίνεται γάρ η κοινωνία.

'For otherwise the state becomes' or 'would be.'

9. 8. συμμαχία τῶν ἀλλων τόπῳ διαφέροντα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων.

The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. 'A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at a distance, in place only.' Or τῶν ἀλλων may be taken with συμμαχῶν, τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων being epexegetic=other alliances of which the members live apart.

9. 8. Δικόφρων δ σοφιστής.

An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1-3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Elench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra. Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that 'the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.' Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, αὐτὸς δ τὸν συνθίκην τούτην.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): 'The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.'

9. 11. εἰ γάρ καὶ συνέδομεν οὕτω καινωνῶντες, ἔκστος μόνοι χρέος τῇ θύει εἰκάζομεν πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δὲ ἐπιμαχίας οὕτως βοηθοῦστες δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδὲ οὕτως δὲ εἴναι δόξει τὰς τοῦς ἀδικοῦσιν, εἰπερ δρούσις δημοσίες συνελθόντες καὶ χαρίς.

'As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.' The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e. g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χρήστος τῇ ιδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ διοπέρ πολεων. I. e. 'If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation;' in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

βοηθουντες is parallel with *κοινωνοῦντες*, and in apposition with the nominative to *συνέλευσιν*.

καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν.

9. 13.

Nearly=τρόποι τοῦ συζῆν, 'pleasant modes of common life,' or more freely 'enjoyments of society,' not 'relaxations for the sake of society,' a construction not admissible in prose.

ξῆται δὲ διοπίαι κ.τ.λ.

10. 1.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of *dioptai* which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The *dioptai* are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

Θεοῖς γάρ τῇ Δίᾳ τῷ περίπετον.

10. 1.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, Τοις δὲ τῇ Δίᾳ δηλοῖς δὲ περὶ διοπίαις εἴσοδος: cp. Xen. Mem. v. 1. 4, ἀλλὰ ταὶ μὲν Δίᾳ τοῦδε δέξιοι μετὸν εἶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 8. § 6, πότερον δὲ μόνος τούτος ἢ ταὶ τῇ Δίῃ ἀερίσας ἡμῖν εἰσγεῖσται πολεμεῖν; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not

based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

10. 2. πᾶλις τε πάντων ληφθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληφθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1)* ‘when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted;’ for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) ‘when all the citizens are taken together,’ but this is a doubtful use of ληφθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the previous argument: ‘When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.’

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve,—and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

10. 2. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχὶ οὐδὲ δρεπή φθείρει τὸ ζῆντον αὐτῆν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper *έργον*. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

10. 5. Διὸν γὰρ τὸν μὲν δικαρχεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ δημοκρατεῖσθαι, τὸ διοικεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον μένειν:

‘Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the pre-

judices or interests of oligarchy or democracy.' Compare infra c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

δόξειν δὲ λύεσθαι καὶ τούτην ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κανὸν δλήθειαν.

11. 1.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) *εὐπορίαν* for *ἀπορίαν* (but the sense which would be given to *εὐπορία* is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of *λύεσθαι* or *λύεσθαι καὶ*, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of *ἀπορίαν*, or to be a corruption of *δλήθειαν*. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), *ἔχει γάρ τοῦτον' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν*. The text may therefore be accepted.

*ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς (διαφέρειν) φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα 11. 4.
διὰ τέχνης τῶν δληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆθει τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπειδὴ^{τε}
πειχωρισμένων γε καλλιστὸν ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τοῦδε μὲν τὸν δρθαλμόν,
ἐπίρου δέ τικος ἔπειρον μόριον.*

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e. g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. (Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (infra c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (Rep. vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in Rep. vi. 498–500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: 'Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (*das Ganze*).'

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—

individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

11. 5. οὐτε δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἑτίων ἀδύνατον. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρρέσσει λόγος. καίτοι τὶ διαφέρουσιν ἔμαι τῶν θηρίων;

'Assuredly,' retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, 'this principle cannot be true of all men. For it would be a *reductio ad absurdum* to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.'

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of 'collective wisdom' is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

11. 7. διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀν τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as *εἰκός ἔστω* or *ἀνάγκη* have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

11. 9. ξένοισι συνελθόντες ἵκανται αἰσθησιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between *σύνεσις* (= *αἰσθησις* in this passage), which is *κρετική μάνον*, and *φρόνησις*, which is *διατακτική*. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, *ἥτοι κρίνομέν γε η ἐνθυμούμενα δρῶσι τὰ περίμετα*.

11. 10, 11. Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term "physician" is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man; whether he be a statesman or

not, is better able to judge than the multitude.' This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word 'artist,' for which Aristotle substitutes 'one who has knowledge' (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the *δημοσύργος* and the *ἀρχιτεκτονός λαρπός* cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the *ἰδιώτης λαρπός* (*δέ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην*) cp. Politicus 259 A, 'εἴ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων λαρπῶν ικανὸς ἔνυμισθεντείς ιδιωτεύειν αὐτός, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀγαγαῖον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τοῦντομα τῆς τέχνης ταῦταν ὅπερ φέ συμβουλεύει;

Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common 11.14-17. sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, *δέ μὲν δῆμος οὐπερ ἐτ θελάττη τονύμα διετάσσετος*) and subject to fits of panic and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, 'whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature' is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares

many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness.

See *infra* at the beginning of c. 12.

11. 18. *καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλείων τὸ πάντων τούτων ἡ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ καὶ διλγούσις μεριδαῖς ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.*

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. *infra* c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

11. 19. *ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία κ.τ.λ.*

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

12. According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I-III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9-11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2, c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism; and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted, (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

12. 1. *ἐνεὶ δὲ ἐν τάσσαις κ.τ.λ.*

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words *τάσσαις δὲ λογίης κ.τ.λ.* (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then

be as follows: ‘ Seeing that the end of the state is “ justice ” which is the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality ? ’

δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν . . . τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις.

12. 1.

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, πρὸς μὲν οὐν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ διλέξεις περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέος, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δίξαν.

*εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀν τὸ μέγεθος ἐπάριμοιλον εἴη καὶ 12. 6.
πρὸς πλούτον καὶ πρὸς διευθερίαν. ὥστ’ εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος
ἢ ὁδὶ καὶ ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἴη ἀν συμβληγὰ
πάντα· τοσάνθε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρέπτον τοσαῦδε, τοσάνθε δῆλον ἄν τον.*

That is to say, If different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον, ‘for if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.’

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

ὅτι τὰς προτίμους . . . δοκεῖ δὲ τούτους.

12. 9.

1) freedom and wealth . . . 2) justice and valour.

ἀνέγκει πάσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις.

13. 1.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. infra §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.

13. 2. *ἡ δὲ χάρα κοινόν.*

'The common or inclusive element of the state,' 'an element in which all are concerned'; or, if the phrase be modernized, 'the land is a great public interest.'

The word is here used nearly as in *τὸ κοινόν* = 'public' or 'common': elsewhere in the sense of 'comprehensive,' 'general,' (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (*supra* ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

13. 5. *καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ· τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἴναι, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἐκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοπούμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διωριστέον.*

'There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.'

13. 6. *εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀρεθμὸν εἰναι δίλγοι πάμπτων οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;*

'How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?' For *διελεῖν* see ii. 2. § 1: also *τίνα τρόπον πειμήρηται*, iv. 1. § 10.

13. 6. *ἢ τὸ διλγόις πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ δεουκεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτος τὸ πλῆθος ἀστ' εἴναι πάλιν ἐξ αἰτῶν;*

'Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?'

τὸ διλγόις = 'the idea of the few,' like *τὸ οἰς* *supra* c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὸ ἔργον may be taken either with *δεῖ σκοπεῖν*, or with *τὸ διλγόις*. *τοσοῦτος* is dependent on *εἰ*, understood from *εἰ δυνατοὶ = ἢ δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσοῦτος τὸ πλῆθος εἰστι.*

διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἡ ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσι τινες, ἐνδέχεται 13.11,12. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετηγέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὄρθονάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιών συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθὲν. τὸ δὲ δρόδῳ ληπτέον ἵσως· τὸ δὲ ἵσως ὄρθον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιεως ὀλῆς συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.

Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1)* ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθὲν refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἀποροῦσι . . . πλειόνων in a parenthesis explanatory of τὴν ἀπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθὲν to the words τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βελτιόν κ.τ.λ., not 'when all the elements co-exist,' but 'when the whole people is better and richer than the few.'

ὅτε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἴναι τὴν τῶν ἔλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν 13. 13. εὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστων.

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are 'out of all proportion to other men' are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

οὐ γὰρ δύλειν αὐτὸς ἔγειν τὴν Ἀργά.

13. 16.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, φθεγξαντη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούρον βίρος. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word ἔγειν is taken to mean 'convey,' 'take on board,' as in Soph. Phil. 901,

ὅστε μή μ' ἔγειν πάντη τὸν. Stahr translates wrongly: 'Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.'

18. 16. τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasylus, but by Thrasylus to Periander; and Livy i. 54: also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

'Go thou, and, like an executioner,

Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays

That look too lofty in our commonwealth.'

18. 16. διὸ καὶ τοὺς φέγγοτας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀλλὰς οἰητέον δρῆσις ἐπιτιμᾶ.

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

18. 18. ὁ δοτρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν . . . τῷ κολούειν:

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read τῷ κολούειν—'have the same effect in respect of putting down the chief citizens.'

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether τῷ κολούειν 1) is to be taken after τὴν αὐτὴν (Bernays), or 2)* is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that τῷ κολούειν must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

18.18-23. It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if

they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking to the public good, they used ostracism for factious purposes.' Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished because the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice prevailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

οῖον Ἀθηναῖος μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους.

13. 19.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51; for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

ὅτε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδέν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 13. 22.
εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὀφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖσης τοῦτο δρᾶσιν.

1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). *τοῦτο δρᾶσιν* refers to the whole passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to this way of taking the passage that *ταῖς πόλεσιν* then occurs in two successive lines in different senses.

κατὰ τὰς διολεγομένους ὑπεροχέας.

13. 22.

'The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or government is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a rival out of the way.'

ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ ἀρχεῖς γε τοῦ τοιούτου παρεπλήσσουν γάρ εἰ τοῖς Διὸς 13. 25.
ἀρχεῖς ἀξιώτες τὰς ἀρχέας.

See note on text. 'Nay, more; a man superior to others is like

a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.' The words *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς* may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* 'as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods' according to the old legend, they, i. e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, 'as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.' Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, δὲ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὅχλος κρατῶν, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, δρουσιν καὶ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεόν, and Herod. v. 49, τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates *μερίζοντες* 'upon the principle of rotation of offices,' but no such use of *μερίζειν* occurs.

16. 4. κτείναι γάρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἔξοδοις ἐν χειρὶς νόμῳ.

οὐ κύριος, sc. δὲ βασιλεὺς, supplied from η βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ must be explained 'in a certain exercise of the royal office,' i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), 'for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy'; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes ἄνεκα δειλίας for ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS.; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἐν χειρὶς νόμῳ is often translated 'by martial law.' But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word *νόμος* is only pleonastic, and that ἐν χειρὶς νόμῳ = ἐν χερσὶν, 'hand to hand,' or 'by a sudden blow.'

δν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης κ.τ.λ.

14. 5.

Il. ii. 391–393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

πάρ γάρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

14. 5.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348:—

δν δ' ἀν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε πῶν ἔτρωθι νόήσω,
αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατος μητίσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

Ἔχουσι δ' αὐται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννικῆν· εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως 14. 6.
κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαῖ.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads πυρανίσις καὶ κατά, instead of τυραννικήν· εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως. So Paris 1, 2, but omitting καὶ: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read παραπλησίας τυραννικήν. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however ὅμως seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susemihl reads πυρανίσισ· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 14. 6.
7. §§ 1–4.

καὶ η φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰτίαν εἰ 14. 7.
γάρ πολέται φυλάσσουσι δόλους τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενιῶν.

διὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰτίαν. ‘Because the form of government is legal.’

The omission of the article before ξενιῶν emphasizes the opposition between οι πολέται and ξενιῶν—‘their own citizens’ are contrasted with ‘any mercenary body.’

τὸν παποτέρα.

14. 10.

Either on analogy of ὄθετρος,* ‘the base born,’ or possibly ‘the injurer of his country,’ like παπόδοιλος, ‘the maltreater of his slavea.’

διὸ γάρ τὸ τοὺς πρότερους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλέθους εὐηργύτας κατὰ τόχους § 14. 12.
παπέρον, διὸ δὲ τὸ συναγεγένετο πορίσα χάραν, ἡγίαστο βασιλεῖς διάστοι
καὶ τοὺς παρελαρβάνουσι πάτριοι.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7–9, where royalty is said to be based on merit;

and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation : and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

14. 13. ἐπον δὲ ἄξιοι εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλεῖαν κ.τ.λ.

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty ; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

15. 2. ὅπετε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἔστιν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πλεονειστρατηγὸν αἵδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος, ἡ οὐ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἔνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἡ οὐ συμφέρει.

κατὰ μέρος, not 'by rotation in a fixed order,' (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, 'by a succession of one citizen to another.' It is implied, though not expressed, that they are chosen by vote : cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ αἰρεταί.

Three MSS. read καθ' αἴρεσιν instead of κατὰ μέρος. It is more likely that καθ' αἴρεσιν is a gloss on κατὰ μέρος, than the reverse.

15. 2. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἡ πολιτείας.

'Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,' is to be regarded as a matter of administration.' εἶδος νόμων μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτείας is an abridgment of εἶδος τοῦ ἐπισκοπεῖν περὶ τῶν νόμων μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτείας.

εἶδος (like φύσις i. 8. § 10, νόμος iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, δὲ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν δργάνου εἴθει ἔστιν, 'has the form or character of an instrument.'

15. 2. ὁστ' ἀφίσθω τὴν πρότητην.

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This is a strange notion ; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἀφίσθω, sc. τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος.

τὴν πρότητην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of 'to begin with' or 'at once' : so τὴν ταχίστην, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs

in Xenophon Mem. iii. 6. § 10, περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τὸν γε πρώτην ἀπισχήσομεν: and in Arist. Met. 5. 12, 1038 a. 35, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω τὴν πράτην. Aristotle refers to the Lacedaemonian kings again in v. 11. § 2, and to the life generalship, c. 16. § 1, *infra*.

This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in 15. 3 ff. Plato's Politicus 293–295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician's art is also introduced. Cp. also Rhet. i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

μετὰ τὴν τετράμερον,

15. 4.

sc. ἡμέραν = μετὰ τὴν τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between τριήμερον and τετρήμερον.

ἀλλ' ίντις ἀν φαῖτι τις ὁς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλεύεσται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα 15. 5, 6. αὐλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνίγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἴναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ὃ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἀλλων εἴναι δεῖ κυρίους.

αὐτόν, sc. τὸν βουλευόμενον, incorrectly translated in the text 'a king:' better, 'whether you call him king or not' there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ὃ παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—'although they have no authority when they err,' i. e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle's Politics in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . δεῖ κυρίους had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words ἀλλ' ίντις . . . αὐλλιον is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, δεῖ πάντα τοίνυν . . . κυρίους.

15. 7. ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίασις συμφορῆς καλλίων μᾶς καὶ δἰπλῆς. Βιδὸς τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἀμεινον ὅχλος πολλὰ ἡ εἰς δοτισοῦν.

Compare the saying ‘that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;’ and again, Burke, ‘Besides the characters of the individuals that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.’

15. 8. ἔκει δὲ ἔργον ἀμα πάντας δργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermae, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

15. 10. αἱρετώτερον ἀν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὕτης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀν γέ λαβεῖν πλείους δμούς.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this ‘aristocracy of virtue.’ In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

δμούς, ‘equal in virtue to one another,’ an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of *ἀριστοκρατία* in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, *πολλοὺς δμούς πρὸς ἀρετήν*, § II.

15. 12. ἐπειδὴν ποθεὶς εὐλογος γενέσθαι τὰς διληψίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth., viii. 10.

ἔπει δὲ καὶ μείζων εἶναι συμβίβηκε τὰς πόλεις, οἷσις οὐδὲ ἥρδεον ἔτι 15. 13.
γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

Here as elsewhere iv. 6. § 5, he accepts democracy not as a good but as a necessity, which arises as soon as wealth begins to flow and tradesmen 'circulate' in the agora, vi. 4. § 13; and the numbers of the people become disproportioned to the numbers of the governing class.

ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, γέ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. 15. 15.

Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, διὸ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. that 'there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.' Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, 'there is no difference between a king and a free state because' &c.

διδόναι τοσούτους. 15. 16.

Either 1)* with emphasis 'so many and no more'; or better 2) with reference to the previous words εἶναι δὲ τοσούτῳ τῷ ἰσχὺν ὅστε ἱκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλεύσων κρέπτω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἡγέτω, 'so many as would not make him dangerous.'

Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of *ἀπορίαι*; as in c. 16. 15, Aristotle states, 'without clearly distinguishing, them.

Yet the *στρατηγός* ἄνθρωπος, who in time of peace is deprived of 16. 1. functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with δικαῖος νόμοις βασιλεύς.

περὶ Ὁπούντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος (sc. τῆς διαιρέσεως) Διαττοῦ (sc. τῆς 16. 1. Ἐπιδαμνοῦ).

'With a somewhat more limited power than at Epidamnus.'

δικαῖος δὲ ποτε.

16. 2.

Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or δὲ after δικαῖοι may mark the apodosis.

διότερον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δρχεῖν ἢ δρχεσθαι δίκαιοι. καὶ τὸ δικαῖοι μέρος τούτων 16. 3. δικαιότως. τοῦτο δὲ φένται νόμος.

καὶ τὸ δικαῖοι μέρος = καὶ τὸ δικαῖοι μέρος δρχεῖν δίκαιοι.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the *περιβασιλεία*,

asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled: and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. ‘And here law steps in; for the order of their rule is determined by law.’

16. 4, 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν δοτα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν δὲ τὸν νόμον, οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπος δι-
δύναστο γρωτίζειν. ἀλλ’ ἐπίγηδες παιδεύσας δὲ τὸν νόμον ἀφίστησι τὰ λοιπά τῇ
δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπανορθῶσθαι
δίδωσιν, ὃ τι δὲ δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. ‘But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them.’
τὰ λοιπά, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

16. 5. δὲ μὲν τὸν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἀρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεόν καὶ
τὸν τοῦν μόνους, δὲ δὲ ἀνθρώπον κελεύειν προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον.

This is a reflection on the παμβασιλεύς. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason: in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τὸν νόν (instead of τὸν νόμον), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, 2nd Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τὸν νόμον in the beginning of the clause and read τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν νόν μόνους, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νόν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεόν.

16. 8. οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον γρεύοντες τὸ μίσος γρεύοντες δὲ γάρ τὸν νόμον τὸ
μέσον.

‘And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.’

· ἐτὶ κυριότερος καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὸ 16. 9.
ἔθη εἰσὶν, διστο τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἀνθρώπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλά
οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.

The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τὸν τε ἀεὶ
ἐν ἀρχῇ ὅντων ἀκρασεῖ καὶ τὸν νόμων καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὥφελίᾳ
τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείνται καὶ ὅσοι ἀγραφοὶ ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὀμολογουμένην
φίρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ Ἰδιον μὲν καθ' ὃ γεγρα-
μένον πολιτεύονται, καὶ οὐδὲ ὅσα ἀγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὀμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

16. 9.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατὰ τὸ πλείονας εἴρει
τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καβισταμένους ἄρχοντας.

In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of 16. 9-13. the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

εἰ τούτοις οὔται διὸ ἀρχεῖς τοὺς ἴσους καὶ δμοῖς ἀρχεῖς οὔται διὸ δμοῖς. 16. 13.

Even in the παρβαστατικά there is an element of equality. δμοῖς either 1) ‘equally with himself’; or 2) with a slight play of words ‘after the manner of equals.’

εἰ μὴ τρόπον τούτο.

17. 2.

To be taken after δμοῖς ‘better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the

virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

17. 4. ἐν φέρει [καὶ ἔτ] ἀγγίσθαι πλῆθος πολεμεῖν.

The reading of Bekker, καὶ ἔτ, which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of πέρικεν. If they are retained the meaning will be ‘in which there is likewise a single’ or ‘compact body, defined by their all carrying arms’ (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.

17. 4. κατὰ νόμου τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμονται τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.

The citizens of a polity are here called εὐπόροι, ‘respectable’ or ‘upper class,’ though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are ‘the hoplites’ (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called εὐπόροι (vi. 7. § 1). τοῖς εὐπόροις is found in the better MSS.: *al.* ἀνέροις.

17. 6. οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν.

‘He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.’

17. 7. ἀρχεῖθαι κατὰ μέρος οὐ γὰρ πέρικε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν.

‘This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.’ The double meaning of μέρος is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. τοῦτο=τὸ εἶναι πᾶν.

18. 1. ἀρχεῖθαι δυναμένων.

Bekker's insertion of καὶ ἀρχεῖν after ἀρχεῖθαι (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some; of command in others.

18. 1. ἐν τοῖς πρέσοις ἀδελχῇ λόγοις ἐπι τὴν αὐτὴν διαγκαῖον ἀνθρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ τολμεῖν τῆς πόλεως τῆς δράστης.

The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—

- 1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).
- 2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).
- 3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).
- 4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).
- 5) And still a ‘grain of a scruple may be made’; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.
- 6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς παιδεύσθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψην. 18. 2.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See *Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings*.

BOOK IV.

I. 2-6. The statesman has four problems to consider,

- 1) What is the best or ideal state?
- 2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
- 3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
- 4) What is the best state for average men?
1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances;
3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

I. 2. ταύτη ἔστι τὴν δύναμιν.

The MSS. vary between *την* and *δοτι*: *την* has rather the greater MSS. authority, but *δοτι* is required for the construction, and the recurrence of *την* which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is unpleasing.

I. 4. ἀχορίγγιον τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν διογκίων.

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, “not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,” but the words ‘for the best state,’ are not found in the Greek. Better ‘not possessing the common necessities or simple requisites of life,’ a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cp. c. 11. § 21, πολλάκις οὗτοις μᾶλις πολιτειαῖς αἰρεστέρας ἔνοις οὐδὲν παλύσιν συμφέρων ἔτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτειαῖς, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For *διογκίων*, cp. *εὐχορηγημένη* in § 1, and *δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας* in § 6.

τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιρούντες πολιτείας τὴν Λακαδαιμονίου . . . ἐπαινοῦσιν. 1. 6.

Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an 'existing' constitution), the meaning is plain. 'They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.'

*χρὴ δὲ τοιάτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἡνὶ ρᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ 1. 7.
πεισθῆσσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἀλλοττον ἔργον τὸ
ἐπαφρόθενται πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, δισπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμα-
θάνειν τοῦ μαθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.*

'The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.'

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν (*sc. πολιτειῶν*) may be taken either with *τάξιν* or with *κοινωνεῖν*, either we ought to introduce 1) 'from among existing constitutions'; or 2) 'in passing out of existing constitutions that form,' &c.; cp. in next sentence *τὰς ὑπαρχούσας πολιτείας βοηθεῖν*.

κοινωνεῖν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have *κοινεῖν*. The emendation *κικέων* [Susemihl], taken from 'consequi' in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; *κοινοῦ* is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

ὡς ἔστιν οὖν ἀλλοττον ἔργον κ.τ.λ. The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

*Διὸ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας πολιτείας δεῖ δίνεσθαι 1. 7.
βοηθεῖν.*

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i. e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to

be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

L. 7. καθόπερ ἀλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.

There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

L. 8. τὸν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἶσται τινες εἴναι καὶ μίαν διγυρχίαν.

This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, δύοι μίν οἶσται κ.τ.λ., and c. 2. § 3 infra.

L. 8. συντίθεται ποσαχῶς.

That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined ; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another : for the latter cp. infra c. 5. §§ 3, 4 ; c. 9. §§ 4-9.

L. 10. καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἔστιν.

'And what is the end of each individual form of society ?' i.e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).

ἐκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.

κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.

L. 10. τόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολετείαν.

Either 1)* the words τῶν δηλούντων are governed by κεχωρισμένοι, 'are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution' ; i. e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions ; but see infra § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive : 'Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.'

L. 11. τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖς καὶ τὸν δραμήδον δχω τῆς πολετείας ἐκάστης καὶ τρόπος τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσσις.

Either 1), 'we must know the differences of states (sc. πολετείαν) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation ; or 2)*, referring τῆς πολετείας διάστης only to διαφοράς, and supplying πολετείαν with δραμήδον, 'the difference of each state and the number of states' ; or 3), τὸν δραμήδον means 'the order of classification' (Susemihl ; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt)

states are said to be ‘posterior’ to the good states). This gives a good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.

ἐν τῇ πράτῃ μεθέδει.

2. I.

Cp. infra c. 8. § 1, where the words *ἐν τοῖς καὶ δρχῖσ* refer to iii. c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀριστης 2. I. πολετίας θεωρήσαι ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τούτων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τῶν δυομάτων).

He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless, as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows : c. 3. § 4, *ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς καὶ πλοῦτον διαφορᾶς ἔστιν η μὲν καὶ γένος η δὲ καὶ δρεγήν, καὶ εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕπερον εἴρηται πλειστοῖς εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*, a passage which is supposed to refer to vii. i. e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books (Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be different ; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14–18, where Aristotle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good, is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in some former part of the work also occurs infra c. 7. § 2, *ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν παλέσσει δῆμοι περὶ οὓς δεῖλορεν δι τοῖς πρότεροι λέγουσι.*

βασιλεῖα γὰρ ἐκατέρα καὶ δρεγή συνεστάσις μεχεργημένη.

2. I.

‘For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a principle of virtue, provided with external means.’

πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν ρεψίσσειν.

2. I.

Not ‘when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,’ for there is no question about this, but *ρεψίσσειν* is taken in the other sense of ‘having,’ ‘using,’ ‘having as an institution,’ like *utile* in Latin. For this use of the word cp. *ρεψίσσειν δεκτήσειν*, iii. 1. § 10; and for the matter cp. iii. 17. §§ 4–8.

2. 2. τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον η̄ τοῦν μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ ούσαν, η̄ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος, διστητην ούσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλευαρχίαν (ἢ γάρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας).

Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the pre-eminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is overmastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

πολιτείας. We might expect *αὐτῆς*, or *τῆς ἀριστης* to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general *πολιτεία* here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare *infra* c. 8. § 2, *τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εἰδογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἦμāν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας*: also for the general meaning, *Plat. Polit. 301 D, Rep. ix. 576 D, etc.*

In the phrase *ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας* the word refers to *ἀλευαρχίαν*.

2. 3. : *ἡδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήρατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως.*

The difference between Plato (*Polit. 303*) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. Cp. vi. 4. § 1, *δημοκρατιῶν οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη ἡ πρότη τάξη*.

καὶ τῶν πρότερον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See *Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle*.

2. 4-6. The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity, tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

3. 1. . The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6-8.

Ἱτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἔστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' 3. 4.
ἀρετὴν, εὖτοι εἴ τι δὴ τοιῶν ἔτερον ἐργαταὶ πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the *ὑποθήσεις* or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον εἴδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῆν αὐτῶν.

3. 5.

‘As the parts of states differ from one another (*σφῆν αὐτῶν*), so must states differ from one another.’ Compare the curious comparison *infra c. 4.* §§ 8, 9.

πολεῖα μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἔστι, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἡ 3. 5.
κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἡ κατά τιν' αὐτῶν ισότητα κοινή, λέγω
ὅτιον τῶν ἀπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ κοινή τιν' ἀμφοῖν.

The last words, *κοινή τιν' ἀμφοῖν*, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with δύναμις, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: cp. *infra c. 4. § 2.* The words *ὅτιον τῶν ἀπόρων* & *τῶν εὐπόρων* may be an explanation of *κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων*, which comes in out of place, and *ἡ κοινή τιν'* *ἀμφοῖν*, as in the English text, may be an explanation of *ισότητα κοινής*.

κατά τιν' αὐτῶν ισότητα κοινή, ‘More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;’ as e.g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty

in the words $\eta\; \kappaοινη\; τω\; \alpha\muφοι\;$, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

3. 7. For the winds compare Meteorologica ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato's Laws iii. 693 C : according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

3. 8. $\alpha\lambdaγθίστερον\; δέ\; καὶ\; βέλτιον\; ὡς\; ἡμεῖς\; διεῖλομεν,\; δυοῖν\; \eta\; μᾶς\; οὔσης\; τῆς\; καλῶς\; συνεστηκυίας\; τὰς\; δῆλας\; εἴναι\; παρεκβάσεις,\; τὰς\; μὲν\; τῆς\; εὐ\; κεκραμένης\; δρμονίας,\; τὰς\; δέ\; τῆς\; δρίστης\; πολιτείας.$

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence, and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him : 'There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, $\deltaυοῖν\; \eta\; μᾶς$ (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.' From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion ; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

4. 4. $\deltaοπερ\; \delta\tau\; \alpha\lambdaθιστι\; φασί\; τινες.$

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind : and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

4. 5. $\delta\lambda\; \epsilon\piε\; πλείστα\; μόρια\; καὶ\; τοῦ\; δήμου\; καὶ\; τῆς\; διγυρχίας\; εἰσίν\; α.τ.λ.$

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor fewness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy : neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8 ; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise

it (cp. G. C. Lewis' 'Political Terms,' Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly 'that there is more in actual sovereignty than force' (*Early Institutions*, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the *quality* than on the *quantity* of the sovereign power.

τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς.

4. 5.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31. 526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πολεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἰργαστούσι δέ πλείους 4. 7.
τῶν εἰρημάνων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν δρχή λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημέσην
πρότερον διαλογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλεῖστα πᾶσσα ἔχειν πόλεις.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3. § 4). His reason for returning to them is that he is going to make a new sub-division of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν εἰρημάνων. As he says, *infra* § 20, "Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολι-
τεῖαι πλείους καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας εἰργαστούσι δέ τις δ' εστὶ καὶ δημοκρα-
τίας εἰδη πλεῖστα πλείους διαγαρχῆσας λέγωμεν. Compare Book vii. 8. § 9.

The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. 4. 8.
Suppose the different kinds of teeth were *a*, *a'*, *a''*, *a'''*, etc., the
different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were *b*, *b'*, *b''*, *b'''*, *c*, *c'*, *c''*, *c'''*,
and so on with the other organs which are important in determining
the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the
different combinations of these will give the different species.
Thus:—

a', b, c'', will be one species,
a, b', c'', another and so on.

So with constitutions:—

If we combine *γεργεῖ*, having some political power and coming
occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised *βάνεσσα*, and a
politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or

very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργοί, βάκανοι, θῆται with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

4. 9-17. The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato's enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). ‘Then at any rate there must be soldiers’ (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premisses. At this point the writer loses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τὸ προπολεμῆσον in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7-9.

4. 11-14. Διάτερ δὲ τῷ Πολιτείᾳ ε.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (Rep. ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is παιδαριώδης λίτων. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word *ἀρχαί* of which Aristotle

here takes advantage. Plato means by the *ἀναγκαιότητη πόλις*, 'the barest idea of a state' or 'the state in its lowest terms.' But when Aristotle says judges are 'more necessary' than the providers of the means of life, he means 'contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.' The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the 'soul' and 'body' of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the *μέρη* of the *πόλις* and the *mere* conditions (*ἴν οὐκ ἀνεύ*) of it. 'Husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.'

ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ.

4. 11.

Here evidently the title of the book.

Ισον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

4. 12.

Equally with τὸ καλόν.

ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέστων πολετικῆς ἔργου.

4. 14.

ὅπερ grammatically refers to τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, suggested by τὸ βουλευόμενον.

ἴστιν εἰπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑκένα.

4. 15.

ταῦτα = τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, gathered from τὰ τοιάτα in § 14.

ἑκένα = τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρῆσιν συντείνοντα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts : Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

ταῦτην τὴν λειτουργίαν,

4. 16.

sc. τὸ περὶ τὰς δρχάς.

πολλοῖς.

4. 18.

1) 'To many' or 'in many cases' opposed to *ἕνεκεν* in what follows; or 2*) *πολλοῖς* may be taken with *δοκεῖ*, the meaning being 'many (differing from Plato) think, etc.'; the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.

4. 18. ἀντιποσταται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—‘ Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons ; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.’

4. 20. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἱρίας, εἴρηται πρότερον is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὰ τίνας αἱρίας for διὰ τὴν αἱρίαν) of the first words of § 7.

4. 20. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only ; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

4. 21. καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερου πλήθους εἶδος.

Susemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause=‘and the like.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται αἱ δὲ αἰσθῆσει αἱ δὲ ἰθαρμῷ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλαι, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

4. 22. τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων.

Sc. εἶδη, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of εἶδη.

4. 22. τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν.

τούτοις, dative after τὴν αὐτὴν, and refers to πλούτος, σύγχεια, &c. & c. l.

Lit. ‘the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,’ or ‘similar differences having a relation to these,’ e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

4. 22. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο ἀπόρος ἡ τοῦτο εἰπάρκεια.

If the reading ὑπάρχειν is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηδὲν μᾶλλον which must be taken closely with it, ‘that the poor shall be no more’—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—‘than the rich’; or ‘shall have no priority,’ which gives a rather curious sense to ὑπάρχειν. A doubt about the propriety of

the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) ὑπερέχειν (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P¹, P⁴; and Aretino's transl. 2) ἀρχεῖν an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation 'nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus' seems to favour ἵπάρχειν τοῖς ἀτόποις ή τοῖς εὐπόροις.

δημοκρατίας εἶναι ταῦτη.

4. 23.

ταῦτη is slightly inaccurate = 'the state in which this occurs.'

Ἐν μὲν αὖτε εἶδος κ.τ.λ.

4. 24.

Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 δῆλο δὲ seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

Ἔπειρος εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἀπαντας τοὺς πολίτας δοὺς ἀν- 4. 24.
υπεύθυνοι, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἔπειρος δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι
μετέντα τὸν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον γένοιται, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

The words δοὺς ἀνυπεύθυνοι agree with τοῖς δικτυεύθυνοι κατὰ τὸ γένος, as the ἐὰν γένοιται does with the δοὺς ἀν ἀλεύθεροι δοὺς in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word δικτυεύθυνοι is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, δικτυεύ-

θύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος) to be, 'not proved to be disqualified by birth.'

"Οργησε δὲ πολις λέγει τοῖς συαδόντος εἶναι πολιτοφρανίσης, πότερος ταύτης § 4. 27.
δοὺς πλείους δοὺς οἱ ἀρχοῦσσις ἄστετος, δηλον.

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a

poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

4. 31. τῶν δὲ καθ' ἔκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

For use of gen: after *κρίνειν* cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws i. 646 D, *τὴν πολιτείαν* (*πολιτεία* here = *πολιτεύμα*) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with *αἱ ἀρχαὶ*, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

5. 1. Διὸ μὲν οὐν ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences *τῶν ἔχόντων τιμήματα τηλικαῦτα διότε κ.τ.λ.* or *τῶν ἔχόντων μακρὰ τιμήματα*.

In what follows the *dynastia* is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

5. 2. For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

5. 4. τὰ πρᾶτα μικρὰ τλεοντούντες παρ' ἀλλήλαι.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

6. 3. διὸ πάσι τοῖς επεμένουσι δέσσοι περίγεων.

Omitted by II³ (i. e. the MSS. of the second family except F³) and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that

account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

διὰ τὴν ἔχομένην αἴρεσθαι.

6. 3.

'The principle of election which follows next in order' (cp. c. 4. § 24, *ἕτερον εἶδος*). This use of the word *ἔχομένη* is supported by iii. 11. § 15, *ἄλλῃ δὲ ἑτοίν (ἀπορίᾳ) ἔχομένη ταύτης*, and vi. 8. § 4, *ἔτιρα δὲ ἐπιμελεῖα ταύτης ἔχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς*, and several other passages. The other interpretation of *ἔχομένη*, given in a note to the English text, 'proper to it' is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον.

6. 4.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῶν πλήθους.

6. 5.

Either 1*) 'on account of the preponderance of their numbers,' or 2) more definitely 'on account of the preponderance of the multitude'; (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολεττύματος δύσκολον μὴ τοῦς 6. 8. πληθότων ἀλλὰ τὸν κόμιον εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. infra § 9.

μήδε οὔτε ἀλιγήτης δοῦτε τρέφεσθαι εἰς τὴς πελους, διάγκυη τὸν κόμιον 6. 8. δέκους αὐτοὺς δρᾶται.

'When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (*αἱροῖς*) the rule of law.'

6. 9. πλεῖστοι δέ,

sc. οὐσίαν ἔχοντες.

6. 9. τὸν τόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον.

Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

6. 10. εὖ δ' ἐπιτείνωσι.

'But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.'

7. 1. δούτερη Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολεμίαις.

Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idiomatic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus (302) seven.

7. 2. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὐν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἣς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρότοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀριστεων διπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολεμεῖσαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς θηθέσειν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀδράν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγαρεῖνται ἀριστοκρατίαν.

The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already referred in iv. 2. § 1; the particle *γὰρ* seems to imply that he had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation of the good ruler to the good man.

7. καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι.

According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the government of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with constitutional government.

7. 4. καὶ γὰρ ἀλλα ταῖς μὲν τεκμηρίαις κακῷ ἀγριελασσαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶ δημοτικὲς εἰδοκαροτείαις καὶ δοκοῦνται εἶναι ἀνευαγά.

Cp. Plat. Laws xli. 951: 'There are always in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.'

οῖον ἐν Καρχηδόνι . . οἶον ἡ Δακεδαιμονίων.

7. 4.

Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (*τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν*, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (*τὸ πιστὸν τῆς πολιτείας*, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Δακεδαιμονίων εἰς ἀρετήν τε καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μῆκις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression *εἰς ἀρετήν τε καὶ δῆμον*, followed by *δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς*, instead of *δήμου τε καὶ ἀρετῆς*, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὐν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀριστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο 7. 5.
εἴδη· καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ρέπουσι πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν
μᾶλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (*ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία*): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (*πολιτεία*) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

ἐπάξιμον δ' οὕτως οὐκ εὖσαν εὗται τούτηι παρίκβασιν εὗται τὰς ἀρτι 8. 1.
ἡρθείσας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀρετής πάσαις δημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθο-
τάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα κατεριθμοῦσται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὗται
παρεκβάσεις, δοπερ ἐν τοῖς αὐτὸν ἀρχὴν εἴσομεν.

αὗται refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβάσεων. Of δημαρτήκασι πολι-
τεύων, and this to the singular παρίκβασιν.

δοπερ ἐν τοῖς αὐτὸν ἀρχὴν εἴσομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

φανερωτέρα γάρ ἡ δύναμις εἰτής ε.τ.λ.

8. 2.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'

8. 3. διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορητέοις.

Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. infra § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For εὐγένεια, see Rhet. i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

8. 5. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστοκρατούμενην πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατούμενην.

The words ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατούμενην (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must 1) supply εὐνομεῖσθαι from τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι, 'A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.' 2) We may alter the order of words by placing μὴ before ἀριστοκρατούμενην, instead of before εὐνομεῖσθαι (Thurot, Susem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert μὴ before πονηροκρατούμενην. Or 4) alter πονηροκρατούμενην into πονηροκρατέοισθαι, answering to εὐνομεῖσθαι.

8. 6. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν . . . τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάστων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ήμιν μηδὲν καθεστήξει διὸ διόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γρωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροις νόμοις ἀκυήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρίστων ἔστιν ἡ καλώς ἔχουσιν ἀκύρους.

8. 6. τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τὸ καλῶς κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἵς ἐμμένουσιν, the clause ὅτι γάρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

8. 6. ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ὅτι πείθεσθαι.

8. 8. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται.

Sc. πολιτεία, Preserving the play of words and supplying πολιτεία with καλεῖται from τῆς πολιτείας, we may translate, 'in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.' But are there 'many' such governments? Cp. supra c. 7. § 1; infra c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see Essay on the μέση πολιτεία, &c.

8. 8. μέσον γάρ ἡ μῆβις.

'It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution, or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom

of the poor and the wealth of the rich; *Διευθερίας* answering to *ἀπόρων* as πλούτου τοῦ εὐπόρων.

As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems θ. 1-4. to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. supra note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his mind a syncretism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

σύμβολον.

θ. 1.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, *οἱ ἐπιχειρόμενοι, δοτράγαλον κατατέμοντες, θάτερον μὲν αὐτοὶ κατεῖχον μέρος, θάτερον δὲ κατελίπαντον τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους* ἵνα εἰ δύο πᾶλιν αὐτοὺς ἡ τοὺς ἑκίνων ἐπιχειρούσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπαγόμενον τὸ ἥματον δοτραγάλον, ἀντεπούστο τὴν φεύγαν: and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, ἀνθράκου σύμβολον δέ τε τετραγμένος . . . ἐξ ἄνδε δύο.

ἢ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτίον δεινάτεραι νομοθετοῦσιν ε.τ.λ.

θ. 2.

'For either they must take the legislation of both.' These words are resumed in *εἰς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος* and followed by *ἄντερος δὲ* instead of repeating §.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

ὑμφαίνεται γὰρ διάτερος δε αὐτῷ τῶν διπον.

θ. 6.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, *ἐπιδιαιζόμενος εἰς δύο τῷ μίσθῳ χάρας.*

9. 9. *τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἱροῦνται, τῆς δὲ ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν.*

I.e. 'The people choose the elders, but are not eligible themselves; and they share in the Ephoralty.' Whether they elected the Ephors is nowhere expressly said. We are only told that the mode of election was extremely childish (ii. 9. § 23).

10. 1. *ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτη τίθεμεν τὸν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος.*

Tyranny is and is not a form of polity, in the sense in which the word 'polity' is used by Aristotle. Cp. c. 8. § 2, *τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εἰλογύν ἔστι ποιῆσασθαι μνεῖαν δὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡκιστα ταῦτη εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἵμν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.*

10. 1. *περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πράτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν.*

Either 'royalty* commonly so called,' or 'the most truly called royalty,' which would seem to be the *παμβασιλεία*. Cp. iii. c. 16.

10. 1. *τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς.*

Two slightly different senses are here combined in δεῖ, 1) 'what we ought to establish,' and 2), incorrectly, 'how or by what means we may or must establish it.'

10. 2. *τυραννίδος δὲ εἴδη δύο μὲν διελομένης περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν.*

Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6-10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnetia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnetes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

10. 2. *δὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἀπολλάττεων τοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.*

Not 'because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty'; for the words 'change into one another' would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but 'because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;' likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of *ἀπολλάττεων*, cp. vi. 1. § 3, and i. 6. § 3.

10. 4. *τοσαῦτα δὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας,*

εἰρημένας, sc. in the previous sentences. 'There is more than

one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.'

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution 11. to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βελτιστὸν, τῆς ἁκόστους ἐνδεχομένης 11. 3. τυχῆν μεσότητος.

The gen. *μεσότητος* is a resumption of *μέσον*, and depends on *βίον*. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πάλεσι.

11. 5.

ἀμφότερα, sc. either 1) *‘their rogueries and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,’ or 2) simply ‘their dislike both of civil and military duties.’ It is possible also that *ταῦτα ἀμφότερα* may refer to the *μεγαλοπόντηροι* and *μικροπόντηροι*, in which case the words *Ἐτι... ἀρχοντι* are either inserted or misplaced.

The *φύλαρχοι* at Athens were the cavalry officers under the *παταρχοί*. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. *βουλαρχεῖν* literally = ‘to be a chief of the senate.’ The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. *φύλαρχοῦσι*, translates by an obvious mistake, ‘minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.’ For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon’s law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), *τὸν δὲ μὲν αὐτοῦ κόμιον θεοτρόπον μέλιστα καὶ παρέδεξε ὁ πλεόνας ἄτυκος εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσι μηδετέρας μερίδος γενήματος: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνος γάρ τόν τε μερίδαν τάνδε μετέχοντα εἴκενε μᾶλλον ἀγρέων νομίζομεν.*

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔπειρθαλή τὸ ἐόδεικ τούτων τετένει λέπειν.

11. 6.

τούτων, sc. τῶν εἰστυχμάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιῇ δρκῇ.

11. 7.

Dative of the manner; ‘to be ruled in any fashion.’

11. 8. ὅστ' ἀποκαίον ἄριστα πολεμένεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν εἰδὲ δὲ φαμὲν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

'So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural components of it, will of necessity be best administered.' ταύτην, sc. τὴν εἰδὲ ἵστων καὶ δρμών . . . εἰδὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

11. 9. πολλὰ μέσουσιν ἄριστα.

'Many things are best to those who are in the mean;' or as we might say in modern phraseology, 'The middle class have many advantages.' Cp. Eur. Suppl. 238-245:—

τρεῖς γάρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν διδυοι
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τὸ ἔρωτός ἀεὶ^τ
οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φύσει πλείον μέρος,
εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρον ἀφίασιν κακά,
γλώσσας πανηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέση φύσει πόλεις,
κύριον φυλάσσοντος δύτων' δὲ τάξην πόλις.

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

11. 15. Σῶλων τε γάρ δὴ τούτων (δηλοῖ δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3:

πολλοὶ γάρ πλούτευσι ακούοι, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,
πλούτοι δὲ πάντες παντελεῖς
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

11. 15. οὐ γάρ δὴ βασιλεύς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἀπόκτησης ἔχει συγγένεια τὸ Διοκούρον, δι' οὗτος βασιλεὺς δέν, οὐτ' ἀρχεῖ, θεάστης δὲ βασιλεύεις ἀποχειρέως τὸ τοιούτοις προβλέπεις εἰς ἀγοράν
Σοτε δεῖσαντα τὸν βασιλέα Χαρίλαον εἰπεῖς βαρύδεν καταφυγεῖν. Yet Plutarch

is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' 11. 18, 19.
αἵτοις ἑπτεραις πολιτείαις ἀποβλέποντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
πολιούχασσαν, οἱ δὲ ὀλυμπίας, οἱ πρὸς τὸ τὸν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοπούντες
ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ σφέτεραν αὐτῶν. Έστι διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἵτιας ἡ μηδέποτε
τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείας ἢ ὀλυμπίας καὶ παρ' ὅλης.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

τὸν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed
to ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι the states of Hellas generally.

εἰς γὰρ ἀνήρ συνεπεισθῇ μάνος τῶν πρότερον [ἔφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων] 11. 19.
ταῦτην ἀποδούνται τὴν τάξιν.

The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1-6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε τόσον κράτος δυνατοῖς διεργατοῖ). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρότερον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If 'one man' only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λαθέσθαι. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

ἔφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, 'the leading men.' For ἔφι cp. εἰ διὰ τοῦ πρότυμων. (Dem.) But are not the words a copyist's repetition of τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων above?

ταύτην διποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν. Not necessarily 'to restore' or 'give back' but more simply 'to give what is suitable, assign,' like [οἱ εἰκονογράφοι] ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ίδιαν μορφήν, Poet. 15, 1454 b. 10.

11. 20. τίς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν.
Here, as limited in § 1, ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι,
διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, i. e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp.
v. 1. § 16 where it is implied that the safety of democracy is due
to its approximation to the μίση πολιτεία.
11. 21. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὖσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετώ-
τερας ἐνīοις οὐθὲν καλύτερη συμφέρειν ἔτεραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.
'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in
itself] and some other better suited to the peculiar circumstances
of some state.'
- πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given
constitution, which may not be the best possible under the circum-
stances, but is the one to be preferred, in some states of society.
12. 2. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἔτεροφ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέ-
στηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις.
'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the
clause ἐξ διπλ. is explanatory of ἔτεροφ μέρει = ἔτεροφ τῶν μερῶν.
12. 3. ὅπου ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀτόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν.
'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion im-
plied in the last words.'
12. 3. καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον εἴδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν
τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.
'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each
sort of oligarchy varies according to the predominance of each
sort of oligarchical population (sc. δ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ).
12. 5. πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότερος δὲ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴ δὲ δέ μίσης.
The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of
oligarchy and democracy. When Aristotle calls the arbiter δέ
μίσης, this is probably meant in the same sense in which δικαιοσύνη
is said to be a mean because it fixes a mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5.
§ 17, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης δέστις οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερος
ἀρρεῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου δέστις, and v. 4. § 7, Διὸ καὶ ὅτι μηδεμιοῦτον,

ἔπι τὸν δικαιοτὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἔπι τὸν δικαιοτὴν λέγει λέγει ἐστὶν ἔπι τὸ δίκαιον δικαιοτῆς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἐμψυχον καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαιοτὴν μάστιγον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔποι μεσιδίους, ὡς, ἐὰν τοῦ μίσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαιοίου τευχέμενοι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν φυετῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ 12. 6.
γάρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύσουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.

Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies : the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answering, whether all these artifices (*σοφίσματα*) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. infra p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14-18.

τοῖς μὲν μεγάλοις, τοῖς δὲ μικράν, δοτερ δὲ τοῖς Χαρόνδου νόμοις.

13. 2.

Yet the penalty must have been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

διδόσσει γάρ εἰ πόνηται καὶ μὴ μετίχεσσε τῶν τιμῶν ἄσυχίας ἔχει, διὸ 13. 8.
μὴ ἴθεται τοις αἰτούσις μήτε ἀφεστήσει μηδέ τὴν οὐσίαν.

The connexion is as follows: 'The qualification must be such

as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

13. 9. ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ η μὲν πολιτεία ἦν ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (*ἦν*) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

13. 10. οὐστ' ἐν τοῖς ιππεῦσιν εἶναι τὴν λοχίν.

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

13. 11. ὡς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας.

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

13. 11. κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεσθαι.

1*) Some word like *δοθεῖσις* has to be supplied from *διήγοις θυτες* τὸ πλῆθος before κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν; or 2) κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν may be taken after ὑπέμενον, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

14. 1. Πάλιοι δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἕκστοτης λόγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἀφεῖται, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν.

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14–16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.

A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων (sc. μορίων) ἐν μὲν τι τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ 14. 2. τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς δρχὰς (τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἰναι κυρίας, καὶ ποίαν ταῦτα δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δέ τι τὸ δικαίον.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over individuals; see infra § 3): 2) the administrative or executive: 3) the judicial. The words *τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν* seem to refer back to *δεῖ θεωρέειν τὸν νομοθέτην*. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with δεῖ and with τρίτον.

Nothing more is known about Telescles. From the manner in 14. 4. which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather than a legislator. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Τύλεκλεος* is said like *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

ἔτει δὲ διαδῆγε.

14. 4.

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be supplied, e. g. *ἡ ἀρχὴ* from *τὰς δρχὰς*. The same phrase occurs infra c. 15. § 17.

οὐνάκι δὲ μέρος

14. 4.

is governed by *εἰς μὲν τρόπον* above.

ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

14. 6.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22-24; c. 6. §§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences. There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies. First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indistinguishable, lastly the most extreme.

14. 6. τὰ δὲ ἀλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρέτας οὖσας, δύσας ἐνδέχεται· τοιαῦται δὲ σίνης δύσας ἀρχεῖν διογκάλον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους.

The words δύσας ἐνδέχεται can only mean 'as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.' The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὸ κληρωτάς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ή πάσας ή δύσας μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης. Susemihl has introduced κληρωτάς οὐκ before ἐνδέχεται = δύσας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κληρωτάς εἶναι· τοιαῦται δὲ σίνης referring to αἱρέτας. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

14. 8. fin. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἱρέτοι, κατὰ νόμον δὲ ἀρχωσιν διοπτερικαὶ πρότεροι, διλγαρχικοί.

Opposed to the milder πολιτικὴ διλγαρχία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow διλγαρχικὴν διογκάλον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i. e. 'not all [who possess the required qualification]'. Yet these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

14. 8-10. Compare for several verbal resemblances, supra c. 5.

14. 10. τῶν δὲ ἀλλων ἀρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἱρέτοι ή κληρωτοί.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

14. 10. ἀριστοκρατία μὲν η πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

14. 11. διφρύγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευμένον πέρι τὰς πολιτείας τούτος τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ διαστῆ πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν, i. e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which

the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

διοικεῖ has been changed into *διοίσει* and *διοικέται*, for which latter there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads *disponitur*. But no change is needed. For use of *διοικέν*, cp. v. 10. § 36.

ουμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ μᾶλιστ' εἶναι δακούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν κ.τ.λ. 14. 12.

Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question: but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

ἀποεληρωτῶν τοὺς πλείους.

14. 13.

I. e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

αἱροῦται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί.

15. 3.

'Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are *ἐπερόν τι παρὰ τὰ πολιτευτὰς ἀρχὰς*.'

οἷοι στρατηγὸς στρατευόμενοι,

15. 3.

sc. *ἐπιμελεῖται implied in ἐπιμελήσων.*

ἀλλὰ τῶντα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις αἰδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν· αὐτὸν γάρ το 15. 4.
χρήσις γέγονεν διμοισθητούστων περὶ τοῦ διάματος. Σχει δέ τοι Ἀλληρ διανοη-
τικὴν πραγματείαν.

'Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them.' *Ἀλληρ* is redundant.

μᾶλλον δὲ ταῦς διαρρέεται.

15. 5.

I. e. rather than dispute about the name.

15. 6. βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἥργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ή πολυπραγματούσης.

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 370 B ff.

15. 9. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν, ή κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ή παιδῶν μᾶλλον καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence : cp. infra § 13, παιδονόμος καὶ γυναικονόμος : and vi. 8. § 22, Ιδίᾳ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικαιέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσι . . . γυναικονομία . . . παιδονομία κ.τ.λ.

15. 10. ἔτεραι ἐν ἔτεραις, οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.

'Differing,' i. e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word *ἔτεραι* is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of *ἔτερων*, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

15. 10. πότερον διαφέρει . . . ή τυγχάνουσι μέν τινες οὖσαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ίστι δὲ ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αἵραι.

The alternative *πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.* is repeated and expanded. 'Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?'

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for *τὰς ἀρχῶν* is taken with *τινες* : and with *κατ' has to be supplied *τὰς πολιτείας* from *κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας* supra. We may also supply *πολιτείας* with *τινες*, and translate 'may not some states essentially derive their character from offices.' But the abrupt transition to a new subject (*ἀρχαι*)*

in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (and Edit.) after Victorius reads διαφοραι for τὰς διαφοράς.

οἵσιν ἡ τῶν πρόβουλων αὐτη γέρε οὐ δημοκρατική.

15. 11.

πρόβουλοι, as he says vi. 8. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution; supra c. 14. § 14.

εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ διαφοραι κ.τ.λ.

15. 14-18.

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme:—

οἱ τρεῖς ὅροι.

i. τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς
δρχάς.

- a) οἱ πάντες.
- b) οἱ τίνες.
- c) οἱ τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς
δὲ τίνες.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραι.

ii. οἱ τίνες.

- a) οἱ τίνεται.
- b) οἱ οἱ τῶν διφοραμένων.
- c) οἱ τὰς μὲν οἱ τίνεται,
τὰς δὲ οἱ τῶν.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραι.

iii. τίνει τρόπον.

- a) οἱ αἱρέται.
- b) οἱ εἰλήρηται.
- c) οἱ τὰς μὲν αἱρέται, τὰς
δὲ εἰλήρηται.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραι.

οἱ δώδεκα τρόποι.

i. πάντες οἱ πάντες
αἱρέται.
2. πάντες οἱ πάντες
εἰλήρηται.
3. πάντες οἱ τῶν
αἱρέται.
4. πάντες οἱ τῶν
εἰλήρηται.

ii. τὰς οἱ πάντες
αἱρέται.
B. τὰς οἱ πάντες
εἰλήρηται.
C. τὰς οἱ τῶν
αἱρέται.
D. τὰς οἱ τῶν
εἰλήρηται.

iii. τὰς μὲν δρχάς πάντες, τὰς
δὲ τὰς οἱ πάντες αἱρέται.
B. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τὰς
οἱ πάντες εἰλήρηται.
γ. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τὰς
οἱ τῶν αἱρέται.
δ. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τὰς
οἱ τῶν εἰλήρηται.

οἱ δύο συνδυασμοί.

τὰ μὲν εἰλήρηται.
τὰ μὲν οἱ πάντες.

τὰ δὲ αἱρέται.
τὰ δὲ οἱ τῶν.

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or by vote and by lot.

The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties :

All elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some; by lot out of some;
Some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;
All and some elect	by vote out of all, by lot out of all, by vote out of some, by lot out of some;

and to the two further combinations (*οἱ δύο συνδιασμοί*) : partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a 'bazaar of constitutions' (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

15. 15. ἀντερ τὸν Μεγάρου.

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5, 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year B.C. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.

τούτων δὲ αἱ μέν δύο κ.τ.λ.

15. 19.

The vote is considered less democratical than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (*άμα*, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of 'some out of some' and 'some out of all' are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is 'some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,' the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

γίνεσθαι.

15. 19.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense=καθίστασθαι, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

Διεργαχεῖτερος δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφῶν.

15. 20.

Ἐξ ἀμφῶν seems naturally to mean τὰ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ γηῶν, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election 'out of all and out of some' should be 'more oligarchical' than the election out of some. Another way of taking the words is to explain ἐξ ἀμφῶν as a double election. But in this passage ἐξ is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore ἐξ ἀμφῶν could not=ἀμφόις. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀμφῶν is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of 'some out of some' is maintained, the election in both ways, i.e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons

elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

15. 21. μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὄμοιος,

sc. ἀλγαρχικόν. These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr): that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. *μὴ* must be taken with *γενόμενον*.

15. 21. τίνας ἐξ των δύο.

In both ways, sc. κλήρῳ καὶ αἱρέσει.

15. 22. τίνα δὲ τίστ συμφίεται καὶ πώς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις ἡμί ταῖς δινάμεστοῖς ἀρχῶν τίνες εἰσὶν, ἔσται φανέρων.

Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit* *καὶ* before *τίστ*, thus referring *τίνες εἰσὶν* to *δινάμεστοι*. If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain *καὶ* before *τίνες εἰσὶν*, the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i.e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

16. 3. τὸν τῷ Φρεαττῷ δικαιονῆτρον.

Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28, § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piraeus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed, probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his

native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀφίσθω καὶ τῶν φοικῶν καὶ τῶν ἔπικράν, περὶ δὲ 16. 5.
τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγομεν, περὶ δὲ μη γυρομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ
τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ αἰνῆσις.

This sentence appears to be out of place ; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows ; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17-22.

οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες.

16. 5, 6.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed ; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive ; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others ; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them ; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority ; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms ; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people : for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the

laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that 'Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people' (ii. 12. § 2).

BOOK V.

The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of L. I. the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

Ἐτι δὲ σωγρίαι τίνες καὶ ποιητὴς καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἐπὶ δὲ διὰ τίνες L. I.
Διὰ μάλιστα σύζυγοι τῶν πολιτεῶν ἐκάστη.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws over-subtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written *σωγρίαι τίνες* and *διὰ τίνες Διὰ σύζυγοι*, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

Δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ἴντολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν.

L. 2.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after *ἴντολαβεῖν*; 1) 'We must in the first place begin by conceiving' or 2)* 'we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.'

τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ μετ' ἀνθρώπους ζεῖν.

L. 2.

In Bekker's 2nd edition *καὶ* is altered to *αλλα*. without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The *καὶ* here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of *id est*. Cp. Nic. Eth. I. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ αλλα καὶ ἡ σέβη πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρᾶτος: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὸ διάφυτα καὶ τὰ παθητικά where τὸ διάφυτα = τὰ παθητικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this

passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

1. 4. οἱ δὲ ἄνθροι ὅπερ πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσι τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνθροι.

The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτῶν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v.

2. § 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον δικαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀνονόν οὐ πάντα πλέον.

1. 5. ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ.

Spengel reads ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: 'They are perversions, when regarded simply,' i.e., 'by an absolute standard of justice'; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy, or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

1. 8. Διὸ καὶ εἰ μεταβολαι γέγονται διχῶς.

The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading δικαίων shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1) the particle διὸ is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word διχῶς referring to what follows: 'Hence arise changes; and in two ways.' Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Con-

ring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle's *Politics* to infer a 'lacuna' between the words *στάσεών εἰσω* and *ὅδεν στασιάζονται* from the want of connexion.

*Ζωτερ δὲ Δακεδαιμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν 1. 10.
βασιλείαν.*

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24–26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidae, of which he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to all the Spartans.

Πανσταίαν τὸν βασιλέα.

1. 10.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 182, ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὅπτα καὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι τιμῆν ἔχοντα (Πλεῖστορχον γέρε τὸν Δεωνίδον ὅπτα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιός δὲ ἐπερρόστενος). The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

καὶ δὲ Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον δοτὶ χώρ. τὸν 1. 10, 11.
φιλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἡλιαίαν ἐπίσταγκτος δοτοῦ ἦτι τὸν
ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως ἐπεψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις.
Διαγυρχαῖν δὲ καὶ δέρχεσθαι εἰς τὴν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτην.

The revolution at Epidamus was only partial. The change of φιλάρχων into a βουλή made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8. § 17, καλέσας δὲ [τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας] ἑστα, μὲν πρέβοιλος . . . ὅπου δὲ πλῆθος ἐστὶ βουλὴ μᾶλλον. But according to an ancient custom in the governing body the magistrates (*τὰς ἀρχὰς = τὰς ἀρχούσας*) were required to go to the *Heliaea* at every election—this relic of oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit was indicated in the appointment of 'the single magistrate' (cp. iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting τὸν δὲ τῷ πολιτεύματι with εἰς τὴν Ἡλιαίαν instead of with τὰς ἀρχάς. 'It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote.'

quiring it.' Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (*Dorians*, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of Ἡλαῖα simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι is doubtful.

τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι. Either 1) * the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6, §. 11; iv. 6. §. 9 and v. 4, §. 2. Compare also iii. 7. §. 2, τινὲς δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολιτεύμα-σημαίνει ταῦτα, πολιτεύμα δ', ἐστι τὸ κύριον τῶν πολεών, and infra. v. 8. §. 5, τοὺς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, which show that the two meanings of πολιτεύμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word 'government' or 'state,' pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

* ἄρχων δ' εἰς ἡν. ἡν. is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, (. . . πολλοὶ παιώνιοι ἔπει τίκριον τῆς διοικήσεως τοιάντη γάρ ἄρχει τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπιδαμνού), where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamnus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamnus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

I. 11. πανταχοῦ γάρ διὰ τὸ ἀνισούν τὴν στάσιν οὐ μή τοῖς δινόσιοι ὑπάρχει ἀνιλογος ἀδισος γάρ. βασιλείᾳ ἀνισος, εὰν γέ τοι τοῖς ὅλοις γάρ τὸ ίσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσι.

οὐ μή . . . ίσοις is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἀνισος.
 1) 'Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.' According to this way of taking the passage ἀνιλογος is the nom. to ὑπάρχει.
 2) Others supply τὸ ἀνισον from the preceding sentence (sc. ὑπάρχει ἀνιλογος). '*I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.' This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἀνιλογος with τοῖς δινόσιοι. 'Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.' According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

I. 13. ::The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after τὸ ίσον'

dīter, in his 2nd Edition (see note on Text) accords with his correction of the text in § 2, διαλογούστων τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ κατ' διαλογίαν *for* instead of καὶ τὸ κατ' διαλογίαν.

εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν διλήσις, ταῦτα δὲ ἀπλεῖστιν.

1. 14.

The antecedent of *ταῦτα* is wealth and poverty, latent in δῆμος and διλησθία. The conj. *τάκτων*, adopted by Bekker following Lambinus in his 2nd Edition, is unnecessary.

ἄποροι δὲ πολλοὶ πόλλαχοι.

1. 14.

'But there are in many places a large class of poor.' Some MSS. read *έποροι*, some omit πολλοί, and it has been contended by Stahr that *ἄποροι δὲ καὶ εἴποροι πόλλαχοι* is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

τὸ δὲ ἀνδρῶν πάντη καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ισότητα φαῖλον.

1. 14.

'Either equality of number or equality of proportion, if the only principle of a state, is vicious': cp. *infra* c. 9. § 13; iv. 13. § 6; vi. 5. § 2.

ἀνδρῶν πρέστον καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου.

1. 15.

ἡμαρτημένου is to be taken with *τοῦ πρέστον* as well as with *τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ*.

ἢ πρὸς τὴν διλησθίαν.

1. 16.

Διλησθία is here used for the oligarchical party, *τοὺς διλησταύς*, parallel to δῆμος in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle's transitional and uncertain use of language.

εἰνῆρ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, δὲ τι καὶ δῆμος εἴναι, εἰς ἔγγρυπτα τῷ δῆμῳ στέψει.

1. 16.

This reflection is probably true of Greek democracies, but can hardly be justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.

- 1. 16.** Επειδή δὲ καὶ τὸν μίσων πολιτείαν δηγυγέρει τοῦ δημόσιου ή η τῶν διάγεων, ἵνα περ ἐστὶν αὐτοφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the *μέση πολιτεία*, which is the safest of all such forms of government, [i.e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

ηπερ refers to *ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολετιά*. *τοιούτων*=the imperfect forms.

An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence = δῆμος ἐγγυτέρω τῆς τῶν μέσων πολεούσας ἡ η. τῶν δάιγων, ἔστι τῆς τῶν μέσων πολεούσας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., η before τῶν δάιγων was omitted.

2. i. The two causes, *tinos exores*, *tinos exekes*, *tinos apoxai taw staseow* are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

2. 3. περὶ ἡς ἥδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about *toro* and *anoo* in the previous chapter.

2. 4. αι δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, δόθει ἀυτοῖς τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ὅπτι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὐδαὶ, ὅπτε δὲ ὡς ἀλείσιν.

The seven causes are κέρδος, τιμή, ὑβρίς, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφράγησις, αἴξησις παρὰ τὸ ἀνθελογον. Or, according to another way of reckoning (ἄλλοι τρόποι), other elements, partly the same, and partly different are added, viz. διάβολος, θυμούσιον, ἔμποντον.

As often happens both in the *Politics* (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the *Ethics* (cp. vii. cc. 1-10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: ἔργα, κέρδος, τιμή, ἀγροτική, φύσις, κακοφρόνησις: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεγθέντων. To be taken closely with τὸν εἰρημένον γρότον, in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described,' sc. πέρδος and τριῶν to which τοὺς εἰρημένους (§ 5) also refers.

- 2. 5.** οὐδὲ διάφοροι, ταῦτα τοιαῦτα γένηται ταῦτα
εἰς διάφορα ταῦτα. — They are the same and not the same; — The

love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.'

διὰ μηρότητα,

2. 6.

sc. τῆς κινήσεως. Cp. below, c. 3. § 10, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὸ παρὰ μηρὸν λέγω δὲ παρὰ μηρὸν, ὅτι πολλάκις λαθάνει μηδὴ γνωμένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι τὸ μηρόν ε.τ.λ. for the explanation of the term.

συνέστησαν οἱ γνόμοις ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἀπεφερομένας δίκαιος. 3. 4.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidos in the year 394 B.C. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian B.C. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv, 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the διαστάσις mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

διὰ τὰς ἀπεφερομένας δίκαιος. Cp. infra c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

οἶον καὶ ἡ Θῆβαι μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύταις μάχῃ τοῖς αὐτοτελεοῦσσι; 3. 5.
democracy destroyed.

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle's knowledge of Theban history, infra c. 5. § 15, and note.

ἢ Μέγαρέων [δημοκρατία διεφθάρη] δὲ ἀργάτερον ἀναρχίαν ἔπειβοτε. 3. 5.
Probably the same event mentioned infra c. 5. § 4, but apparently

not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (B.C. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

3. 5. ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυπωρίδος,
sc. ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γῆμόροι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconciliation. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelo we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiq. Rom.* vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

3. 7. τὸ Τάπαρι ἄγνοβάτος.
Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) 'the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.' Diodorus, 'the Sicilian,' (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

3. 7. δημοκρατία δύσκολη ἀπολεσίας.
Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of *politeia* or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

3. 7. αὐτὸν Ἀργεῖς τὸν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολογήσας ὅτι Κλεομένης τοῦ Δάσκαλος ἡγεμόνισσας παραδέσσοντας τὸν τρίπολον τὸν τοῦ.
- The meaning of the name Hebdomē was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is men-

tioned in Herodotus (vi. 76–83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (*De Mulierum Virtutibus*, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word ἑβδόμην. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month (*ιεπέμην ισταμένου μηρός*, Ib.); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (*Apophth. Lacon.* 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (*loc. cit.*) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

ἀπολομένων ὥπλον Κλεομένους κ.τ.λ. Read in the English text: ‘the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.’

καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις διεχούστων πεζῶν οἱ γυνέριμοι ἀλάτοις σύνοπτο διὰ τὸ ἔκ 3. 7.
καταλόγου στρατεύσθων ὥπλον τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον.

The *καταλόγος ὅπλων* mentioned in Thuc. vi. 43, καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἡσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐς καταλόγου, and elsewhere, Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 1, in which the Θῆται, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

ἐς καταλόγου. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

ἥπλον τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word *διεχόστων* chiefly refers. Cp. Thuc. vii. 27.

πλεόνων γάρ τὸν διόριον γεννήσθαι. 3. 8.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of *γεννήσθαι*. But *διόριον*, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, ‘when the citizens become more and more

divided into rich and poor.' The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of *diópev*.

3. 9. ἐν Ὀρεῷ.

A later name of Hestiaeia in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles; on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea. After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time κατέλιθη ἡ διογυρχία. For another reference to Hestiaeia, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

3. 10. τέλος δ' οἰδηπός ἥρχον.

οἰδηπός is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom *οἰδηπός* would be governed by *ἥρχον*, we may adopt the emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, *ἐπ' οἰδηπός*.

3. 11. οἷον Τροιζηνίοις Ἀχαιοι συνάκτουσαν Σύβαριν, εἴτα πλείους οἱ Ἀχαιοι γενόμενοι δέσποινοι τοῦς Τροιζηνίους· οὗτοι τὸ δύο συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

The foundation of Sybaris (a. c. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Trozenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.

3. 12. καὶ δι Σαρπίου Συβαρίτην τοῖς συναγένεσιν.

Sc. *διαστίσων* or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. xi. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.

3. 12. Ζαγκλαῖος δὲ Σαρπίος ἴστοδεξάμενος ἀγέρεσσον καὶ αὐτόν.

This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 28. The Zancleans had

invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.

*Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς δέρους καὶ τοὺς μαθοφόρους πολίτας 3. 13.
ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἤλθον.*

Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia, and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.

*καὶ Ἀμφιπολέται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἀντοῖκος ἐβέπεσσον ὑπὸ τούτων αἱ 3. 13.
πλεῖστος αὐτῶν.*

αὐτῶν is to be taken with of *πλεῖστοι*, which is in partitive apposition with *Ἀμφιπολέται*. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of ‘as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians’ who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.

στασιάζοντι δὲ μὲν ταῖς διγυρχίαις κ.τ.λ.

3. 14.

‘There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.’ This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e. g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

αὐθάδετερ εἴργαται πρότερον.

3. 14.

Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.

3. 15. Κολοφόνιοι καὶ Νοτιοί.

That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

3. 15. μᾶλλον δημοκρικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιά σκούπες τῶν τὸ δότυ.

The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piraeus was its head-quarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piraeus, from which it returned victorious.

4. 1. γίνονται μὲν αὖτις αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν.

Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

4. 1. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

4. 2. δθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας.

Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word διεστασίασαν may be causal and active, 'they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.' (Cp. παραστασίεσθαι v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking διεστασία, like στασία, as a neuter) 'they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.'

ὅστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἀμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ὁστις πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς 4. 3. ἔλλοις μέρεσιν.

The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κῆδειας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν 4. 5. στάσεων τῶν ὄπερον.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. reip. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgilaus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἑπταλήρων στάσεων γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο 4. 6. ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν φί Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν Τιμοφάνους γάρ τῶν εὐπόρων ταῦς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρες, δὲ περισσότες καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοὺς υἱούς αὐτοῦ Δάξανδρος ἡρέε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρέβινε, πρόβενος δὲ τῆς πόλεως.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long pre-meditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Nicias 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have

repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

4. 7. Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

4. 8. η ἐν Ἀρειῷ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that 'at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.' Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the *Polities* to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

4. 8. συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Cp. iv. 3. § 8, διγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δὲ ἀνεμέρας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς, sc. πολιτείας. *σύντονος* means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

4. 8. ὁ παυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αὕτος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ισχυροτέραν ἐποίησε.

διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης, 'by means of this victory.'

τῆς ἡγεμονίας, sc. αὕτος γενόμενος. διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν follows τῆς ἡγεμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of

Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

περὶ τῆς ἐν Μαντίνειᾳ μάχης.

4. 9.

I.e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 B.C. described by Thuc. v. 70-74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἵτοις γερμένος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Αθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετίβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Diocles after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀμβρακίῃ.

4. 9.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were *δούτιοι διληπλοι*): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

οἱ δυνάμεις αἱρετοῦ.

4. 10.

‘Who are the causes of the power of a state?’ cp. supra,

§ 9, δ δῆμος αἰτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

4. 13. ὅτε μὲν γέρε εἰσπατήσωστε . . . ἀρχοντας αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the *coup d'état*, and ended in the *plébiscite* by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

4. 13. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἔξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρῆματα παρέξειν.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

4. 13. φευσάμενοι.

'Having once told the lie' which, it is inferred, was detected.

5. 2. καὶ ἐπὶ 'Ρόδω': μισθοφορά τε γέρε οἱ δημαγογοι ἐπέριξαν, καὶ ἐκάλεον διαδιδόντας τὰ διφειδόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἤταγκασθησαν συστάστες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον.

'The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.' Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, supra, c. 3. § 4. The words διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας occur in both passages.

5. 3. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ 'Ηρακλείᾳ δ δῆμος.

Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in B.C. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century B.C. a democratical party existed in the mother-city. Nine

places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἥ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία.

5. 4.

Cp. supra c. 3. § 5.

ἡ τὰς προσδόους τὰς λεπτουργίας.

5. 5.

Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from *ἀναδόστους ποιοῦντες*.

Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First.

Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish 5. 8. tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich.

Παιωνίσταρος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακούς.

5. 9.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

Θεαγένης ὁ Μεγάρος.

5. 9.

Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

Δαφναῖος απηγορεύων Δαφναῖον.

5. 10.

Cp. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.

5. 10. *ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας.*

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἡ πάτριας δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, 'the good old democracy,' as opposed to the later and extreme form.

5. 11. *ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἥπτον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρει τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον.*

τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τὸν δῆμον τῶν νόμων = 'a remedy against the people becoming master.' That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes: cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: 'What should be the area of a constituency?' Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvan-

tages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common action ; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

*αἱ δὲ διγυρχίαι μεταβάλλουσιν διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους τοὺς φωνερούς 6. 1, 2.
τάροις . . . ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφοράς.*

According to c. 1. § 16, ἐν μὲν γάρ ταῖς διγυρχίαις ἐγγίνονται δύο, οὐ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσις καὶ ἔτι οὐ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves ; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into ‘that arising from those outside the governing body’ (οὐδὲ μᾶλλον, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Τοῦτο μὲν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μάλιστα δέ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσις arising δέ μᾶλλον although the leader comes δέ αὐτῆς τῆς διγυρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 κακοῦνται δέ ε.τ.λ., with which the second main division begins.

ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις.

6. 1.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Νάξιοι πολιτείαι in the so-called ‘Polities’ of Aristotle.

ζητεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφοράς.

6. 2.

Goettling would interpret μᾶλλον as = μᾶλλον & τοῦ πλήθους which is harsh. The conjectures αὐτῶν and ἀλλήλων seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μάλιστα δέ in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσις (οὐδὲ αὐτῶν) : but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the νόμοις who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising δέ μᾶλλον or δέ αὐτῶν.

6. 2. οἵσιν ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (*πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ δικαρχία*).

6. 3. The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

6. 5. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

6. 6. ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαριλέα ἵσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαρχοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθέται whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynicus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

6. 6. καὶ ἐν ὅσαις διλεγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὣν οἱ ἀρχοντες εἰσιν.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

6. 6. διπερ ἐν Ἀθήναις συνέβαστε.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οἱ διλείται, οἱ δῆμος or οἱ δῆμοι only. That the membership of a club should

have been the qualification for an office of which the election was in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 infra).

*καὶ δπον τὰ δικαιστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἔστιν δημαγωγοῦντες γάρ 6. 7.
πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολετείαν.*

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

*γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς δικαιαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλάσσωσι τὰ θέματα 6. 8.
ἀσελγάς.*

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also infra c. 12. § 17.

Hipparinus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of 6. 8. Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

*Καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ δὲ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν πρὸς Χάρρητα πράξας ἀπεχείρησε μετα- 6. 9.
βαλεῖν τὴν πολετείαν.*

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between 367–333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory. Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

διὰ τοιαύτην αἵτιαν,

6. 9.

sc. διὰ τὸ ἀναλάσσει τὰ θέματα τοὺς εὐπόρους ζῶντας ἀσελγάς.

*ὅτι μὲν αὐτὸν ἀπιχειροῦσί τι κακών, ὅτι δὲ εἰλέπονται τὰ κακά· ὅθεν πρὸς 6. 9.
ἀποθέται στοιχαίουσι ή αἴτοι ή οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι εἰλέπονται.*

*αἴτοι=‘the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the
theft is made.’*

οἴτοι=‘the thieves or peculators.’ The revolution arises in two ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government, or of the government upon the thieves.

ἔρσις τῇ τῷ δὲ Λακεδαιμονικῇ γερήστρῳ.

6. 11.

I. e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election out of certain families (*διασταύρωμα*), resembled that of the Lacedaemonian elders who were chosen but ‘in a ridiculous fashion’ by the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.

6. 12. Timophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

6. 13. τῶν περὶ Σίμου.

σάμον is found in all the Greek MSS. and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. *Σίμον* which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaean who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

6. 13. ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναιρόντων δύνην μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in Aristocratem, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

6. 14. Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which 'divided all Hellas,' again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

6. 15. τῶν δὲ Θηβαῖς κανὸν Ἀρχίαν.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition

with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

έφιλονείσχασαν αὐτούς.

6. 15.

Const. preg.=φιλονεκοῦντες ἔδικος. The infinitive δεθῆναι helps the construction of αὐτούς, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

διὰ τὸ δῆμος δεσποτοῦς εἴναι τὰς δηλητηρίας . . . η ἐν Χίῳ δηλητηρίᾳ. 6. 16.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, supra, iv. 4. § 21.

πολλάκις γάρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρώτον τίμημα . . . τοὺς μέσους.

6. 17.

is an accusativus pendens; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first . . . the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

οὐ μόνοις διὰ ταῦτα ὀλίγοι.

7. 1.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fewness of men of wealth and birth.

Παρθενίαι (ἢ τῶν δροῖσιν γάρ οἵσσω).

7. 2.

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called δεινοῖσσι. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until

the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

7. 2. Λύσανθρος.

For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch's Life of Lysander, 24-26.

7. 3. Κινάδων δὲ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάφ συστήματα ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Σπαρτιάταν.

For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. Hell. iii. 3. §§ 4-II.

ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάφ if genuine must mean 'against Agesilaus' and (less directly) against the Spartans.

7. 4. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυραιῶν ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας.

See Bergk Frag. 2-7, p. 316.

7. 4. Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

7. 5. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τε πειρῶνται μηγίναι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀριστοκρατίαιν.

ταῦτα refers to τὰ δύο, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

7. 6. διαφέροντο γὰρ τὰς δυομαζομένας πολιτείας αἱ δριστοκρατίαι τούτη, καὶ θιά τούτη εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἡγεμονίαι δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι εἰστῶν. τὰς γὰρ διοικουμένας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν διληγορίαν δριστοκρατίας καλοῦσσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας.

τούτη and διὰ τούτη have been taken as follows: 1)* 'Aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in the number of elements

which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to διαφίσουσι: 'there are such differences; for those of them which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) τούτῳ and διὰ τοῦτο may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner: 3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i.e. in having the three elements of δῆμος, πλοῦτος, ἀρετή instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (*αὐτῶν*) are less stable and the latter more so. For those which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The δῆμος being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words *αἱ μὲν ἡγεμόνες, αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον*, are partitive of *αὐτῶν*, which refers to *αἱ δημοκρατίαι* and cannot therefore be applied of *μὲν μᾶλλον μέρους* to timocracies *αἱ ἡγεμόνες μάκρων* to aristocracies. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

εὐεργεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ εἰσπράττειν τὸ Θεοπίου.

7. 9.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.

τὸν Θουρίους. Thurii was founded in the year 443 under the protection of Athens, and had nearly ceased to exist in 390. Yet in this short time it was subjected to at least two serious revolutions, 1) that which is mentioned here from an oligarchical aristocracy into a democracy; 2) another revolution, noted *infra* § 12, by which it passed from a polity into an oligarchy of a few families, whether earlier or later than the preceding, is unknown. It may be conjectured, but it is only a conjecture, that the narrowing of the aristocracy briefly alluded to in this passage is the same change with that which is afterwards mentioned more fully in § 12, and their overthrow which ensued may be further identified with the expulsion of the Sybarites soon after the foundation of the city. It may also be conjectured with considerable probability that the government of Thurii became an oligarchy at the time when the Athenian citizens were driven out, after the failure of the Syracusan expedition.

7. 9. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμῆματος εἴναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χάραν ὅλην τοὺς γυωρίμους συγκρίσουσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, cp. ii. 11. § 14, δοῦλον μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολεμιστέρον πλείονας μετέχειν τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ δημοτικότερον τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ καλλιαρ ἐκποτῶν διποτελεῖσται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάρρος.

ὅτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολετίας δημοφυλικάς εἶναι μᾶλλον 7. 10.
κ.τ.λ.

Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. infra, c. 8. § 16.

ἢ Λοκρῶν πόλις.

7. 10.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [Diodorus xiv. 44, Justin xxi. 2 and 3].

δέ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἀνέγένετο, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ τὸ μεμηγμένη. 7. 10.

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

ὅπερ συνίβαντες ἦν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Λακεδαιμονίουν.

7. 14.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'

παρελογίζεται γάρ ἡ δύναμι ἢν' αὐτῶν, δοπερ δ σοφιστικὸς λόγος. 8. 3.

ἢν' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν δυνάμων.

σοφιστικὸς λόγος = δ σωρός, or 'acervus.'

τῷ μὴ δίδυσι

8. 5.

and the following are causal or instrumental datives after διὰ τὸ
εἰδικῆσθαι. The article is to be continued with the second μὴ
δίδυσι.

τῷ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειτον αὐτῶν εἰσάγεται εἰς τὴν πολετίαν.

8. 5.

For the expression of a similar spirit acting in a wider field and giving a mythological origin to the traditional policy of Rome, cp. Tac. Ann. xi. 24: 'Quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Athenien-

sibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit,' and the real speech of Claudio (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in their editions).

8. 6. οὐτὶ γὰρ ὁσπερ δῆμος ἦν οἱ δῆμοι, διὸ καὶ ἐπειότους ἐγγύουσαι δημαγογοὶ πολλάκις, ὁσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον.

ἡδη, sc. ὅταν πλείους ᾔστι.

ὁσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον refers only to the clause, διὸ καὶ . . . πολλάκις as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6. § 6 (demagogues in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy becoming a democracy.

8. 9. πρὸς παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς.

The construction is πρὸς τὰς φιλοεικίας παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς (sc. τοὺς ἄξει), ὁσπερ τοὺς δῆλους.

αὐτούς may be either the subject or the object of παρειληφέναι, with a slightly different meaning. Either *‘before the spirit of contention has also carried away or absorbed them,’ or, ‘before they too have caught the spirit of contention.’

8. 10. τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος.

i. e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth of a city has increased or diminished.

8. 10. συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἀπισκοπῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐπ' ὅτας μὲν πόλεις τιμῶσαι καὶ ἀναυτόν, κ.τ.λ.

The words *καὶ τοῦτο τὸν χρόνον*, though somewhat pleonastic, have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare the present with the past value of property at that time, i. e. with the property serving as a qualification at the time when the change is occurring (*εἰσοριας πορίσματος γεγονότος*). The words are placed after *καὶ τιμῶσαι* by Susemihl following the authority of William of Moerbek, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With *καὶ τιμῶσαι* repeat *καὶ τιμῶσαι ἀπισκοπῶν* κ.τ.λ.

ἢ δῆμος καὶ δημιαρχία καὶ μοναρχία καὶ πάση πολιτείᾳ.

8. 12.

καὶ μοναρχία is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is found in the best MSS. The advice given is at least as applicable to kings as to other rulers of states. πάση πολιτείᾳ=not 'every constitutional government' but in a more general sense 'every form of government.' (See note on text.)

τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.

8. 12.

=*τὰς παραστάσας*, 'their followers' or 'followings.'

τοὺς ζευς δούμφόρους πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.

8. 13.

As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.

τούτου δὲ ἀκούει τὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἕγχειρίσων τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

In this favourite remedy of 'conservation by antagonism,' which is really only an 'unstable equilibrium,' Aristotle does not seem to see how much of the force of the state is lost.

μοναχῶν δὲ καὶ ἐνθέχεται ἄμα εἴναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ 8. 17.
τοῦτο κατασκευάσσεται τοις.

τούτο, sc. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν περδαῖνειν, to be gathered from the previous sentence.

διοικήσαται πατέρα φρεγίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλᾶς τιθίσθωσαν.

8. 19.

λόχοι are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions appear to have corresponded. Cp. Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, *διοικηταὶ μὲν γένος εἰ τὸποι εἰ μὲν πατέρα φυλᾶς εἰ δὲ πατέρα μορίας εἰ δὲ πατέρα λόχους* καὶ δραχεῖται δέποτε διάστημα μέρις ἀφεντήσασιν. The accounts apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such divisions.

μὴ μόνον τὰς απήσεις μὴ τοις ἀναδόστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, 8. 20.
ἢ ἐπίστεις τῶν πολιτειῶν λαθθάνει γηρύζεται.

As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed on the rich, or by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion to the amount assessed. Infra c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how

Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.

8. 20. καν τις ιδρίση τῶν εὐπόρων. εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμα εἶναι ή ἀν σφῶν αὐτῶν.

The construction is *ἀν τις ιδρίση των σφῶν αὐτῶν*; but whether *σφῶν αὐτῶν* refers 1) to *οἱ εὐπόροι* or 2)* to *τούτους*, i.e. *τοὺς ἀπόρους*, is not clear.

8. 20. μηδὲ πλειόνων ή μᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν.

Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk. v. c. 9. § 1, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'

9. 1. τρία δέ των χρὴ ζχειν κ.τ.λ.

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, τοῦ μὲν οὐν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἔστι τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἔστι δι' ἀ πιστεύομεν ζέω τῶν ἀποδεῖξεων. Στοι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims εὔνοια, φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ as the proper qualities of a statesman: καίτοι ἔμαι τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὄργιζεσθε δι' οὐδενὸς οἵματος ηστον εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρέοσσων.

9. 1. δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς.

= 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

9. 2. πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διαιρέσιν.

In this passage (cp. infra *πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν*) the words *αἵρεσις* and *διαιρέσις* are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,'—'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

9. 4. ή ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται κ.τ.λ.

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from

ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις. ‘May not the reason be that those who have these two qualities are possibly wanting in self control?’

ἀπλῶς δέ, δότι τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις. 9. 5.

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the *Politics*, or to a special treatise called ‘*oi νόμοι*.’ The meaning is that ‘enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.’ *τοῖς νόμοις* = ‘their laws,’ the article referring to *πολιτείαις* which follows.

οἱ δὲ οἰκόμενοι ταῦτην εἴναι μίαν ἀρετὴν.

9. 7.

ταῦτην, sc. τὸ διλγαρχέστατον (οἱ δημοκράτατος) εἴναι gathered from the preceding sentence.

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that ‘happy inconsistencies’ may be better than extremes. The *Opportunist* may do greater service to the Republic than the *Intransigent*.

ικαθάπερ γένις.

9. 7.

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὥπτὸν οἰκέσιον φεύρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξοι τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας εἰ δὲλλας πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιμέναι καὶ ἐπιτεωμέναι φεύρεσσι, οἷον δημοκρατία εἰς μόνον ἀνιμένην διαβεποτέρα γίνεται διότε τὸλος ἔχει εἰς διλγαρχίαν, δὲλλας καὶ ἐπιτεωμένην σφόδρα, διότερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότητος καὶ ἡ συμβοτής εἰς μόνον ἀνιμένην ἤρχεται εἰς τὸ μόνον, δὲλλας καὶ σφόδρα γρυπά γενέμενα ἢ συμβάτην διατίθεται διότε μηδὲ μικτήρα δοκίνις εἴναι.

διὰ τὴν ὄπεροχήν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἀνεργίων.

9. 7.

‘On account of the excess (cp. above δὲλλας ἀνεργός) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.’

συρβάνει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς δὲλλας πολιτείας.

9. 8.

δὲλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of ‘likewise.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3, πρὸς τὸ τὰς δὲλλας τύχης δχω, where δὲλλας = ‘which we are comparing with the virtues;’ and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, διουλών τὴν δὲλλας εἰδεῖν.

δοτι' δχω.

9. 8.

δοτι· is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is

found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. Περὶ Ψυχῆς ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 11, ἐστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποθεμένος τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμεις δὲ δύστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν.

9. 9. φθείρουσες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν σόμοις.

Sc. τοὺς εἰπάρους ἢ τὸ πλήθος. ‘So that when they destroy either party by laws *carried to excess [or possibly ‘by laws based on superior power’] they destroy the state.’

9. 11. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων . . . τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας.

Cp. Rep. iv. 423 E, ταῦτα . . . πάντα φαιᾶται, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἔν μέγια φυλάττεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἵκανον. τί τοῦτο; ἔφη. τὴν παιδείαν, ἡν δὲ ἄγα, καὶ τροφήν.

9. 12. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις δύμνουσι ‘καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ κακόνους ἕτομαι καὶ βουλεύονται δὲ δὲ ζῆν κακόν.’

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

δύμνε . . . θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας, μὴ μὲν ἄγω ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φροντσεῖν μήτε τέχνη μήτε μαχαρᾶ μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεθὲ δμέραν καὶ σπουδήν δὲ τι κα δύναμαι κακὸν τῷ πόλει τῷ τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer's Kleine Schriften, vol. ii. p. 106.

9. 13. χρή δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνεται καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοινατίον.

‘To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong,’ not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 infra, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δικερ πότερον δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς.

9. 14. νῦν δὲ ἐν μὲν ταῖς διληγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐλοὶ τρυφῶσιν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 556 D, δοταν Ισχρὸς ἀπὸ πένητος, ἀλιωμένος, παρατραχεῖς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσιῷ δοκιατροφρεστι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας διλογρίας, θηρ δεύματά τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν κ.τ.λ.

9. 15. ‘εἰς δὲ χρῆσθαι.’

Probably ἐστί is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.

πρὸς βούθειαν τὴν διὰ τοῦ δῆμου.

10. 3.

'The assistance which arises from i.e. is necessitated by the people.' Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause *εἰς τοὺς γυναῖκας* which follows.

τοῖς ἀνεμόσι.

10. 3.

'The good' in the party sense, i.e. the higher classes like the *ἀγελά* of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in 10. 3. i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (*διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλως εἶναι τὰς πόλεις*); here, when they were already 'increased in power,' (*μετὰ τὰς πόλεις τείχη πάντας*). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

εἰς δῆμους.

10. 5.

Not 'the democracies,' but 'the peoples in different states.'

Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story

of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

10.8. Εστερ Κόδρος.

In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

10.8. ἐλευθερώσατες Εστερ Κύρος,

who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See infra, § 24.

10.8. κτίσαντες χάρας.

'Who have settled a country.'

κτίζειν χάρας is said like *κτίζειν πόλιν*, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

10.8. Εστερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίου βασιλεῖς.

Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

10.8. Μακεδόνες.

Such as Perdiccas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Archedaus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

10.8. Μολοττᾶν.

Cp. infra, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

10.9. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2, διαφέρουσι δὲ τελείωσεν ὁ μὲν γάρ τύραννος τὸ ξενῆ συμφέρει σκοπεῖ· δὲ βασιλεὺς τὰν ἀρχομένων οὐ γάρ ἔστι

βασιλεὺς δὲ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων δὲ τοιοῦτος οἰδεῖς προσθέται· τὰ ὀφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἀν σκοποί τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις:—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

τὸν Περιάρδρον πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

10. 13.

See note on iii. 13. § 16.

δὲ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος.

10. 15.

Sc. ἐπέθετο, to be supplied from τῶν ἐπιθέσεων, or from ἐπιθέτηραι (supra, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54–58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz. whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάρδρον τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ.

10. 16.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

ἡ Ἀμύντας τοῦ μικροῦ.

10. 16.

Probably Amyntas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne B.C. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

ἡ δὲ Φιλίππος ἵνδι Πλαυσανίου.

10. 16.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, καὶ πόλις πρὸς τὸ Θεβαῖον δεῖνα φέλετων εἰς τὴν Ἀππαΐην, διὰ εἰ πρὸς βορεῖτας εἰς Φαραΐς ἄξειν, ὑπέσχεστο

ἀντὶ ἀντονούσιν εἰ δύοις προέστη καὶ ἐπίστευσε μηδὲμονοι. To Alexander there is none.

The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus b.c. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 93). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 b.c., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6; and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

10. 16. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εἰσούχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ.

Sc. ἡ ἐπίθεσις. Εὐαγόρα is governed by the *ετ* in *ἐπίθεσις*. The story is differently told by Theopomitus (Fragm. 111, Müller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydaeus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his 'Evagoras' throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

10. 17. Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413–399, and had two wives,—the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or

Arrhibaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ἡ Φιλίσπου μῆτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδίκης Ἰρέα δὲ θυγάτηρ where read Εὐρυδίκη Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)

10. 18.

Cotys was assassinated in 358 b. c. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

10. 19.

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ δὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσθῆται πληγαὶ ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέφευραν οἱ δὲ ἐνεχείρησαν ἀει ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας.

The first *kai* means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second *kai* that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

ἐνεχείρησαν, sc. διαφθείρουν.

10. 19.

Πενθαλίδας.

It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthalidae derived their name from him.

10. 20.

ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἔχειτε τοιούτων εἰπόντων τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσαδίαν τοῦ στόματος.

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Εὐριπίδης ἔπειδεν εἶπε τοῦτο ὅτι τὸ στόμα δυσάδες ἔχει, πολλὰ γάρ, εἴπει εἶπε, διέφρητα δυσαεσάτη, i.e. Some one said to Euripides, 'Your breath smells.' 'Yes,' he replied, 'for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.'

δοντερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πελοτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας.

10. 21.

We must supply *περὶ* in thought before *μοναρχίας*. It is inserted

in the margin of P^s. ‘As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.’

10. 21. οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρεῖον, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσατος Ξέρξου, ἀλλ’ οἴόμενος συγγράψεσθαι ὡς ἀμυνοῦντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesiae Fragmenta, Περσικὰ § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), ‘Ἀρτάπανος (sic) δὲ μέγα παρὰ Ξέρξῃ δυνάμενος, μετ’ Ἀσπαμίτρου τοῦ εὐνούχου καὶ αὐτοῦ μέγα δυναμένου βουλεύονται ἀνέλειν Ξέρξην, καὶ ἀναιροῦσσι, καὶ πείθονται Ἀρτοξέρκην (sic) τὸν οὐδὲν ὡς Δαρεῖον (sic) αὐτὸν δὲ ἔπειρος πάις ἀνείλε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρεῖος ἀγύμενος ὑπὸ Ἀρταπάνου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν Ἀρτοξέρξου πολλὰ βων καὶ ἀπαρνούμενος ὡς οὐκ εἴη φονεὺς τοῦ πατρός· καὶ ἀποθήσεται. According to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing *οὐ* before *ἐκρέμασε*. The purport of Aristotle's rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for *οὐ κελεύσατος* may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the Historia Animalium but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also De Gen. An. ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

10. 22. Σαρδανάπαλος.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23-27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in Nic. Eth. i. 5. § 3.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἀκείνου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἀν γένοιστο ἀληθές.

10. 22.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

Διανοτιρ τῷ ιστήρῳ Δίου ἐπέθετο.

10. 23.

See infra §§ 28 and 32.

Σωτερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἷος Κύρος Ἀστυάγης.

10. 24.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his Historia Animalium, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

Σεύθης δὲ Θρᾷξ.

10. 24.

A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in Anab. vii. 3, Hell. iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

οἷος Ἀριοβαρζάνης Μιθριδάτης.

10. 25.

According to Corn. Nepos Datames, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 8. 4, *ὅτερος Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνην προδοὺς.*

οὐδὲ ἀπολεσθεῖν δεῖ τὴν Δίους ἴνδιμηφύιν.

10. 28.

'There should be ever present with them the resolution of Dion.'

Ιεναις εὐτρό.

10. 28.

Sc. &c.

Διὸς Διοκλεμόνος πλείστες κατέλιπον τυραννίδας.

10. 30.

Διός, 'because one form of government naturally hates another.' Cp. Thuc. i. 18, *ἐντοῦ δὲ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖς τύραννοι καὶ οἱ τῆς Βαρ-*

'Ελλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὸ τυραννεύσεως οἱ πλειστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὃντα Λακεδαιμονίου κατείθησαν : and Hdt. v. 92 about the Lacedaemonian hatred to tyranny.

10. 30. *καὶ Συρακούσιοι.*

This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466–406, from the overthrow of Thrasybulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

10. 31. *καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον.*

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred b. c. 343 ; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, b.c. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see supra note on § 16). We have thus a measure of the latitude with which Aristotle uses the expression *καὶ νῦν* 'quite lately' which recurs in ii. 9. § 20, *καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς Αἰδηρίοις.*

10. 31. *οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν.*

Either 1) the same persons who are called *αἰχναὶ συστάντες*, or some part of them, *οἱ συστάντες* being taken substantively= *οἱ συστασιῶντες*. Or 2) *αὐτῶν* may be understood of the whole people as if *πολῖται* had preceded; *συστάντες* would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted *εἰσ'* before *αὐτῶν* without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests *μετά*. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasybulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months ; see infra c. 12. § 6. According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

10. 32. *Διονύσιος δὲ Δίων στρατόπεδος, ερδεοτῆς δὲ καὶ προσλαβόν τὸ δῆμον, δεκίνον ἀεβαλὸν διεφέρει.*

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on *ἀεβαλόν*. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by

members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μίσος,

10. 35.

sc. χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε δημιαρχίας,

10. 35.

sc. τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς δημιαρχίας, understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

οὐ γύρωνται δὲ ἐπὶ βασιλεῖαι νῦν.

10. 37.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

ἀλλ' οὐ περ γύρωνται, μοναρχίαι [ταῦ] τυραννίδες μᾶλλον.

10. 37.

The objection to the *αὐ* (which is found in all the MSS.) is that *μοναρχία* is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including *βασιλεία* and *τυραννίς*. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of government' must be supplied with *γύρωνται* from *βασιλεῖαι*. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to *βασιλεία*. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's *Politics*.

ἡρθία γέρε σύντοτο δὲ κατέληστο.

10. 38.

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

δὲ περὶ Μαλοποὺς βασιλεῖα.

11. 2.

Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.

11. 2. Theopompus is said by Tyrtaeus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:—

Ἡμετέρῳ βασιλῆῃ θεοῖσι φίλῳ Θεοπόμπῳ,
δν δὰ Μεσσήτην εἰλομεν εὐρύχορον,
Μεσσήτην ἀγαθὴν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὴν δὲ φυτεύειν·
ἀμφ' αὐτῇ δὲ ἐμάχοντ' ἐννεακαΐδεκ' ἔτη
νελερέως, αἱεὶ ταλαισίφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
αλχημγαῖ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες·
εκοστῷ δὲ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πίστα ἔργα λιπόντες,
φεῦγον Ἰθωμαῖον ἐκ μεγάλων δρέων.

According to Plutarch, Lyc. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the *ρήτρα* more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note *in loc.*

11. 5. ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

11. 6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἀεὶ φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας.

ἐπιδημοῦντας is translated by William de Moerbek without any authority ‘praefectos populi,’ apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θύρας. Either ‘at his gate’ or ‘at their own gates.’ In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

11. 8. καὶ τὸ πάντας ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, τυραννικόν, δέος οὐ τε φιλαρήτρεψατ.

1) *Reading οὐ τε with Bekker's second edition after Victorius: ‘Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.’ Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain μήτε with the MSS. we must translate either ‘that he may not have to keep soldiers,’ for his subjects will keep them for him; or, ‘so that a guard need not

be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

ἀναθῆματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν κ.τ.λ.

11. 9.

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

τῶν περὶ Σάμου ὅργα Πολυκράτεια.

11. 9.

Lit. and 'among' or 'of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

*καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷς ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν πόνῳ γὰρ ἔπειτα ἦν 11. 10.
Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν διασαν εἰσενηρχέται συνθέτειν.*

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the Oeconomics, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6. The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

11. 10. βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.
Cp. note on text.

11. 11. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται μόναρχος.
i.e. 'for they are both alike.'

11. 13. ηλῷ γὰρ ὁ ηλος, δωπερ ἡ παροιμία.

Sc. ἐκκρούει, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say; 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, § 7, μωρία δὲ καὶ δῆλα ἔκ τε ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων καταδεῖξαι τοις ἔχων, προτιμώντων τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, τοῦτο μὲν παρατήσομαι, ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀπειροκαλίαν τινὰ μειρακιώδη ἐκπέσῃ μοι τὸ σύγγραμμα καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν ἀλλαρ ηλῷ ἐκκρούειν τὸν ήλον.

11. 13. αὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον δ τύραννος.

Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considérable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's Russia, p. 280, ed. 8.

11. 14. οὐθὲν δὲ ἀλλεῖται μοχθηρίας.

Sc. δ τύραννος; or οὐθὲν may be the nominative to ἀλλεῖται.

11. 16. εἰς τὸν μὲν οὖν δροντι . . . φρονῶσιν.

The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.

The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.

" 2nd " = 1st "

" 3rd " = 2nd "

The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.

But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.

δὸς ἔτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἀνατίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. 11. 17.

Literally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,' i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

ἴν φυλάττοντα μάνον τὴν δύναμιν . . . τοῦτο μὲν διστηρῶν δεῖ 11. 18, 19.
μένειν, τὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκριθέμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν
καλῶς.

Compare Machiavelli, who in his 'Prince' goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of 'doing evil that good may come' and of 'keeping up appearances' and of 'fear to be preferred to love.' 'Let it be the Prince's chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.' (c. 18, Bohn's Translation, p. 461.) Again 'A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects' property.' . . . 'To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.' (c. 16, pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, infra §§ 20, 25: 'He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.' (ib.) Again, cp. §§ 22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19. p. 462: 'Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.' Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at

certain periods of the year and 'should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,' p. 476. Cp. Hallam, Mid. Ages i. 66, 'The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?' (quoted by Congreve).

11. 19. Bekker in his 2nd edition, following a suggestion of Schneider, adds *eis* before *δωρέας*, but unnecessarily.
11. 22. The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos De Regibus c. 2: 'Dionysius prior .. et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuque imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitae, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.'
- The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian Polity of Syracuse, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῇ Συρακοσίων πολιτείᾳ καὶ συνεχῶς φησιν αὐτὸν [Διονύσιον τὸν νεότερον] οὗτον δέ τε ἡμέρας ἐνεγκαύτα μεθύειν διὸ καὶ ἀμβλυωπότερον γενίσθαι τὰς δύνεις. (Arist. Berl. Ed. 1568, b. 19.)
11. 23. φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀλλοῖς βούλονται τοῦτο ποιοῦντες.
- These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.
11. 24. κατασκευάζειν γάρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.
- Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.
11. 28. καλάσσειν.
- Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with *ἡλικίαν*, but *ὑβρίεως* may be supplied with *τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν* from the preceding.
11. 30. διαφθείρωντες.
- Sc. τὸν τύραννον.

χαλεπὸν θυμῷ μάχεσθαι.

11. 31.

Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, ἐτι χαλεπότερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἡ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησίν Ἡράκλειος.

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli's 'Prince' quoted above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφούρους ἴντολαμβάνειν δεῖ σώζεσθαι δὰ τὴν ἀρχήν.

11. 32.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcileable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

Ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸν διακείσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἥθος γέγοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ ἡμίχρηστον 11. 34.
ἀντα, καὶ μὴ παντρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπάντρον.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15, p. 453, in a still more subtle style of reflection : 'It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his ruin.' And again : 'He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his states ; for there are some things having the appearance of virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.'

Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicyonian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 12. 1.
3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3.

p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a victory in the Pythian games B.C. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says 'there is some confusion about the names of Orthagoras and Andreas. It has been supposed with some probability that the same person is designated under both names : for the two names do not seem to occur in the same author.' Orthagoras, 'speaker for the right,' may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. Infra § 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from Myron to Cleisthenes.

Πλειστερῶν ἔπομέναι τοῦτο προσελθόντα δίκαιον εἰς Ἀρετὸν πάγον.

12. 2.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to

have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

12. 3. Cypselidae.

The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

Cypselus	30	years.
Periander	44	"
Psammetichus	3	"

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From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total $73\frac{1}{2}$ years?

Sylburg would change $\tau\pi\alpha$ καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα into ἑπτὰ καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα. Giphanius would omit καὶ τέτταρα after τετταράκοντα. Susemihl would change τέτταρα into ἡμισυνη, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read τέτταρα or τέσσαρα.

12. 5. τράκοντα καὶ πέντε.

Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 B.C. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. $17 + 14 + 4 = 35$.

The whole period 560–510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

12. 6. Here the addition is correct. $7 + 10 + 1 = 18$, although the time assigned to Hiero's reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does

Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I B.C. 405–367, Dionysius II 367–356, and again 346–344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

Idem.

12. 7.

i. e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as 12. 8. if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

διά τε τοῦ χρόνου.

12. 9.

Sc. τί διπλος εἴη μεταβολή to be supplied from the preceding sentence. ‘And in what is any special change made by time?’ i. e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

With τὰ μὴ ἀρθάμενα supply τί or διὰ τί from τί διπλος εἴη above; cp. 12. 9. διὰ τίς αἰτίας ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Δακωνικήν μεταβάλλει;

12. 10.

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato’s order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases μεταβάλλειν and μεταβαίνειν in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always ‘passed over’ into their opposites:—the ‘passing over’ is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυραννίδες οὐ λέγει οὔτ’ εἰ ζῶσαι μεταβολή, οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ζῶσαι, 12. 11.
διὰ τίς αἰτίας, καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολεμεῖαν.

1) * He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes’—a condensed sentence in which καὶ is omitted before διὰ τίς αἰτίας. εἰς ποίαν πολεμεῖαν, sc. ζῶσαι μεταβολή.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second οὔτε: οὔτε, εἰ μὴ ζῶσαι, διὰ τίς αἰτίας. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last

development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why does not the cycle continue or return into itself?') The meaning may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government, experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this inconsistency?'

12. 12. ή Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilaus, as here, made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change from tyranny to aristocracy.

12. 12. ἐν Καρχηδόνι.

Sc. τυραννίς μετέβαλεν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii. c. 11. § 2—'that Carthage has never had a sedition worth speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,' and a similar statement occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. 5. § 9, τοιοῦτον δέ των τρόπων Καρχηδόνοις πολεμεύμενοι φίλοις κέκτηται τὸν δῆμον δέ γάρ των ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουσίας ποιῶσιν εὐπόρους κ.τ.λ. To avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηδόνι, a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a time in the history of Carthage *before* the establishment of the aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be assumed in order to save Aristotle's consistency. In § 14 infra, he calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he talks of it as having a democratic element.

12. 15. ἔργον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ἀλγαρχίην, πλουσίαν καὶ πεζήν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

Bekker inserts *kai* in his 2nd Edition—*ἀσωτευόμενοι (καὶ) κατατοκί-* 12. 17.
ζόμενοι. The addition makes no change in the sense.

μεταβάλλουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδέποτε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. 12. 18.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.

BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view: in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

1. 2. *διὰ τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ τε λοιπόν*

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) 'As well as any omission of those matters (*ἐκείνων*) which have just been mentioned,' i. e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) *ἐκείνων* may refer to the forms of constitutions [*πολιτείῶν*].

1. 4-6. Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts *περὶ τὸ* before *βουλευμένον* in § 4, and *τὸν* before *δεῖ* in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.

αὗτη δ' ἔστιν ἡνὶ καλοῦσι τινες ὀλιγαρχίας,

1. 6.

'which they call oligarchy,' is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the expression δακτυλίους δάχτυλος, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3; τὴν τοῦ καλούμενου γελάκτος φόσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

τῇ δὲ δημαρχίᾳ ταῦτα.

1. 9.

'All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,' i. e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), 'may exist in the same state.'

ἀς ἐν μάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταῦτη μετέχοντας εἰσιθερίας.

2. 1.

μετέχοντας, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγειν εἰάθασσε, the subject and object being nearly the same.

τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.

2. 2.

'That is also the end, and that is the just principle.'

εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὅντος τὸ γῆρας.

2. 3.

The MSS. vary between δουλεύοντος and δούλου ὅντος. Supply ζητεῖ or some weaker word than ἔργον.

συμβαλλεται ταῦτη πρὸς τὴν διευθύνταν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ίσον.

2. 4.

'The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.'

τὸ δικαζεῖν πάντας ταῦτα εἰς πάντας.

2. 5.

The old translator takes this as if he read εἰς ἄλλα. But we may retain ταῦτα, regarding εἰς πάντας as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.

2. 5. τὸ τὴν ἐκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηθεὶς οὐ σπέλειστον ή τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ἢ σπέλειστον ή τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1st) by placing the words & τῶν μεγίστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μὴ before τῶν μεγίστων [Lambinus].

2. 6. ἀρχῶν

is used in the generic sense to include the ἀρχιστος ἀρχὴ of iii.
1. § 7.

2. 6. μεβδῷ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

2. 7. τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ ἀσφυκτὴ συσστενία μετ' ἀλλήλων.

i. e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

2. 7. ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν αἴδειν εἶναι.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. ‘The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.’

2. 8. ἄντι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν αἴδειν εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

2. 8. δέ τις ἀρχαῖς μεταβολῆς.

These words are translated in the text “has survived some ancient change”; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, ‘have survived from the old state before the change.’ For an example of such a ‘survival’ compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.

τὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας ταῦτ' ἔστιν.

2. 9.

ταῦτα, i. e. ‘election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.’

τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον δρχειν τοὺς διπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους

2. 9.

is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbek. The phrase is peculiar: ‘that the poor should no more have power than the rich’—we might expect rather ‘that the rich should no more have power than the poor.’ But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of *εὐπόροις* and *διπόροις* (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τούτῳ ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἔξουσι τὸ ἵσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμῆματα 3. 1.
διελεῖν χιλίους τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἵσον δύνασθαι τοὺς πεντακοσίους, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τούτῳ λεύκην, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὗτος, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἵσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαιοτηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (*πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμῆματα ε.τ.λ.*) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained (500 = 1000), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίου is the dative after *διελεῖν*: ‘to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.’ The clause which follows (*καὶ . . . πεντακοσίους*) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with *ἵσον δύνασθαι*, placing a comma at *διελεῖν*, ‘and arrange the qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.’ According to this

way of taking the passage, τὸ τιμῆμα τῶν περιποσίων is not parallel with χιλίου, sc. πολίτων, for which we should have expected τῶν τῶν χιλίων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

διελεῖν μὲν οὖτες. ‘We ought to distribute the qualification in this proportion, i. e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as 500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an equal number of representatives from both.’ In the previous case Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through representatives.

The word διαιρέσεως in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts, like διελεῖν in the previous sentence (ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὖτες κ.τ.λ.).

3. 4. λέγουσι γάρ ὅτι διέξει τῶν πλείον τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κ.τ.λ.

‘It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor. When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification exceeds, that is supreme.’

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which

the poor have a majority = $4 \times 2 + 15 = 23$,

the rich have a majority = $6 \times 2 + 5 = 17$,

Majority of poor 6

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy pure and simple.

3. 5. διποτέρων αὐτὸν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερέιναι συναριθμουμένων ἀριθμούρων ἐκατόρεως, τοῦτο κύριον.

ἐκατόρεως is the dative after *ὑπερέιναι* and a pleonastic explanation of διποτέρων.

λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὅπερ ἀν τις διέλοι τοὺς δῆμους· βελτιστὸς γὰρ δῆμος 4. 1.
δὲ γεωργικός ἐστω, ὅπερ καὶ ποιῶν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου οὗ τὸ
πλήθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἡ νομῆς.

ὅπερ ἀν τις κ.τ.λ. is the explanation of **πρώτην**, ‘I call it the first, meaning that which comes first in the classification of democracies,’ because it is the best and most natural, implied in **βελτιστὸς γὰρ δῆμος**.

ποιῶν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the addition of **βελτιστὴν** which may be supplied from **βελτιστός**. Or Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is the very best material of a democracy.

ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἡ νομῆς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic tribes ‘cultivating their living farm’ (i. 8. § 6), who are far from being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειαν δυσχαλος, διότε μὴ πολλάκις 4. 2.
δεκτηριούσιεν διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειαν τάναγκαῖα πρὸς τοὺς ἄργους διατρίβοντι καὶ
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason why people do not desire the property of others. But though a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a population which having little or no independent means, is absorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the necessities of life ; they are patient as well as industrious, and too busy to covet the property of others.

αὐτὸν μὴ μετίχωσι τῆς αἵρεσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλά τυνες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος 4. 4.
εἰς πάντας, δούτερη δὲ Μαστικά.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle was adopted in the constitution of Telescles the Milesian (iv. 14. § 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they elect by turns.

4. 5. καὶ δέ τοισι καὶ τοῦτ' εἴναι σχῆμα τι δημοκρατίας, διόπερ ἐν Μαντίνειᾳ ποτὲ οὐ.

So iv. 9. § 7, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἔγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὗσης [τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας] διὸ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν. Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy 'after a fashion,' at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, B.C. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle's cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

4. 5, 6. The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratical constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are 'paper-constitutions' only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

4. 5. οὐδὲ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἔστι τῇ πρότερον ἀρθεῖσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ.

διὸ refers to what has preceded. 'And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge': a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.

ἀρχειν τοὺς ἀπεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας.

4. 7.

Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connexion with the preceding words, as in the translation, *'are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάσεις γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν 4. 8.
παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμαι πάντες, η τὸ ὅλως μὴ
ἔξιναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς η διπό τυνος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

ἀπό των τόπων, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply *μὴ* from *μὴ ἔξιναι*; if outwards, the force of *μὴ* is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

δοῦνα the city is more precisely defined by *πόλις*, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

ἴστι δὲ καὶ δύ λέγουσιν Ὁξεῖλου νόμον εἶναι τοιούτον τι δυνάμενος, τὸ μὴ 4. 9.
δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐδάστη γῆς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

τὸν δὲ δεῖ διαφθοῦν αὐτῷ Ἀφυτείσιν νόμῳ πρὸς γάρ δ λέγομεν ίστι 4. 9, 10.
χρήσιμος. ἐκίνοι γάρ, καίτερ δύτες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν διάγη, δμως
πάντες γεωργῶσιν τημένους γάρ οὐδὲ διλος τὸς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλε-
καῦτα μόρια διαιροῦστες διστ' ἔχειν θεωρεῖται ταῖς τημένοις αὐτοῖς
πάντας.

διαφθεῖν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as
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that which is ascribed to Oxylos the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one, however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was small.'

The meaning of οὐ περβάλλειν is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heracides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller, vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. Δικαίος καὶ σωφρόνης βιώσας καὶ ἀλλοτρίων οὐ θιγγάνοντις ἀπεργάτες τῶν θυρῶν. Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

4. 11. τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις.

Not to be taken after γεγυμασμένοι; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket τὰ. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months before his death, 323 B.C., recorded by Arrian, Exped. Alexandri, vii. 9, in which he contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

4. 15. ἔτοιμα δὲ παρεβάλλειν.

sc. τὰς ἄλλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'

έπομένως, i.e. 'in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,' gathered from *βελτίστην καὶ πράτην*.

χείρον δὲ πλήθος χωρίζειν.

4. 15.

'At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding stage.' Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of *τεχνίται* (and *a fortiori* of course all below them). The second excludes the *θῆται*, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. infra c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

Διὸ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολειτίας, εἴρηται πρό- 4. 15.
τερον τὰ πλέοντα σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon *καὶ ταύτην*, to which the words *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας* are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, 'Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.' Or, if the emphasis on *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολειτίας* is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

Διὸ . . . εἴρηται. The connexion is, 'But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.' For the absolute use of *μᾶλλον* cp. Plat. Phaedo 63 D, *φησὶ γὰρ οὐρανίεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγομένους*.

Διὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δῆμῳ μᾶλλον.

4. 16.

The last word qualifies *οἰκεῖον*: 'For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.'

Διπερ συνάζῃ τῆς στάσεως αἵτιον γενέσθαι περὶ Συρίην.

4. 17.

Διπερ=the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (Herod. iv. 161), about 460 or 450 B.C., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

Κλεοβύνης.

4. 18.

Cp. Hdt. v. 69, ὃς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον δῆμον πρότερον ἀπωστίσαντο τὸν πάτερα (al. lect. πάτερα) πρὸς τὴν ἁντεῖν μοῖραν προσεδίδιστο, τὰς φυλὰς μετουνόμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλεῦνας ἐξ ἀλασσώνων. Δίκαιο τε δὴ φυλάρ-

χους ἀντὶ τεσσέρων ἐποίησε, δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δῆμους κατένεμε ἐς τὰς φυλὰς.

Cp. Schömann's Antiquities of Greece, Engl. Transl., p. 336.

The breaking up old divisions in an army and a state is not a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal relations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments, are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

5. 1. οἵτις δὲ ἔργον . . . μέγιστον ἔργον.

The repetition of *ἔργον* is awkward; but the general style of the Politics is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in either place.

5. 2. Διὸ δέ, περὶ ὃν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων περάσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.

διὸ because of the instability of states; the words *περὶ ὃν τεθεώρηται πρότερον* are either omitted or altered by those who change the order of the books.

The clause *τίνες σωτηρίαι* is the explanation of *περὶ ὃν*, and is resumed in *ἐκ τούτων*.

5. 3. καὶ φερόντων πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.

These words are an explanation of *τὸν καταδικαζομένων*, 'Of those who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,' not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.

Cp. Cleon in Aristoph. Knights (923):

δέσποις ἔμοι καλὴν δίκην,
ἰπούμενος ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς.
ἔγω γὰρ ἐς τοὺς πλουσίους
σπεύσω οὐδὲν ἀν ἐγγραφῆς.

5. 5. δεῖ ποιεῖν δλίγας ἐκελησίας.

Cp. iv. 14. § 4.

5. 8. ἀθρόα χρὴ διατίμειν τοὺς ἀπόροις, μᾶλιστα μά, εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον ἀθροίζειν δύσας εἰς γηδίους κτῆσιν.

ἀθρόα, ‘in lump sums,’ opposed to the piecemeal method of doling out money which he had been describing above.

εἰ τις, indefinite ‘if we can only collect.’

δύναται, sc. *ἀθρόα διανέμειν*. The MSS. vary between *ἀθροίζειν* and *συναθροίζειν*. Bekker’s emendation *ἀθροίζειν* is unnecessary.

ἐν δὲ τούτῳ.

5. 9.

‘In the meantime,’ i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

ἀφιεμένους τὸν μαραίνων λειτουργῶν.

5. 9.

They being excused from those services which are useless.

Cp. v. 8. § 20.

For Tarentum, see Müller’s Dorians (iii. 9. § 14), who suggest without any proof that the words *κοινὰ ποιεῖντες τὰ κτήματα* refer only to the *ager publicus*. Compare ii. 5. § 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another’s horses and dogs in common.

Ἴστι δὲ τοῦτο πολῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν εἰληρα- 5. 10.
τοὺς τοὺς δὲ αἱρετούς.

See note on text.

ἀρχῆς is a genitive of respect, assisted by *μερίζειν*. ‘Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.’

τοὺς μὲν εἰληρατούς, sc. *ἀρχεῖντες*. Either the accusative immediately follows *πολῆσαι*, or is in apposition with *τοῦτο*; or some word like *αὐθιστάντες* is to be supplied from *μερίζεσθαι*.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

τὰς δεῖ φανερόν εἰ τοίνες.

6. 1.

With *δεῖ*, *παρασκεύαζειν* from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.

6. 1. τὴν μὲν εἰκρατον μάλιστα τῶν δημοφραγίων καὶ πρώτην.

With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρὸς τὴν βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρώτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

6. 2. οὐδέ.

ἡ=ἐν ἡ. ‘And in this.’

6. 2. μετέχειν ἔξειναι,

sc. δεῖ.

6. 2. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος,

‘The people being introduced in such numbers.’ An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

6. 4. ὅσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εὐδιακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τούς πλωτήρους ἐπιδέχεται πλείους δημαρτίας.

καλῶς ἔχοντα is taken in a double construction with τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν and with πλωτήρου. Either (1)* ‘well furnished with sailors for navigation,’ or (2) ‘well furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.’ τούς πλωτήρους may also be construed with ἐπιδέχεται, ‘allow of more errors in their sailors.’ (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλωτήρων τετυχησάτε φαιδλων.

7. 1. ἀπεῖ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.

Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

7. 1. ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐθὺς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.

‘There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,’ or ‘we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.’

7. 1. ὅπου δ' ὁπλίτην.

Sc. εἴησι συμβέβηκε understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἴησι. It is not necessary to read 1) ὁπλίτων with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) ὁπλιστὴν with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads ὁπλιστὸν and the old translator who gives ‘armativam’).

The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched 7. 2, 3. by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavy-armed.

*νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅπου τοιούτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, δταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις 7. 2.
δέγνωται χείρων.*

The change in the nominatives is observable, ‘When the two parties (*πλῆθος* καὶ *εὐπόροι*) fall out, the rich (*εὐπόροι*) are often worsted in the struggle.’

φέρμακον . . . στρατηγῶν.

7. 2.

‘A remedy such as military commanders employ.’

ταύτῃ δὲ ἐπικρατοῦσιν.

7. 3.

The antecedent of *ταύτῃ*, ‘in this way,’ is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) ‘by their superior flexibility’—sc. διὰ τὸ φιλήν τὴν δύναμιν εἶναι.

ἐπεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παιδῶν ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἄργυρων.

7. 3.

Lit. ‘and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.’ The opposition of *ἐπεκριμένους* δὲ to *ἔτι μὲν δτας νέοις* implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For *ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἄργυρων* cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, *ἀθλητὰς πολέμου*.

ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ.

7. 4.

See note on v. 6. § 2.

κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν

7. 6.

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

τὰ λήμματα γάρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἡττον δὲ τὴν τιμήν.

7. 7.

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, οὐ γάρ ἔστιν δμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν οὐδὲ τιμᾶσθαι.

The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition 8. of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy

and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering ‘the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.’

8. 3. πρώτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν διαιγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ὃ δεῖ τιὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἔφορόστας περὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εἰκοσμίαν.

τῶν διαιγκαίων, sc. 1) ἐπιμελειῶν; or *2) ἀρχῶν, cp. supra § 1, τῶν διαιγκαίων ἀρχῶν.

8. 8. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἔστιν ἡ περὶ τὸς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέτων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς.

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιθεμένων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (*κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς*), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10, περὶ τὰς προθίστας τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (*ἀναγεγραμμένοις*) and deprived of citizenship.

8. 9. καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων,
sc. κοινωνέν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις.

8. 10. ἔτι δὲ ἔνα πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστάτων ἑτέρας καταδικασάσης ἑτέρων εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέρους.

‘Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (τῶν ἐνεστάτων opposed to τῶν νέων) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.’

With τὰς τῶν νέων and τὰς τῶν ἐνεστάτων supply δίκαιοι.

τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.

8. 11.

Sc. ποιεῖ understood from ἀπέχειν ᾔχει διπλῆν.

δὸς βελτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητῶν καὶ περὶ 8. 12. ταύτην.

τὸ σόφισμα, ‘the suitable or appropriate device.’ The correction τὸ σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression ἐὰν μὴ τὸ σοφίζωνται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e. g. ‘to find out the way’ or ‘the proper way of making the office less unpopular.’

καὶ περὶ ταύτην, sc. τὴν φυλάττουσαν. ‘About this as well as the last case,’ i. e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.

τοιαῦται δ' εἰσεν αἴ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται 8. 14. πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

The optative here would seem to require ὡς, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or εἰσεν may be altered into εἰσοι.

τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν τι τούτων ἐστὶν εἴδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

8. 15.

The order of the words is τὸ δὲ πᾶν εἴδος τούτων ἐστὶν ἐν τι εἴδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμέλεια, a change which is unnecessary.

καὶ προσευθυνούσαν.

8. 16.

‘And which in addition audits them.’

ἥ γάρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν.

8. 17.

The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean ‘the final ratification and the introduction of measures.’

ἔχομέν δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφαρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, δύος 8. 20. μὴ τοῖς λερέσισι ἀποδίδωσιν δέ τοις, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἀστίας ὄχουσι τὴν τιμὴν.

Either 1)* the words ἀστίας δύοι, or 2) αἱ θυσίαι must be supplied before ὄχουσι.

Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.

8. 20. καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχοντας κ.τ.λ.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13.

8. 21. ἐπιλογομούσι.

Audits by the officers called *λογισταὶ* (cp. § 16). But it is hard to distinguish them from *ἐξεράσται* since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that *λογισταὶ* and *ἐξερασταὶ* are only different names for the same officers.

BOOK VII.

Bernays (*Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 69 ff.) has drawn 1-3. attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See *Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings*.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the *Politics*: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3-5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e.g. Eth. i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, δῆμος δὲ καὶ . . μεγαλόψυχος; ix. 4. §§ 3-6: x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (*Acad.* ii. 38), and other writers.

ἀδηλον γάρ δύος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀριστήν ἀναγκαῖον ἀδηλον εἶναι 1. 1.
πολεμίαν.

'For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.'

ἀριστα γάρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἀριστα πολεμομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ- 1. 1.
χόντων αὐτοῖς, δὰν μὴ τι γέγονται παράλογον.

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is to be taken closely with πολεμομένους. Not
'they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit,
who are governed in the best manner:' but 'they lead the best

life who have the best form of government possible under their conditions of life.'

The qualification ἐκ τῶν ἵπαρχόντων, though not mentioned in the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. infra § 13, νῦν δὲ ἵπαρχοί τοιούτοις, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἔκάστηρ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι, δὲ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχωρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοιούτοις θυστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεων.

Aristotle adds a further qualification ἐὰν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον: as we might say without much meaning and almost as a *façon de parler*, 'under ordinary circumstances.'

L. 2, 3. νομίσαντας οὖν ικανός πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀριστείας ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβήτησειν ἀντὶ ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἑκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ἵπαρχειν τοῖς μακαροῖς δεῖ.

καὶ τῶν is partitive, 'enough has been said among, or in, the things which have been said.'

ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. 'Popular writings in general,' whether those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods, into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, here said to be found in the ἔξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, is again mentioned in Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360 a. 25, and would seem to have been a received notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, οὐκεπι-
μένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἑκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά· τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργίας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆς τίθεμεν. Ωστε καλέσ-
αν λέγοτο κατά γε τάπτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ δρμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. The λόγοι ἔξωτερικοὶ are alluded to in the same manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. i. 13. § 9. They are opposed to λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν Eud. Eth. 1217 b. 22.

τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, sc. τῶν ἀγαθῶν, which is somewhat strangely omitted. The clause which follows τῶν τε ἑκτὸς κ.τ.λ., is either dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.

ἀνθρίας κ.τ.λ.

1. 4.

The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls *φρόνησις* by the term *σοφία*, making no such distinction between *σοφία* and *φρόνησις* as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

τοὺς φίλατόν τοὺς φίλους.

1. 4.

φίλους is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα δύσπερ πάντες ἀν συγχωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' 1. 5.
ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

δύσπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with *ἀν συγχωρήσειαν*, 'as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ' etc.; or *δύσπερ* may be a qualification of *πάντες*, 'in a manner every one' (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

1. 5.

Cp. infra § 8, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἡπερ εἰληφε διάστασιν.

'Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue 1. 5-13. is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.'

The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the 1. 6, 7. soul is twofold:

1) *ὅταν τὸν ἔργον*, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not *vice versā*.

2) *κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις*, from reason, i. e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

τὸν δὲ περὶ φυχῆς ἔκστος δύναμην, δορκηρὸν δὲ ὑπερβάλλη, τοσούτῳ 1. 7.
μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι.

Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a μεσότης, is careful to explain that it is also an ἀκρότης.

1. 8. *Ἄλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φίσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἀλληλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἥπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν ὃν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαβέσσεις ταύτας.*

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. ‘If one thing is superior to another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.’ But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of διάστασις, after the relative ἥπερ in apposition with ὑπεροχήν. ‘According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.’ The subject of εἴληφε is the antecedent of ὁν, i. e. πράγματα, supplied from ἐκάστου πράγματος.

Bekker, following the old translation ‘sortita est,’ reads εἴληχε for εἴληφε in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

1. 9. *Ἐτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔπειν τὴν ψυχήν.*

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, τί γάρ ὠφεληθήσεται ἀνθρώπος ἐάν τὸν κόσμον ἀλον κερδήσῃ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἡμιωθῇ;

1. 10. *μάρτυρο τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις.*

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 14. § 8, Διὸ δὲ θεὸς δεῖ μίαν καὶ δελἡτὸν χαίρει ἡδονήν οὐ γάρ μόνον καίρους ἔστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκαρίας καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἢ ἡρεμία ἔστιν ἢ ἡ καίρους: also Ib. x. 8. § 7, δοῦτο δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριστῆτε διαφέροντα, θεωρητικὴ δὲ σάξη: and Metaph. xi. c. 7, 1072 b. 26, ἢ γάρ τοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἔπεινος δὲ (sc. δ θεός) ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ δὲ η καθ' αὐτὴν ἔκεινον ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος.

1. 11. *ἀχόμενον δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγιον δεόμενος καὶ πάλιν εἰδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς.*

The words πράγματα καλῶς may be taken either with εὖδαιμονα or with τὴν ἀρίστην. Either 1)* ‘the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly’: or 2) ‘the happy state and that which does rightly is the best’: or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) ‘the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,’ as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words πράγματα καλῶς are ambiguous, including both our own ‘doing well,’ and ‘faring well.’ The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

ἀνδρία δὲ πολεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δίκαιων καὶ 1. 12.
μορφήν, διὸ μετασχέν ἐκεῖτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος
καὶ σύζητος.

τὴν αὐτὴν δίκαιων, sc. ἁκείνοις, to be supplied before διὸ μετασχέν, ‘with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.’ Cp. for construction supra § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts καὶ συζητώσιν after φρόνησις, and ἀνδρεῖος καὶ before δίκαιος to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

ἐπέρας γάρ ἔστιν ἥργον σχολῆς ταῦτα.

1. 13.

Lit. ‘For this is the business of another time of leisure,’ or ‘of another time when we shall be at leisure,’ or*, ‘of another discussion.’ Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word σχολῆ is translated ‘discussion’ in this passage by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. It is found in this sense in the Laws of Plato, 820 C, and perhaps in Arist. Polit. v. 11. § 5.

διὸ τὴς τῶν μεθόδου.

1. 14.

‘Enquiry,’ rather than ‘treatise.’ No reference is made in the Politics to the whole work as a book.

It has been already said, c. i. § 11, not exactly that the happiness 2. 1. of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can

be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question, which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Susemihl that c. 1. § 11, ἔχομεν δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεδμενος κ.τ.λ. is another form of what follows, and that if c. 1. §§ 11, 12 be omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2 would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2 is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

2. 3. εἴτε πᾶσιν ὅντος αἰρετοῦ καινωνῶν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.

'Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.' The remark is parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

2. 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἔκαστον αἰρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάρεργον ἀν εἴη τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ταυτήν, sc. σκέψιν πολιτικῆν supplied from πολιτικῆς.

ἐκείνῳ, sc. the question, 'which is the more eligible life?'

τοῦτο, sc. the question, 'which is the best state?' Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 2. § 8.

2. 5. ἀμφισβητέεται . . . πότερον δὲ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of life is fully discussed.

2. 6. ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸν τε εὖ φρονῶντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίων σκοπὸν συντάπτεσθαι καὶ τὸν διθρόπειν ἔκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν.

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and

contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

. οὐκίζουσι δὲ αἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχεις δεσποτικῶς μὲν γεγράμενον μετ' 2. 7.
ἀδικίας τινὸς εἴπαι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπό-
διον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ.

ἔμποδον δὲ ἔχειν, ‘to contain an impediment.’ The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὸ μὲν ἀδικον.

Μεταπέρ εὖ Δακεδαιμονὶ καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέλεται σχέδιο 2. 9.
ἢ τε παιδείᾳ καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Cp. Plato's Laws, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, supra, ii. 9. § 34.

καθάπερ εὖ Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν. 2. 10.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbek either reading κρίκων from κρίνω, ‘a lily,’ or confusing κρίκων and κρίσιν, translated ‘lilia.’

Ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔξῆν πίνειν ἐν ὁρτῷ τῳ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ 2. 11.
μηδένα ἀπεκταγόντες πολέμους.

Cp. Hdt. iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύφον περιφερόμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, ‘when the cup was brought round.’

Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The 2. 12-18.
question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior
was discussed in Nic. Eth. x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the
individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised con-

cerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6. § 7; c. 7. § 14.

2. 15. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν.

Cp. in i. 7. § 5, οἷον ἡ δικαία, and infra c. 14. § 21.

3. 3, 4. καίτοι τάχ' ἀν ἵπολάβαι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἴναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὐτω γάρ ἀν πλειστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἶη πράξεων. έστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον ἀρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παιδῶν μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μῆτρος δλως φίλου φίλου μηθένα ἵπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν τὸ γάρ ἄριστον αἰρετάτατον.

'It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue, and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue. But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.' Compare the notion of Thrasymachus (Plat. Rep. i.) that justice is the interest of the superior and supra, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis maintained by Callicles (Gorgias 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τοῦτο, sc. πρὸς τὸ ἵπολογεῖν παιδῶν, κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. μὴ διαφέροντι τοσούτοις ὅσου ἀνὴρ γυναικός ἡ πατὴρ τίκνων ἢ δεσπότης δοῦλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government answering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical (cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10).

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given only by a natural superiority.

τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοῖοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ μέρει.

3. 5.

Either 1) 'For equals to share in the honourable is just,' or 2)*
'For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a turn.'

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν.

3. 9.

καὶ τοῦτο=οὐδὲ διπλακτεῖν; or rather some positive idea which is to be elicited from these words. 'There may be in a state internal as well as external activity.'

ὁμοῖος δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὀντοῦν τῶν ἀνθρόπων.

3. 10.

'Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have many thoughts and powers energizing within him.'

σχολῆ γὰρ ἀν δ θεὸς ἔχει καλῶς τινὲς δ κόσμος αἰς σὸν εἰσὶν ἀξιοπεπιλεγμένοι. 3. 10.
πράξεις παρὰ τὰς αἰκεῖας τὰς αὐτῶν.

i.e. 'were happiness not possible in isolation.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ix.

4. § 4, *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸν δ θεὸς τἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἀν δια ποτὲ ἀντίρριον;* ib. x. 8.
§ 7, quoted supra, c. 1. § 10.

καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

3. 10.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has done in his second edition; = 'mankind generally.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 17, where πᾶσαι are joined with γίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπων.

περὶ τῶν ἄλλας πολεμίας κ.τ.λ.

4. 1.

'About these general questions.'

περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχήν συνιστάναι πᾶσας.

4. 1.

'Other than the best.' These words seem most naturally to refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these words. (See Susemihl's note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχήν συνιστάναι πᾶσας.

4. 1.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, *ὅστε δῆλος ἔστι καὶ πολεμίαν τῆς αὐτῆς ὁστὶν ἀπιστήμεται τὴν ἀριστηρὰν θεωρήσει τίς ἔστι, καὶ πολὺ τις ἀν οὗτα μάλιστ' εἴη κατ' εὐχήν,*

μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν δειρῶν. Aristotle appears to start with a consideration of the perfect state; but in attempting to describe the conditions of it he seems to forget his higher purpose. Unless it may be supposed that the Politics is an unfinished work.

4. 3. τὴν οἰκεῖαν ὑλην.

=τὰς ἵποθέσεις, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

4. 5. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὅστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μᾶλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἀνθρώπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειν ἃ τις τοῦ διαφέρεσσον κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος.

'That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.' The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

4. 8, 9. ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θεῖας γάρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἣτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν ἐπεὶ τῷ γε καλῶν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴσθε γίνεσθαι, διὰ καὶ τῷλιν ἡς μετὰ μεγίσθους ὁ λεχθεῖς δρός ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀγαγαῖον.

The connexion is as follows: 'The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.'

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. Metaph. xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθῳ σχῆματι καταλειψμένα ταῖς ὕπερος ὅπι θεοῖ τέ εἰσιν οὐτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν διῆρι φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικᾶς ἢδη προστήκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς κόμμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.

τοῦτο refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἔργον.

ὁ λεχθεῖς δρός, 'the above-mentioned principle,' sc. εὐραξία.

ἢδι πρότην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους δι πρῶτον 4. 11.
πλῆθος αὐταρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν.

διδ refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words δύοις δὲ καὶ πόλις, η μὲν δὲ διάγων λλαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10. § 3, οὗτε γὰρ ἐκ δύοις ἀνθρώποις γένεται ἀν πόλις, οὗτ' ἐκ δύοις μηριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἔστιν.

πρότην and πρῶτον. ‘We then first have a state when we first have a sufficient number.’ πρῶτον may be either adjective or adverb.

κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ‘A good life according to the requirements of the political community,’ i.e. the life of a freeman and citizen.

εἶναι μεῖζην πόλιν.

4. 12.

μεῖζη is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. The point is as follows: ‘There may be also a greater city than is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not unlimited.’ He has said above (§ 4) ‘that the more numerous city is not necessarily the greater,’ but in this case it is or may be.

εἰσὶ γὰρ εἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων, τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων. 4. 12.

The πράξεις, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp. i. 5. § 3, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον.

ἀναγκαῖον γυμνίζειν ἀλλήλους.

4. 13.

Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, E, οὐ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλεις ἀγαθὸν η γυμνίσμους αἴτους (sc. τοὺς πολίτες) αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ‘Οπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλους ἔστιν ἀλλήλων ἐτούτοις τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὗτ' ἀν τηρῆσθαι τῆς δύνατος οὗτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δύσης ποτέ τις ἀν τῆς προστηκούσῃς ὅρθως τυγχάνου.

δῆλον τούτον ὃς οὐτός ἔστι πόλεως ὅρος ἀριστος, η μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους 4. 14.

ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἵνης εὐσύνοντος.

This is a condensed sentence, meaning ‘the largest number which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the purposes of life.’ Aristotle wishes to combine μέγεθος τι with εὐσύνη. Cp. Poet. 7, 1451 a. 3, ὅπου δὲ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων δῆλον μέγεθος, τούτο δὲ εὐσύνοντος εἶναι.

5. 2. *ἀλεστας*,

like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who draw or pull to either extreme.'

5. 3, 4. The paragraph—*τὸ δὲ ἀδύος . . . εὐπαρακόμοτος*—is ill arranged : it may be analysed as follows : 'The city should be difficult of access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens ; the whole territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily seen is easily protected) : it should be well situated both in regard to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles : 1) the one already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience to friends: to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words *δεῖ γάρ . . . διάπτων* are a repetition of the words *τὸ δὲ εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἴναι τὴν χώραν ἔστιν*.

5. 4. *εἰς μὲν δὲ λεχθεὶς δρός,*

sc. περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς χώρας.

5. 4. *ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλης, καν εἰ τινα ἀλληρά ἐργασίαν ή χώρα τυγχάνει κακτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμοτον.*

τῆς ὑλης dependent on εὐπαρακόμοτον=εὖ ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὴν κομιδὴν :
*τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλης either 1) wood (ὑλη) which is used as timber,
 or 2) timber which is used as material (ὑλη).*

6. The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero, who discusses the subject at length in his *De Republica*, Book ii. cc. 3 and 4.

6. 1. *καὶ τὴν πολυναθρωπίαν,*

sc. δυναμόφορον εἴναι φασιν.

6. 2. *ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.*

'That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.'

6. 4. *αὐτῇ γάρ ἐμπορεύειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἀλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.*

'Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.'

Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

ὅπει δὲ καὶ τὸν δρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχονται καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια 6. 5.
καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅπου μήτε τὸ αὐτὸν νέμεται ἄστοι
μήτε πόρων λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἀλλοις ἔργοις,
φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γέγρεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν,
ὑπάρχει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ τι βλαβερόν, φυλακέσθαι ῥάδιον
τοῖς νόμοις φράγμασι καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐδὲν καὶ τίνας ἐπιμέσγεσθαι δεῖ
πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

In this passage *ὑπάρχονται* the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) *ὑπάρχειν* by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into *ὑπάρχοντα*, in the latter case with the omission of *καὶ*. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for *ἔργοις* may be supplied with *ὑπάρχονται* from the preceding sentence, the plural words *ἐπίνεια* καὶ *λιμένας* being taken in apposition as an exegesis. ‘But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.’

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piraeus at Athens, Nisaea at Megara, Cenchreæ and Lechaeum at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphae at Thespiae, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖσθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

εἰ μὲν γάρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολετικὸν ἔχεται βίον.

6. 7.

ἡγεμονικόν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of *πολετικὸν* into *πολεμικὸν* in Bekker's 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For *πολετικὸς* *βίος*, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ἦν βίον πολετικόν.

πολλὰς γάρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις [οἱ Ἡρακλεῖται].

6. 8.

Cp. Xen. Anab. v. 6. § 10, πολλὰ γάρ ὅπει πλοῖα ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ.

6. 9. καὶ πόλεων.

πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of 'ports like the Piraeus' *; or closely connected with λιμίνων of 'cities in relation to their harbours,' cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἐπτείσιν (Coraes), ἐμπορίων (Schmidt), περιπολίων (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίων might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεων [οΓ πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. οΓ, περὶ μὲν οὖν πόλεων [οΓ πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

7. 2. τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην are explanatory of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo l. 250:

ἡμὲν δοσι Πελοπόννησον πίειραν ἔχουσιν,

ἥδ' ὅστις Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἀμφιρρήτας κατὰ νήσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.

Plato too was no stranger to speculations about race. Cp. Laws v. 747 D, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λαθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὃς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἀλλῶν τόπων πρὸς τὸ γεννάν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους: and Rep. iv. 435 E, τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἄν τις αἰγαίσται τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, δὲ περὶ τούς τε Φοίνικας εἴναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαῖτις ἀν οὐχ ἥκιστα. Cp. also Herod. ix. 122, φιλέειν γάρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἀνδρας γίνεσθαι· οὐ γάρ τοι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἴναι καρπόν τε θεμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἀνδρας ἀγαθούς τὰ πολέμια: and iii. 106, ἡ Ἑλλὰς τὰς δρας πολλῶν τι κατιλιστα κεκρημένας ἔχει. So Plat. Tim. 24 C, ἡ θεὸς . . . ἐκλεξαρέη τὸν τόπον ἐν φρεγένησθε (viz. Hellas), τὴν εὑκρασίαν τῶν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδύνσα, στι φρονιμωτάτους ἀνδρας οἶσα.

7. 3. μᾶς τυγχάνον πολετείας.

Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too

strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ισχυρὸν Ἑλλήνες δύοφρονίσσαν, οὐτε καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνεσθαι εἴναι περεγύνεσθαι καὶ Δασοῖς ἀνθρώποισι.

φασὶ τινες δέν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸν μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. 7. 5.

This, like some of Aristotle's other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ἀς οὗν τε πραοτάτους εἴναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγράντας τούτωντον, where we may observe that the word φιλητικὸς is not used by Plato.

δ ὑμός.

7. 5.

'Passion' = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

ἀργαλέως μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλοτητος,
οὐτε γὰρ ἔχθαιρειν οὐτε φαλεῖν δύναμαι.

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. 1 Aristotle raises the question whether φίλα resides in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and not in τὸ θυμοειδές. Like our word passion, θυμός has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, 7. 5-8, but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, καὶ [δρυίσσων] μᾶλλον τοῖς φίλοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις: and Psalm xli. 9, 'Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.'

οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπέγχει.

7. 6.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible, though, in the absence of context, it is im-

possible to interpret it with certainty : 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved?' cp. again from Psalm lv. 12 : 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A *mot* attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning θυμὲ θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκάμενε, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60) : the metre might be restored either by omitting δί, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting οὐ before δί.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render ἀπάγχεο 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read ἀπ' ἔγχεον.

7. 7. οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας.

Yet the *μεγαλόψυχοι* described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

7. 9. οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ξητέων διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γεγο-
μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the *ἀκρίβεια* in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and *a priori* truth of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

8. 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ διαπερ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστάτων οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι μόρια τῆς Δῆλης συντάσσεως, ὃν ἀνευ τὸ ἀλον οὐκ ἀν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῷλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲ ἄλλης κοινω-
νίας οὐδεμᾶς, ἐξ ἣς ἐν τῷ τὸ γένος.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words οὐδὲ ἀνευ τὸ ἀλον οὐκ ἀν εἴη answer to ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν in the application to the state.

The editions vary between *ταῦτα* and *ταῦτά*. *ταῦτα* is confirmed by the words of § 6, πόσα ταῦτα ἔστιν ἵνα ἀνευ πόλεις οὐκ ἀν εἴη. If we

read ταῦτα it will be convenient to supply *τεκίναι* with ἐπὶ ἀριθμῷ, if ταῦτα, τεκίναι.

ἐξ ἧς ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, i. e. ‘out of which is formed,’ or ‘which forms a lower class having a unity;’ ‘which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,’ ἐπὶ τὸ γένος = ἐπὶ τοῖς δοκίμαις τὸ γένος.

‘The end has nothing in common with the means; the final cause with the conditions.’ Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection, ‘that the end is inseparable from the means,’ or, ‘is only the sum of the means’; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; ‘that no line can be drawn between *a priori* and *a posteriori* truth.’ The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

δρυάνω τε πατέτι πρὸς τὸ γεγονότον ἔργον καὶ τοὺς δημιουργούς.

8. 3.

Governed by οὐθὲν ποτέν δοκίμαι. ‘The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.’

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts 8. 5–6. and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: ‘Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.’ He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the

character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 infra), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

8. 5. ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14–16, *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀριστήρης εἰς βίου τέλειον.*

8. 6. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταῦτ' ἔστιν διὸ οὐδὲ πᾶλις οὐκ ἀντίτιν.

'Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.' All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the *θῆται* are a condition but not a part; τὸ βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

8. 7. πέμπτων δὲ καὶ πρώτων.

'First,' i.e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class.

Spengel would omit *καὶ πρώτων*. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἢ καλούσιν *ἱερατείαν*, 'which they call ritual.' The formula *ἢ καλούσιν* seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. *ἢ καλούσι τινες δληγαρχίαν*, vi. 1. § 6.

8. 7. ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν.

The last words are pleonastic, 'sixth in numerical succession.'

8. 9. The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'of necessary matters of life,' is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἀναγκαῖτον in § 7. *ἀναγκαῖον* may also refer to punishments: see infra c. 13. § 6.

9. 1, 2. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τοῦτο πολιτείᾳ.

'This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is

already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.

καθάπερ γάρ εἴπομεν.

9. 2.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see supra c. 4. § 1.

ὅτι δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοτοῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας . . . εἴρηται θ. 3.
πρότερον.

The connexion is as follows: 'But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.'

εἴρηται πρότερον in c. 8. § 5 supra. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

τοὺς μὲλλοντας ἵστασαι,
sc. πολίτας, (ἐν τῇ καλλισταὶ πολιτευομένῃ τόλει § 3), 'citizens of
the best state.'

9. 4.

πότερον ἔτερα καὶ ταῦτα θερίον.
Bekker in his second edition inserts *ἴτεροι* after *ἔτερα* unnecessarily. Without it we may translate: 'Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?'

9. 4.

Compare Book ii. 5. § 26.

9. 5.

ἄλλα μήτε τὰς αἰγάλεις δέι εἶναι περὶ τούτους.
The use of *περὶ* is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: 'they too should have a near interest in property,' an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said infra § 8 τὰς αἰγάλεις εἶναι τούτους.

9. 7.

9. 8. ἐπειρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ή βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

9. 10. καὶ πεχόμεναι δὴ τούτων ἔκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

τούτων, i. e. not merely the *ἀπλετικῶν* and *βουλευτικῶν*; to these must be added the *γεωργοί*, *τεχνῖται*, and *τὸ θητικόν*, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the *γεωργοί*, *τεχνῖται* and *τὸ θητικόν*) and the parts of it (*τὸ ἀπλετικόν* καὶ *βουλευτικόν*) is permanent. The division between *τὸ ἀπλετικόν*, *τὸ τερέων γένος* and *τὸ βουλευτικόν* is transitory or *κατὰ μέρος*, i. e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

10. 1. ἔπεικε δὲ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν μεστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρήσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

10. 2. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with *τῶν συσσιτιών ή τάξις*, ‘the custom in Crete: going back to the reign of Minos.’

10. 3-5. ‘The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs’ (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), ‘and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians’ (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) ‘who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrhenia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis’ (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) ‘Chones.’

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.

ὅση τετύχηκεν ἔπειδεν οὐσα, viz. that part of Italy which is bounded or enclosed at its narrowest point by the two gulfs. The reason (*ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα*) is imperfectly expressed: ‘You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.’ It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, ‘What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?’ There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, ‘breaks out’ into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions their existence in Italy.

Σύρτω is the reading of most MSS., *σύρτην* of two only. The 10. 5. MSS. of the old translator appear all to give *system*. *Σύρτις* is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Πολιτείαι 542, *καὶ οἱ τὴν Σύρτιν δὲ κατουιώντες . . . ἐς φῆσι Τίμαος καὶ Ἀριστογέλης, εἰς τρυφήν ἐξέκειλαν οὐχ ἡσσόν Συβαρεγέν*, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëtting’s conjecture *Σύρτις* the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy called Syrites or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συστάσιων τάξις ἐντύθει γέγονε πρῶτον, δὲ χωρισμὸς δὲ 10. 6.
καὶ γίνεται τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους δὲ Αλύπτου πολὺ γάρ ὑπερείνει τοῖς
χρόνοις τῆς Μίνω βασιλείας ἢ Σεσοστρίου,

is translated in the English text: ‘From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.’

It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: ‘The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.’

The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called ‘the origin of the institution’ (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter

country its origin dates further back than in the former, for Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have originated there.

10. 7. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ.

A favourite reflection of Aristotle's. See note on text for parallel passages.

10. 8. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα.

'All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.' Cp. Plat. Laws ii. 657. 'Their (i. e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.' For further references see note on text. 'That this sameness was the weakness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.'

10. 8. τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις

is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus into εἰρημένους, a change which seems to be required by the want of a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of παραλειψμένα. Cp. supra, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις, and ii. 5. § 16.

10. 10. ὑστερον ἔροῦμεν.

This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § 1 the common meals are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of the institution.

10. 11. τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους δρμονογυπτικάτερον.

A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly (Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 ἀστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ δρμίως προβήμους ἔστεσθαι ὑπέρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων καθηκεύειν,

στόσω δὲ ἐνίσεσθαι), and as Aristophanes in his 'Acharnians' seems to imply, were wanting to make peace.

For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text. 10. 11.

δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους.

10. 13.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, *ἀντυπαῖς εἴναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δοῦλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιοίκους*, a comparison which has led to the insertion of *ἢ* before *περιοίκους* in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. 'If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.'

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτῆς εἴναι τὴν θέσων εὐχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυχάνειν πρὸς 11. 1. τέτταρα βλέποντα.

The order of the words is as follows—*δεῖ εὐχεσθαι κατατυχάνειν [τοῦ] τὴν θέσων εἴναι.*

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows: 1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra); 2) good water: 3) convenience for administration (*πρὸς πολεμικὰ πράξεις*): 4) adaptation to military requirements (*πρὸς πολεμικὰ πράξεις*).

Cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, *καὶ σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπέδειξα αὐτῇ, ὅτι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἀναπέπταται, ὅπερ εὐδήλον εἴναι, ὅτι χειμώνος μὲν εὐήλιος ἔστι, τοῦ δὲ θερόντος εὔσκοτος.*

Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: 'Oppidum magnificenter est aedificatum et eleganter; sed positum non prudenter. In qua civitate auster cum flat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiunt, cum septentrio, restituuntur in sanitatem, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoria.' (Quoted by Eaton.)

δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

11. 2.

κατὰ βορέαν=‘facing the same way that the North wind does,’ (cp. *κατὰ ρόσον*) i. e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. 118 A, B, δὲ τόσον οὖτος δῆλος τῆς νήσου πρὸς νότον ἀντέρεσσε, διὸ τῶν δρυκτῶν κατάβορφος.

δεύτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect is what is recommended; i.e. a situation which is open to the healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

11. 3. **τοῦτό γ' εὑρηται**

is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus, *εὑρήσθαι*, adopted by Bekker in his second edition, is unnecessary.

τοῦτό γ' εὑρηται = 'a remedy has been found for this,' i.e. 'a remedy may be found.' The language is not quite symmetrical, but this is no reason for altering it.

11. 3. **ιποδοχὰς δμβρίοις ὑδασιν.**

Five MSS. read *δμβρίοις*, a possible reading, 'rain cisterns for water' instead of 'cisterns for rain water.'

11. 4. **ἐν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιούτον.**

'In the situation described, and looking to the quarter described.'

11. 5. **τοιούτων παμάτων.**

The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, 'such streams as I have spoken of above,' that is to say, 'good streams' (*ὑγειεών* § 4).

11. 5. **δικρόπολις διλγυαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν . . . ισχυροὶ τόποι πλείους.**

It may be asked: 'Why should a single fortress be adapted to a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?' Probably because in the former case the government is more concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain their power against the people, must draw together. An aristocracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is therefore better dispersed.

11. 7. **ἄν τις σόντια πατασκευάζῃ, πειθότερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς δὲ παλαιοῖ τινες τῶν ἀμφέλων συστάδας.**

The last word is explained by Hesychius (under *ἔνστάδες*) as *αἱ πυκναὶ ἀμφέλοις, ἀμεινον δὲ τὰς εἰκῇ καὶ μὴ κατὰ στοῖχον πεφυτευμένας*

ἀκούειν, i. e. 1) *vines planted thickly or in clumps, or 2) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δέν ἔχειν (τείχη).

11. 8.

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff., περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὃ Μέγαλε, ἔγειρ' ἀν τῷ Σπάρτη ξυμφερόμεν τὸ καθεύδειν ἐᾶν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη.

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

Δευχομένος ἡρυφ τὰς ἀκείνως καλλωπισμένας.

11. 8.

The disasters of Leuctra (B.C. 371) and of Mantinea (B.C. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16). Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

.. οἵτις δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀμφότους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέρεσσαν εἰ 11. 9.
καλλὸν τὸ περισσότερον σύζεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφιβόλητος.

A somewhat romantic notion with which may be compared the further refinement of § 11, infra; also the saying of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when he saw catapults brought from Sicily, which in other words and under other circumstances has no doubt often been ejaculated by the African or New Zealand savage, ἀποθαλλεῖν ἀσθέτος ἀπερά. (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 219 A.)

πολεμιστέτηρ.

11. 9.

Either 'the most truly warlike in character' or 'the best defence of the warrior.' Both meanings may be included.

11. 10. δροίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλεω τοίχους.

Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might in many cases need the protection of walls.

δροίως δέ, sc. ἔχει.

12. 1. αὐτά,

sc. τὰ τοίχη, i. e. the position of the walls; or more generally, 'the consideration of these circumstances.'

12. 2. ἀρχείων.

The MSS. vary between ἀρχῶν, ἀρχαίων, ἀρχείων.

12. 3. εἴη δὲ ἀν τοιούτος δέ τόπος δοτις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ικανός καὶ πρὸς τὰ γεγνιώματα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρας.

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness, suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if we may judge from his Latin 'bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis,' seems to have read θέσιν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιφάνειαν. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. 1. 7 'Aedibus vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur areae distribuantur' (quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107, 'The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence.'

12. 4, 5. εἴη δὲ ἀν εὐχαριστία δέ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχει τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γάρ διηρήσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τούτοις τὸν κώστρον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεανίσκοις ἀρχοντάς τυπας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχοντισταῖς ἡ γῆρας ὁ σφραγίδων τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσίᾳ μᾶλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθεύην αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀλευθέρων φόβον.

The opposition of *μήν* and *δὲ* before *νεανίσκοις* and *πρεσβυτέροις* seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates

as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasium, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. *‘Some of the rulers are to be present (*διαρπίζειν*) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.’ Here either another verb has to be supplied with *καὶ τοῖς ἀρχοντῶν* or the word *διαρπίζειν* is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, ‘and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.’ This, however, disregards *μὲν* and *δὲ* and seems not to cohere with the words *διηρήσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας*: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (*τοὺς δὲ . . . ἀρχοντῶν*) that ‘the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders,’ (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause *ἢ γάρ δὲ ὁφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ.*, shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word *κόσμος* is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of ‘institution,’ which is in some degree supported by the use of *κόσμος τῆς πολεοῦσας* for ‘the order or constitution of the state,’ (Περὶ Κόσμου 6. 399 b. 18). Or* *τοῦτος τὸν κόσμον* may be the accusative after *διηρήσθαι* and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of ‘this embellishment of the state:’ [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make *διηρήσθαι* impersonal, *κόσμος* being the indirect accusative following it. *καὶ τοῦτον*, this institution too, i. e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

τὴν δὲ τὰν δύοντας κ.τ.λ.

12. 6.

Cp. supra, c. 5. § 4.

ἔνει δὲ τὸ πλῆθος διαιρέτας τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἵερας, εἰς ἀρχοντας.

12. 6.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employ-

ments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος appear to be a repetition of ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολεμῶν at the beginning of the Chapter. πλῆθος is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

12. 6. περὶ τὴν τῶν ιερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν.

'To have their proper place.' Cp. § 8, τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν. τὴν . . . οἰκοδομημάτων, sc. τάξιν, is to be supplied.

12. 7. τὴν καλουμένην δοτυνομίαν.

The qualifying *καλουμένην*, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

12. 8. The MSS. vary between *νενεμήσθαι* and *μεμμῆσθαι*. P⁴ has compounded them into *νενεμμῆσθαι*. Bekker in his second edition has adopted *μεμμῆσθαι*. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

13. 1. περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.

Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its *λη* (supra c. 4. §§ 1-3). Now he is going on to speak of the *πολιτεία* itself, which is the *εἶδος* of a *πόλις* (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7-9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the 'constitution' of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

13. 2. ἕκκειται καλῶς.

'Stands out well,' or 'distinctly.' For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, οἵτι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν δρθὸν εἴναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν.

13. 3. In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary con-

ditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (*ἐλάττωνς τούς ἀμεινούς διακειμένους*), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9-12.

*ἔπει δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ίδειν, αὗτη δὲ ἔστι καθ' 13. 4.
τὴν ἀριστήν ἀν πολιτεύοντο πόλις, ἀριστα δὲ ἀν πολιτεύοντο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν
μάλιστα ἐνέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ
λανθάνειν.*

The connexion is as follows: ‘In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.’

φασέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡμίκοις, εἴ τι τὸν λόγων ἀκείνων ὄφελος. 13. 5.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἔξινοθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. 13. 5.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text), and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

λέγω δὲ ἔξινοθέσεως. 13. 5, 6.

‘Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;’ they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word ‘just,’—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

*οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαιαὶς πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τυφερίαι καὶ καλάστεις αἱ' 13. 6.
ἀρετῆς μὲν εἰσι, ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖος ἔχοντις (αἱρετά-
τερος μὲν γάρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τὰς ταυτίτερα μήτε τὸν διδόνα μήτε τὴν πόλιν),
αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τυφερὰς καὶ τὰς εὐτυφερίας ἀντίτιονται πράξεις.*

‘They have their rightness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.’ For the use of ἀναγκαῖον, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, *τὰς δὲ ἀνεργεῖαν αἱ μέν εἰσι ἀναγκαῖαι
καὶ δὲ ἔτερα αἱρεταῖ, αἱ δὲ καθ' εἰστάς.*

Under the common notion of *ἀναγκαῖα* and *ἴξ ὑποθέσεως*, by a play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the existence of states.

αἱ δὲ τὰς τιμὰς πράξεις, sc. φέρουσαι, τέλουσαι οἱ γυνόμεναι.

13. 7. *τὸ μὲν γάρ ἔτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἴρεσίς ἐστιν.*

'The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,' i.e. for the sake of removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end to crime.

The conjecture *ἀναίρεσις*, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes, Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

13. 7. *χρήσαιτο δὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ τύφῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαῦλαις καλέστε ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναρτίοις ἐστιν.*

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12, *ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλέμψει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴ τις εὐκάλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας μὴ δι' ἀνάληγσίαν ἀλλὰ γεννάδας δν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.*

13. 8. *δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαῖαν καὶ καλάς εἶναι ταῦτας ἀπλέστε. Διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἀνθρώποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, θεσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιβωρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιεῖτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.*

'The good man will make a use of external goods which is absolutely good. And because (διὸ) this use of external goods is good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to the lyre and not to the player.'

αἰτιεῖτο, sc. τις, gathered from ἀνθρώποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P^s) and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

13. 9. *διὸ καὶ εὐχὴν εὐχάριστα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύντασιν δν ἡ τυχὴ εὐρίσια.*

1) 'Since therefore some things must be presupposed (διὸ), our prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have the goods of fortune,' sc. *εἶναι ἔξειναι δν, etc.*; or 2) 'we desire that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer to our prayer,' making *καὶ εὐχὴν*, sc. *εἶναι*, the predicate, *δν*, sc. *ἐπειδὴ*

ἴκενοις δν; or 3) ‘we ask if we could only have our prayer,’ or ‘though it be only an ideal,’ as above, κατ’ εύχην, iv. 11. § 1, πολιτείαν τὴν κατ’ εύχην γνωμένην.

καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαῖος εἶναι, μὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν 13. 10. πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ’ ἕκαστον καὶ τῷ πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, ii. 3. § 2, τὸ γὰρ πάντες δεῖται, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes ‘each’ from ‘all.’

ἔπια τε οὐδέν δῆμος φύει· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ.

13. II.

Lit. ‘Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,’ or ‘such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.’ To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for ‘instinct,’ or ‘natural impulse.’ From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term φύει in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.

έτεροι . . . ή τοὺς αὐτοὺς δεῖ βίου.

14. I.

‘Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?’

τοῖς ἀρχομένοις.

14. 2.

1) *Dative of reference: ‘In relation to their subjects,’ or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feebler sense, τοῖς ἀρχομένοις may be taken after φαντάρων, ‘so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.’

Ζεῦλαξ.

14. 3.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the

writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

14. 4. πάτερες οι κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—‘the country people combine with the malcontents of the town ;’ but, ‘all the inhabitants *minus* the rulers,’ i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

14. 5. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτὸν τὸ μὲν πεύτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, διν τοῖς μὲν ἀρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχειν.

Lit. ‘For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i.e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.’

αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτόν. The word *αὐτῷ* has less MS. authority than *αὐτό*, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino’s translation. *Αὐτὸ* may be translated: ‘In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.’ The correction *τῶν αὐτῶν* for *αὐτῷ* is unnecessary.

14. 8. ἔτει δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἀρχοτος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός.

i. e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

14. 11. ὁσαντας οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ’ ἀνάλογον ἔροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίωνος αἰρετέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν.

ὁσαντας . . ἔχειν. ‘And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul ;’ *ὁσαντας* answers to *ἀνάλογον ἔχειν*, and is to be taken closely with *καὶ τὰς πράξεις*.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.

ἢ πασῶν ἡ τοῦ δυού, sc. τῶν πράξεων. ‘The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (*τοῦ δυού*).’ Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἢ δὲ τοῦ καῦ [sc. εἰδαμονίᾳ] κεχωρισμένη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τὰ νοούμενα and τὰ φαινόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

ἐπανοῦστε γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίουν πολιτείαν δύσκαται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν 14. 16.
σκοπόν, ὅτι πάστα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πολεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἀ καὶ
κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστιν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπεπόνηταις δακῆσεις (sc. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) εὐθὺς νίσι ὅπεις τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μεγέρχονται, ἥμεις δὲ ἀνειμένοις διατέμενοι οὐδὲν ἡσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ισοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.

καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea.
Cp. c. 11. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

οὗτος καὶ Θίβρων.

14. 17.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the ‘de Republica Lacedemoniorum,’ attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolacon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν Ἑλλῶν ἄκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ πολιτείας εἰτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖσιν, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις εἴτεοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς δραπεδοῦ. 14. 18.
ζωτεος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήσσοντο τὸ ζῆν καλῶς.

'If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.'

14. 19. ὅτι κρατέον δύσκολεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πελας ἀρχεων.

'If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.'

14. 20. Παντωνίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ.

See note on v. 1. § 10.

14. 21. ταῦτα γάρ ἄριστα καὶ ἤδη καὶ κοινῇ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding *τε* after *τόν*.

14. 22. τὴν γάρ βαφὴν ἀφιάσω, δοκεῖ δὲ σιδηρος, εἰρήνην ἔγοντες.

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf) :—

κατὰ γάρ, δε τὰ δεῖν ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,
βαφῇ σιδηρος ᾧ, ἐθηλύνθην στόμα
πρὸς τῆσδε τῆς γυναικός.

15. In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative idealism; we are put off with words such as *θεραπεία*, *οἰνία*, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning

of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians ‘provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil’ (Thuc. ii. 38); that ‘they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her’ (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in ‘the islands of the blest’ than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that ‘the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.’

δει γαρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνηγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως ἐξη σχαλάζειν.

15. 2.

‘The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.’

δ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀνηγκάεις δικαιοὺς εἶναι καὶ σωφροτέν.

15. 3.

Cp. Tennyson’s Maud I. vi.—xiii. :—

‘Why do they prize of the blessings of peace?

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.’

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

*ἔστιντοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτα διαφέρουσι τὸν μᾶλλον, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταῦτα τοῖς
διλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, μᾶλλον τῷ γνώσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διά τυρος
ἀρετῆς.*

‘The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.’

Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. 9. §§ 34, 35: ‘Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.’

15. 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων η̄ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων μείζω [εἴναι] τὰ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων η̄ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν [sc. ἡθικῶν η̄ σολεμνικῶν χρῆσιν understood from ἀπόλαυσιν] καὶ ὅτι [αἱ ἀρεταὶ] εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν τούτων ἀπόλαυσιν].

πῶς δὲ introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

ἀρετῶν goes back to διά τινος ἀρετῆς in the previous sentence.

15. 7. ἐνδέχεται γάρ δημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθων δμοίων ἥχθαι.

The meaning of ἥχθαι is simply ‘trained;’ whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to δμοίως. Either 1)* ‘in the same i.e. a mistaken way; or 2) ‘all the same’=‘nevertheless.’ The first is most in accordance with the context δημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον. The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. ‘For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.’

15. 8. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτο γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις, ὡς η̄ γένεσις ἀτ̄ ἀρχῆς ἔστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἀλλου τέλους· ο̄ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ δ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος.

i) *The connexion is as follows: ‘We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.’ That is to say: ‘In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.’

2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows: 'It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.' According to this way of taking the passage γένεσις in the 1st clause is equivalent to τέλος in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. a) τέλος has no meaning. b) The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For ἀλλον τέλος would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, ἀπό τον δρχης.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: 'So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.' To this interpretation it may be objected that διπλά δρχης is taken in a different sense from ἀπό τον δρχης and that τοῦ τέλους, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

See infra note on § 9.

16. 5.

τὸν χρησμόν.

16. 7.

The oracle 'μὴ τέμε νίαν ἀλλα' which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Göttling has constructed a hexameter ἀλλὰ νίας, Τροίζην, ἀλλας μὴ τέμε βαθείας. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of νίας 'fallow ground' (in Attic used for νέας) and νέας 'the young maiden:' or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

Διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀφύστηι περὶ τὴν τῶν δικαιωθεκα στῖν φύκιαν συγνύναι, 16. 9.
τοὺς δὲ ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, η μικρόν.

The words η μικρόν probably mean 'thereabouts' or 'nearly,' like μικροῦ; or some word such as πλεῖστος may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed

for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, *On Population* vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation ‘must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.’ But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the *Republic* (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time ‘when they have passed the greatest speed of life’ (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the *Laws* (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the *History of Animals* (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

16. 10. ἔτι δὲ η̄ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγου εὐθὺς η̄ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ηδη̄ καταλευμένης τῆς ηλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἀβδομάκωντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν.

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up to the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

16. 10. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις, ὡς οἱ στόλοι χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, δρίστες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην.

Sc. δεῖ αὐτῶς ποιεῖν, taking δεῖ from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read δεῖ χρῆσθαι after χρόνοις, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of χρῶνται after χρῆσθαι is unpleasant.

συναυλία, ‘cohabitation’ probably from αὐλή not from αὐλός.

καὶ αὐτοὺς φίδη.

16. 11.

i.e. ‘themselves when they come to be parents as well as the writers on these subjects.’

Like Plato, Aristotle prescribes gymnastics for women as well as 16. 13. men. Cp. Plat. Laws vii. 789; Rep. v. 457.

Θιδ δέ πλῆθος τέκνων, εὰν η τάξις τῶν ἔθνων καλύγ, μηδὲν ἀποιθεσθαι 16. 15. τῶν γεννομένων ὄρισται γάρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποιας τὸ πλῆθος. εὰν δέ τις γύνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνθυσθέντων, επὶν αἰσθησις ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωή, ἀμφοτεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν.

‘But when there are too many children (for we have settled that there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be practised before sense and life have begun.’

ὅρισται γάρ δὴ . . . τὸ πλῆθος gives the reason for introducing the previous remark. ‘I speak of this because population has been limited.’ Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for supposing that population will be kept down even if nothing is done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher (about 60 A.D.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of kindred.

Respecting the seven ages, see infra, note on c. 17. § 15; and 16. 17. for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early education, cp. Laws vii. 788–794.

ελευθεροί.

17. 1.

sc. δεῖ. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

τὰς δὲ διαιτάσσεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ ελευθερούς οὐκ δρῦς ἀπαγορεύουσα εἰ 17. 6. απλίσσεις δι τοῖς νόμοις συμφίρουσι γάρ πρὸς αἴγαστοι.

This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. ('When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.' Laws vii. 792 A). Yet the words *ἐν ταῖς νόσοις* sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

τὰς διατάσεις, 'the passions or struggles,' a neutral word to be interpreted by *ἀλαζόματος* which follows.

17. 7. *εἴλογος οὖν ἀπελαύνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὄραμάτων ἀνέλευθερίας καὶ τηλικούτους ὅντας.*

A thought enlarged upon by Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered *ἀνέλευθερίαν*, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into *ἀνέλευθερίας*. In his 2nd edition he has substituted *ἀνέλευθέρων*, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; *τηλικούτους ὅντας* may be taken as an accusative of the remoter object. *ἀπελαύνειν* has been altered by Susemihl into *ἀπολαβεῖν*, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading *ἀπολαύειν*, and partly on the 'absumere' of the old translator.

καὶ τηλικούτους ὅντας. 1)* 'Even when they are at this early age,' i.e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) *καὶ* may be emphatic, 'especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.'

17. 10. *ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἀρχοντι μηδὲν μήτε σχαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησι, εἰ μὴ παρά τις θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸ τεθαυμάσιὸν ἀποδίδωσιν δὲ τόρος πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀφίησιν δὲ τόρος τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προΐκουσσαν καὶ ὑπέρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τημαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς.*

οἷς καὶ τὸ τεθαυμάσιὸν ἀποδίδωσιν δὲ τόρος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the Acharnians 263 ff.

The words *πρὸς δὲ τούτους* introduce a second exception: 'in-

decency may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods ;' πρὸς δὲ τούτους, 'and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.' Cp. once more Plat. Rep. ii. 378 : 'The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons ; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.'

Θεόδωρος.

17. 13.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone : Aeschines was his antagonist who played Creon. Dem. Fal. Leg. 418. He is mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

οἱ γὰρ ταῦς ἐβδομάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ 17. 15.
καλῶς, δεῖ δὲ τὴν διαιρέσιν τῆς φύσεως ἐπακαλουθεῖν.

It is uncertain whether we should read *οὐ καλῶς or οὐ κακῶς in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand οὐ κακῶς is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcileable with the context :—'Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature ;' or, 'and we should observe the divisions made by nature, i. e. the divisions into sevens' (Bergk 25). This is also confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, αὗτη [sc. ἡ τῆς διαιρούσας ἀρχὴ] δὲ στοιχεῖα τοῦ πλείστου φυτεύει τὸν πολὺτάν των εἰρήκασσων οἱ μετροῦντες ταῦς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντά-
κοντα ἔτεων.

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The 'sevens' of Aristotle agree with the 'sevens' of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50) :—

Πλέις μὲν ἀνηβος δὲν ἔτι τέττους ἔρχεται
φύσας ἀκβάλλει πρώτου δι' ἕτεσσιν.

τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἐμαυτούς,
 οἵβης ἐκφαίνει σήματα γενομένης·
 τῇ τριτάῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεχομένων ἔτι γυίων
 λαχνοῦται, χροῆς ἄνθος ἀμειθομένης·
 τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος
 ἵσχεν, ἢν τ' ἀνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς·
 πέμπτῃ δ' ὁρίουν, ἀνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἴναι
 καὶ παιδῶν ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεήν·
 τῇ δ' ἕκτῃ περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός·
 οὐδὲν ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὅμοις ἔργον ἀπάλαμψα θέλει·
 ἕπτά δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἐβδομάσι μέγ' ἄριστος
 ὀκτώ τοις ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη·
 τῇ δ' ἑνάτῃ ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δὲ αὐτοῦ
 πρὸς μεγύλην ἀρετὴν γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφίη¹·
 τῇ δεκάτῃ δὲ ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἐμαυτούς,
 οὐκ ἀν ἄφορος ἐὰν μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου.

Compare an interesting note of Mr. Cope's in his edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 160.

¹ al. lect. σῶμά τε καὶ δύναμις.

BOOK VIII.

δει γάρ πρὸς ἑκάστην πολιτεύεσθαι.

1. 2.

Here Susemihl has adopted παιδεύεσθαι after Aretino's translation. But πολιτεύεσθαι the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbek, 'politizare,' and is more in accordance with the context: 'For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.'

φανερὸν δτι καὶ τὴν παιδίαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάστων 1. 3.
καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἴναι κοινήν καὶ μὴ κατ' ίδιαν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινήν
ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ δρθῆν, where he goes on to show that public education
can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we
must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take
into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the
education of individuals must be based upon general principles,
and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

ἴνωνίστε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γάρ πλείστηρ ποιῶνται 1. 4.
επονδὴν περὶ τούτης παιδίας καὶ κοινῆς ταύτης.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the
quality of their education (cp. infra c. 4), but for the circumstance
that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath.
276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of
education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters,
τεσσάρων ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰς τὸν δέκατον
γράμματα μαθόντουσι: and according to Plato, or rather according
to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), 'not many of
them could count.'

καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbek. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' διάγων δημοσέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιήσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπετηρευμάτων.

2. 1. τὸν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖσαν περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τῶν ἀλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνέλευθέρων.

2. 2. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμποδὸν παιδείας.

'The customary education' or 'the education which meets us in life'—without any idea of obstruction.

2. 2. ταραχόδης ἡ σκέψις.

'It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.'

2. 2. τὰ περιττά.

Lit. 'things in excess,' i. e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language 'the higher knowledge.' For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

2. 2. κρετάς των.

Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8, πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εὐληφε πλὴν τῆς γῆς, 'All these views have found approvers.'

2. 6. καταβεβλημέναι,

'laid down and so established:' cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημένα πανδύματα. Cp. supra, ἡ ἐμποδὸν παιδεία.

2. 6. ἐπαμφοτερίζουσι,

'are of a double character,' partly liberal, partly illiberal.

3. 1. οἵστις δὲ τέτταρα κ.τ.λ.

μουσικὴ is here separated from *γράμματα*, which in Plato's Republic are included under it.

We may remark the form of sentence: 'There are four;' but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, *τέταρτον οὖν*.

αὐτη γάρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

3. 2.

Not φύσις but *ἡ σχολή*, as is shown by the clause which follows, *ίνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς* referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. § 6.

δλως.

3. 3.

Either, 1) 'the general question must be asked;' or 2) *taking *δλως* in an emphatic sense, 'the question must be surely' or 'absolutely asked.' In what follows §§ 3-6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But *δλως* is only a conjecture of Victorius. All the MSS. read *τέλος*, except one (P⁶), which reads *τελευτῶν*. (Cp. the old trans. 'finaliter.') The reading *τέλος* gives a sufficient but not a very good sense ('lastly'), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. *συνάγειν*, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν.

3. 6.

Cp. infra § 8, *τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν*. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) 'the leisure occupied in διαγωγῇ:' 2) 'the διαγωγή of leisure.' It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms διαγωγή. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. *πόλεων παιδίαν ἡ παιδίαν ἡ διαγωγή*. *εὐλόγους δὲ πάντα τάσταται καὶ φαινεται μετέχειν. ή τε γάρ παιδία χρόνος ἀνάπτυσσεις εἰσι, τὴν δὲ ἀνάπτυσσις ἀναγκαῖον ἥδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πάντων λίτης λατρεία τὸς δεσμοῦ)*: καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν δρμολογουμένης δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχει τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἥδεσσιν infra c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with *φρόνησις* (c. 5. § 4. init. *πρὸς διαγωγὴν συμβάλλεται τις καὶ φρόνησις*) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παιδία and ἀνάπτυσσις 'amusement' and 'relaxation,' which are properly, not ends, but only means to renewed exertion (cp.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas διαγωγὴ and σχολὴ are ends in themselves. The idea of 'culture,' implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγὴ.

3. 8. ήν γὰρ οἵσται διαγωγὴν εἴναι τῶν ἀλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάπτουσι.

ἐν ταύτῃ, sc. τῇ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ.

τάπτουσι, sc. αὐτήν or music. 'They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.'

3. 8. ἀλλ' οἷον μέν ἔστι καλέν ἐπὶ δάίτη θαλεῖην.

The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original θαλεῖην is to be taken with δάίτη; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and καλέν θαλεῖην is said in the same way as καλίσουσιν δαῦδην in the following quotation.

3. II. ή γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον.

i. e. 'the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education';—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.

4. I. οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνθράκα μᾶλιστα συμφέρον.

'The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.'

4. 2. εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἄρσοις οὖτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἔθνῶν δρῶμεν τὴν ἀνθράκα ἀκολουθούσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν θέσσων.

'And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.' Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle's Criticism on this passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5-8.

4. 3. τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνων.

Not 'of Epirus,' which would be wholly disconnected from the

Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation 'there are other inland tribes,' for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes 'about the Pontus' are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately 'other tribes on the mainland.' For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας.

4. 4.

Said for πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας. But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly 4. 4-7. impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn over-powered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, εἴτε τῷ τούς μέν γυμνάσει τὸν τρόπον τούτου διέφερον, εἴτε τῷ μέντος μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν.

έστι φησίν δὲ λόγος.

4. 6.

Cp. Plato (e. g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which 4. 8. may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

καταλαμβάνειν τὴν φλεγίαν.

4. 9.

'To occupy,' 'engage,' 'employ.'

ἷνα διστερερός εἰδότερος γίνεται τοῖς λόγοις.

5. 1.

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of

music = 'the keynote,' 'that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.' Cp. Arist. Rhet. iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οἱ αἰλῆται, δὲ τι ἀν εὐ ἔχωσιν αἰλῆται τούτῳ προσαλίσαστες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοστίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δέ τοι γράφειν.

5. 2-4. Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music :

1) παιδιᾶς καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἔρεια, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.

2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (*παιδεία*).

3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν καὶ φρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for a) *παιδεία*, b) *κάθαρσις*, c) *διαγωγὴ*; a) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (*πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν*), c) to 3).

This leaves b) *κάθαρσις* to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to *κάθαρσις* (i. e. 'purgation' rather than 'purification'). Cp. c. 3. § 4, *φαρμακείας χάρω*, and c. 7. § 4, *δοκερ *iarpēias τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως**. See note on c. 7. § 3.

5. 2. καὶ ἄμα παῖς μέριμνα, ὡς φητὸν Εὐριπίδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered *ἄμα παῖς* into *ἀναπάνει*, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380 :—

δε [Βρόμος] τάδ' ἔχει,
θιασεύει τε χοροῖς
μετά τ' αἰλοῦ γελάσαι,
ἀποπαύσαι τε μερίμνας.

5. 3. τάπτουσιν αὐτήν.

Sc. *eis παιδιᾶς καὶ ἀνάπανων* understood from the words preceding.

5. 3. Reading *ὑπῆρ* for *οὖρ*, gathered from *ὑπερνοῦ καὶ μέθης* supra, with

Bekker's 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbek.

ἀλλὰ μὴ σύδε διαγνωγή τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι 5. 4.
ταῖς τουτάρισταις.

The particle *τε* is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into *το* or *τοῖς*, or 3) that *καὶ φρόνησι* should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4, ή πρὸς διαγνωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ φρόνησι.

οὐδὲν γάρ ἀτέλει προσῆκε τέλος.

5. 4.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. 'The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.' Yet the meaning of *τέλος* is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ἐντὸς δὲ εἰ μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβάίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δλεγόμενος γήγενος.

§§ 5–8 are a series of *diopias* which take the form of a suppressed dialogue. 1) But a child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

ὅστερ εἰ Δάκωνες ἔκεινοι γάρ οὐ μαθάνοντες ὅμοιοι δύνανται ερίνει 5. 7.
ορθῶς, ὁς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.

Cp. what Plato says of the 'timocratic man' in Rep. viii. 548 E, αἰδεῖστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ὃς δὲ ἄγα, εἴναι καὶ ὑποαμονούστερον, φιλάρμονος δέ· καὶ φιλάρμονος μάτι, βροτοκάλον δὲ οὐδαμότε.

οὐ γάρ δὲ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς φίδει καὶ τελείζει τοῖς πονηραῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βανείσους 5. 8.
απλούμεν τοῦτο τελεύτην.

In Il. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

ἔχει γάρ Ἰωνος ἔμονής τους καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχούσαν· ἔγραψε 5. 13.

δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν δμοίσμα τι.

There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of we know not what: no account can be given of it. *ταύτην*, sc. οὐ τὴν *τυχοῦσσαν*, ‘the higher pleasure;’ *ἐκείνην*, ‘the lower pleasure.’

5. 14. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτῇ οὐτε φύσις οὕτω ἔχεις ἡ ἀριστη σοῦ' ἔστιν οὐτε δοκεῖ, οὐδὲ ἡδονὴν διάκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντος πάντες. “Ισως δὲ καὶ διάκουσι οὐχ ἡν οἴονται οὐδὲ ἡν ἀν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν πάντα γάρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὄντος εἰληφομένων αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν” διὰ τὸ μόνας οὐν γνωρίμους εἶναι πάντας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι.

5. 14. οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην,

SC. ζητοῦσιν.

5. 17. ἔτι δὲ ἀκρόδιμενοι τῶν μημέσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

i. e. ‘any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.’

5. 18. παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις.

‘Near to or not far removed from their true natures.’

5. 20. συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν δμοίσμα τοῖς οὔθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γενοτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἡρέμα· σχήματα γάρ ἔστι τοιάντα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιάντης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν.

‘As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2*) are of an ethical character); but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.’

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of οὐ before πάντες: but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning

thus obtained, 'all do not participate in the sense of figure,' would be a strange statement.

ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα δμούματα τῶν ἡθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον. 5. 20.

'Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.'

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ 5. 21.
Παίστως θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Παλυγράφου καὶ εἴ τις ἀλλος τῶν
γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἔστιν ἥθιστος.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Παλύγραφος μὲν γάρ κρείττον, Παίστως δὲ
χείρος, Διανύσιος δὲ δμοίους εἴκαζεν.

ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς.

5. 21.

'But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very
expression of the feeling in music.'

καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς εἶναι.

5. 25.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted πρὸς τὴν ψύχην before εἶναι. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, 'cognatio ad animam.' Aretino's translation suggests ἡμῖν, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, ἡμῖν (or πρὸς τὴν ψύχην) being supplied from τὴν φύσιν τὴν τριλικαΐτην
or οἱ μεῖν in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92–95; Timaeus 35, 36.

ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν,

6. 6.

sc. τὸ ποιεῖν βανανόσους.

πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἥδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον.

6. 6.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Susemihl transposes χρήσεις and μαθήσεις. Goettling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (x. 9. § 20) Aristotle says that the sophist

having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word *μάθησις*, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means 'early education,' not 'mature philosophical speculation.'

6. 7. Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

6. 10. τῷ λόγῳ.

'Speech,' as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

6. 11. The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynicus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

6. 12. Ἐκφαντίδης.

A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

6. 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὁργάνων κ.τ.λ.

This, like many other sentences beginning with *ἐπεὶ*, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἀλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἴναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητεῖστέραν.

7. 1. ἡ τρίτον δεῖ τιὰ ἔτερον.

Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτον δεῖ has been suspected. *τρίτον* is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. 11. §§ 1-4).

τομικῶς.

7. 2.

'After the manner of a law,' i. e. ἐν τύπῳ explained by the words which follow.

τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀθεοντικαστικὰ τιθέντες.

7. 3.

These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,

sc. τῆς ψυχῆς or *τῶν μελῶν.

7. 3.

τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, τὸν μὲν μετάλοις, πάλιν δὲ τοῖς περὶ 7. 3.
ποιητικῆς ἔροῦμεν σαφέστερον.

This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κάθαρσιν in Poet. c. 6.

διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιάνταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλοσι θετέον τοὺς τὴν 7. 6.
θεατρικὴν μουσικὴν μεταχειρίζομένους ἀγωνιστάς.

'Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,' i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

παραχρεωσμένα.

7. 7.

παραχρέστεις are explained to mean 'deviations from the received scale in music.'

δέ δὲ τῇ πολετείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιοτὶ μόνην καταλείπει 7. 9.
μετὰ τῆς δωριοτὶ, καὶ τούτη ἀποδοκιμάσσει τὸν δρυκόν τὸν αἰλάν.

This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

καὶ δεότε φιλάξεις ἀγχειρίστας ἐν τῇ δωριοτὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς 7. 11.
μίσους.

The emendation Μίσους (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean 'to compose a dithyramb called the "Fables."' Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the

attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

7. 15. *δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅπους τρεῖς*

is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

7. 15. Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.

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